



The Cross and the Crescent in East Africa

An Examination of the Reasons
behind the Change in Christian-
Muslim Relations in Tanzania
1984-1994

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INTRODUCTION

Introduction of the Topic.

When we arrived at Makumira Theological College outside Arusha on our black and red motorbikes, wearing leather jackets, leather boots, helmets and sunglasses, we drove around the campus area in search for our contact person. We stopped, but no one was in sight. Suddenly a student came running out of one of the buildings towards us and asked with a voice as serious and hostile as if we had interrupted a funeral: “Who are you, and what are you doing here?” Surprised, but in a humble voice I explained who we were and the purpose of our visit. At once the student’s face melted into a grin and he started excusing himself: “I am very sorry that I was so rude to you, I hope you will forgive me, but we are afraid of Muslims who are trying to undermine our college.”

As the above referred story indicates, the relationship between Christians and Muslims on the coast of East Africa is somewhat tense. Tanzania which previously was known for being the “successful” African experiment, with its unity both religiously and politically, is facing harder times. The unity which the country achieved was through the creation of an “African socialism,” the so-called *ujamaa* philosophy, created to a large extent by the now legendary African President Julius K. Nyerere. His aim was to melt African tradition and Western socialism together and show that the principles of the old African traditions, the tribes taking care of one another, was the same as the basic thoughts of Western socialism. The *ujamaa* politics was officially left by the government in 1983, and Nyerere retired from presidency in 1985. An era in African politics was over, and commentators all over the world wondered what would now happen to Tanzania.

The religious conflicts in the country started to become visible around this time. Tension was experienced in the streets of Dar es Salaam where religious debates with an increasing temperature emerged. The following decade turned out to be one of increased hostility between the two religious groups, with several actions carried out by religious extremists that caused concern all over the country. The question that commentators who have followed the situation ask is this: what caused the changes in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania?

Personal Interest

Anyone who has visited Africa and has experienced the vitality of the African way of life knows how hard it is to leave the continent. Some of us also experience the longing to go back as a driving force always searching for possibilities to return to this fascinating continent. This world of smells and tastes, colourful apparition and hospitable inhabitants. Africa, with its deserts, savannas, wildlife and rainforests has created dreams and illusions among many Westerners like myself and has fooled us into a lasting relationship to what we thought was a part of paradise.

Anyone who has studied history and the topic of Western colonialism, has felt the need to shed a tear and ask for redemption when the destiny of Africa has been described. The way we have made the continent the playground of our dreams and the garbage can of our conflicts of interest is sad reading.

Anyone with interest in religious matters, and anyone pre-occupied with the thought of theology as a universal matter has had to re-evaluate his thoughts after experiencing the influence of religion in Africa. Especially Westerners who face the problems of secularism and the ignorance of transcendent matters every day, suffers a small shock when arriving in Africa. There, on the other side of the world, people do not laugh at you because you believe in a god which you can not see, on the contrary, they laugh at you if you do not believe in a spiritual reality.

A mixture of these feelings has been a part of me during my time as a student and has also resulted in three visits to different parts of Africa. The writing of this thesis gave me the opportunity to combine my interests, and to focus on the history and the religion of one particular area of Africa. The choice to focus on Islam and Christianity was partly a result of my interest in Western mission in Africa, for which Islam has turned out to be the major challenge. The worldwide Islamic resurgence, with all the prejudices and misinformation that are spread through the mass-media, also made me circle around such a problem. But most of all my interest for Islam was created through my work as a teacher at Hersleb School in Oslo where I was responsible for a class of only Muslim pupils. The conflicts that arise when two different religions meet and have to live together, is a situation that I experienced on one level during my work at the school, and on another level during my field studies in Kenya and Tanzania in the fall of 1994.

What is interesting about Tanzania is first of all that it is a country where Islam and Christianity are represented with almost an equal number of followers. It is also a country which

is known to have had a very peaceful inter-religious climate. The religious conflict is quite new in time, and has so far not been as violent as the conflicts in Sudan and Nigeria. The fact that the religious antagonism is at an early stage makes it easier to trace the reasons behind the emerging clash of interests. It also gives the hope that a more serious conflict can be avoided. Furthermore, the East African coast has a very interesting geographical location, sharing the Indian Ocean with the Middle East and the Indian continent. This makes the area a melting pot of traditions from both the African, the Arab and the Indian world.

Object and Scope

In order to reach a deeper understanding of the religious relationship in Tanzania, several questions have to be answered. When I realized that the problems emerging were of a serious character and that the religious communities were facing changes, a strong longing for understanding struck me. The questions that I sought to answer were as follows:

- Which incidents have disturbed the religious relations the last decade?
- What has happened within the Muslim and Christian communities that has led to the change?
- Which domestic political changes have led to the change?
- What influence from other countries has led to the change?

My first task will be to give a presentation of the incidents that have taken place the last decade. The second question aims at showing the changes that have occurred both within the Christian and the Muslim communities. The impression that I got early in my work was that the biggest change of attitude had appeared within the Muslim community. The presentation of the Muslims is aimed at understanding why a change has appeared among them by looking at their history and the new elements that have influenced the religious society. The new radical elements will dominate my presentation even if it has been crucial to me to show that the Muslim community contains a wide spectrum of directions. I have also tried to find common thoughts that have affected both the moderate and the radical groups, hence are the joint concern of the whole Muslim community.

The presentation of the Christian community is limited to deal with the new tendencies in the churches. The traditional views of the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Anglican churches will not be commented upon unless they have affected the relationship to the Muslims. I, however,

found the growth of the Pentecostal churches, with their influence on both the established churches and on the Christian-Muslim relationship, very interesting, and have tried to give it a deeper examination.

The third question focuses on the changing political landscape in Tanzania as a reason behind the religious conflict. Several scholars have emphasized the importance of the domestic political changes, and a presentation of three scholars holding this view, though with different perspectives, will be given. The fourth question deals with the Islamic worldwide revival and the influence of the leading Muslim countries on the situation in Tanzania.

The aim of my research developed from what I found missing in the literature I read - a deeper search for the reasons behind the change in the relationship between the two religious groups. My intention has been to write a thesis that can help us understand the Christian-Muslim relationship in Africa better. I also intended to write a thesis that could help Christians in Tanzania understand their Muslim counterpart better, since knowledge about Islam is important to avoid conflicts. This is one of the reasons why my work in certain parts is very detailed. If my work should be of any help to people in the area working with these questions, I found it necessary to give a thorough presentation of both the Muslim community and of different scholars' theories.

After my field studies in Tanzania and Kenya in the fall of 1994 certain distinctions were made. Tanzania was made the nucleus of my research because of the previous good religious relationship, the recent conflict, the special political situation and the lack of recent research from the area. But the history of the coast of Tanzania is also the history of the coast of present day Kenya, and the two countries are often referred to as "the coast of East Africa" in scholarly works. The choice to also comment upon parallels in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Kenya was made because it could help me find out whether the conflict in Tanzania was a conflict in this country alone. If Kenya, with a different political situation and with different political leaders experienced the same tendencies as Tanzania, an explanation focusing only on domestic political changes in Tanzania would be unsatisfactory. It would on the contrary indicate that what Tanzania experiences is a trend that influences a much larger area.

To concentrate my work on the last decade was a natural choice. The early 80s contained certain important incidents. The *ujamaa* philosophy was officially left by the government in 1983, Julius Nyerere withdrew from presidency in 1985 and Professor C.K. Omari wrote his first major report about the Christian-Muslim relationship in 1984. By then the relationship between

the two religious groups was still one of peace, but the political changes in Tanzania and an increased focus on pure Islamic ideas in certain parts of the Muslim community were starting to play their part. Another reason for choosing the last decade as the main period of research was that no larger written work is describing the changes that have occurred lately.

This thesis will deal with a tendency in the religious landscape, denoting people as either Christians or Muslims from a classical understanding of the two religions. The fact that the religions in Tanzania, even to a lesser extent than most other African countries, contains sectorial variations with considerable influence from traditional religions is clear to me. But I will relate my descriptions to the established religious communities which are situated in the most populated areas, and my opinion is that these communities give a fairly representative picture of the religious geography of Tanzania.

Approach and Sources

The work with my thesis at the Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology has been in the department of Missiology, Dr. Tormod Engelsen being my tutor. This is due to my work with Christians facing the challenge of another religion in an African context. My thesis does, however, more specifically belong to the discipline of History of Missions, describing the recent history of Tanzania. The thesis also touches other disciplines like History of Religions, and can thus be reckoned as a cross-disciplinary study.

I have chosen to start by giving a brief introduction of the historical development in the area from the time of Islam's arrival to the East African coast. The method used in the first chapter is an historical approach. The classical history work of Trimingham, "Islam in East Africa" has been my major source. His presentation has been supplemented and criticized by the use of August Nimtz's "Islam and Politics in East Africa" and more recent historical works. David Westerlund's "Ujamaa na dini" is giving a very good introduction to the situation that the religious communities faced under the *ujamaa* politics.

In the two major parts of my thesis, first the presentation of the changes and secondly the attempt to explain the changes, I have had to expand my use of methods. In the study of recent history, Knut Kjeldstadli claims that sociologists, social anthropologists, journalists and historians must work together to achieve a picture of the situation as nuanced as possible (Kjeldstadli 1992:97). I have followed his advice and tried to combine the different subjects. The religious development in Tanzania has so far mainly been commented upon in religious journals,

periodicals and newspapers. No major scholarly work has yet described the present trends. In my presentation I have used all the articles I could get hold of in order to get an as wide impression as possible of the events. Some of these articles are worth a closer presentation. The sociologist Dr. C.K. Omari from the University of Dar es Salaam is reckoned as the most prominent local commentator on the religious development. His informative articles from 1984/1987/1994 have been a natural frame in the description of the development the last decade. Another valuable article has been Dr. Frieder Ludwig's "After *ujamaa* - Is Religious Revivalism a Threat to Tanzania's stability?", which contains valuable information about the changes taken place within the churches. Also Sigvard von Sicard's article "Islam in Tanzania" is very interesting reading with its focus on the foreign Muslim influence in Tanzania. My presentation of the Muslim community is largely based upon articles found in Muslim periodicals and newspapers. In addition I have received some unpublished Muslim articles from Westerlund and Ludwig which were translated from Swahili.

The articles that I have found, describing the recent development, have to a small degree contained diverging views. This is due to that very little written material about the situation exists, and that the scholars often have used the same sources. In order to expand this picture I have used material from local newspapers as a supplement in describing the events taking place. Commenting upon this I am the first to state that newspapers alone can never be reliable sources in serious research. My use of newspaper material is first of all that of referring events that have taken place, as a source of information. Secondly the newspapers present a local view on the conflict, and the newspapers are often the spokesmen of certain groups of people. When a Christian newspaper claims that 500 Muslims have joined military training for a religious war, it is not only a question whether this is a fact or not, but it means that many Christians believe that 500 Muslims have joined the training. It is not always the question whether fear is adequate or not. If one group fears another group it makes them react in a certain way unless someone can explain that their fear is without reason.

Interviews have been used in order to get information from a somewhat different angle. The interviews referred to in this thesis were first of all used to confirm the written information I already had. Talking to people who have experienced the conflict also helped me catch some of the atmosphere present, and it also got me closer to the situation than any written work could ever have managed (see Kjeldstadli 1992: 185-189).

In my attempt to give an explanation of the changes in the religious situation, I have presented the theories of the sociologist C. K. Omari and the social anthropologist Kjersti Larsen. This has

been done in order to supplement the views of the theologians commenting on the situation. As a result, the questions of domestic politics, general religious trends and the question of identity have achieved a central place in the evaluation of adequate reasons behind the changes taking place. The sociologists' ability to draw conclusions from a pattern observed has been helpful in describing the changes taking place within the religious communities. The anthropologists' ability to see the changes through participating observation has enlarged my view of the complexity of reasons that are affecting the religious relationship on the personal level. By using the views of these scholars I have however tried to be critical and also point out any shortcoming in their treatment of religious matters.

One of the major problems during my work has been the lack of written material on the issue. Both my field studies and my visits to Selly Oak in Birmingham and St. Andrew's Centre in London left me with the impression that very few recent studies were available. This has in some way been an obstruction, but it has also been a motivation - giving me the feeling of doing pioneer work. My research situation has for such an ambitious work not been ideal. A two months field study left me with a lot of impressions, but without knowing either Swahili or Arabic I have obviously been separated from certain sources. The libraries at Makumira Theological College, Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology, Selly Oak Colleges and St. Andrew's Centre have however been extremely helpful and have provided me with material I never thought I would find.

This study has been a fascinating journey into the world of sciences. A journey into different theories, vital religious life and political cynicism. It has taught me that there are no easy answers, and that the answers you get are often useless- if the questions asked turn out to be wrong.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To understand the development of the religious relationship in Tanzania the last decade it is important to know the history of the East African coast. The demands and the dissatisfaction expressed by the religious groups today are to a large extent based on their interpretation of the history of Tanzania. This chapter will deal with the historical development of Islam and Christianity, from their arrival to the region to the abolition of the *ujamaa* philosophy in the early 1980s.

1.1 Pre-Colonial Times

The early history of Islam in East Africa can, according to Trimingham, be divided into three parts (Trimingham 1964:1). The first part deals with the early settlement of Muslims along the coast, from the middle of the eighth to the middle of the twelfth century, under the rule of Zanj (the Persian term for Bantu). The second period which lasted from the thirteenth century until the Portuguese were defeated around 1700 is also called the Shirazian period and is distinguished by the development of small states along the coast with a distinctive Islamic coastal culture. The decline of this culture was caused by Portuguese intervention. The last period is dominated by Omani Arabs which led to the formation of the State of Zanzibar in 1840 and the transformation of the Shirazi culture. An increasing number of Asian settlers at this time were an important economic factor and the bearers of Islamic sectarianism. In 1884 the German Karl Peters and his German East Africa Company started a new era in the history of East Africa by introducing the colonial rule.

1.1.1 Early Muslim Settlements

Archeological findings show that from an early date the coast of East Africa has been in contact with South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, India, Indonesia and even China. It was probably the search for aromatics and incense, used in perfumes, medicine and in religious ceremonies, that led traders to the African coast. Equally important was the ivory from the African elephant. Later on

gold and slaves became important merchandises. The oldest African source on East African history, the Kilwa Chronicle, tells us that a group of Arabs left the Arabian peninsula and settled in Maqdishu in the middle of the eighth century (Nimtz 1980:3). Two centuries later, according to the same chronicle, a group of Sunni refugees called the followers of Zaid¹ left the Gulf for Kilwa and found there a Muslim settler installed with a mosque and his family (Trimingham 1964:3).

These settlements are only two examples from a row of Persian-Arab waves of immigration to this part of Africa in different times. The majority of these first settlers were males. These males married local Bantu women and became Africans, though with a strong orientation towards their eastern origin. "*The link with an external civilization was very strong and they attempted to reproduce the living of South Arabian and Persian Gulf towns.*" (Trimingham 1964:10)² Out of these intermarriages developed a new culture, the Swahili or coastal culture. They also created their own language, called Kiswahili or only Swahili, which was to become the *lingua franca* of the coast and consisted of a simplified Bantu grammar and mainly Arab words. The other nucleus of this culture was their religion, the orthodox, or *Sunni*, Islam. This religion was gaining a foothold in the development of a new people, the Shirazi people in the south of Somalia (Nimtz 1980:4). Ibn Sa'id's writings from around 1250 gives us the information that all the coastal towns south of Maqdishu were under the rule of pagan Zanj. The inhabitants of these towns were mainly Africans. South of Maqdishu there is, by this time, little archeological evidence of direct Persian influence apart from a mosque on Zanzibar and a Palace on Kilwa. There are no established Islamic civilizations along the East African coast apart from Maqdishu in the middle of the thirteenth century (Trimingham 1964:6-7).

1.1.2 The Shirazi Period and the Portuguese Invention

The Shirazi culture developed a strong base in the north of the East African coast. But changing trade and tribal movements led to greater Shirazian influence further south on the islands of Kilwa, Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia. Also the town states of Mombasa and Malindi which always kept a strong Bantuization, was later on forced to be under Shirazi rule. The first important Shirazi settlement was on the island of Kilwa. This island was probably bought by cloth, suggesting a link between trade and early settlements. The main reason for Kilwa's prosperity

¹Zaid ibn Ali ibn al-Husain was the Prophet's grandson.

²Lapidus 1985 claims that older scholars put too much emphasis on the Persian-Arab influence of the Swahili culture. "More recent scholarship stresses indigenous African basis of the Swahili culture." p.529

was the exclusive gold trade, which the island controlled. The leader of Kilwa, Al-Hawan, is the first leader known to have gone on a pilgrimage (1331). He is also known to have frequently raided the pagan Zanj, calling these raids *jihad* (Holt 1970B:382-83). These coast states were self-governing and most of the time independent. Kilwa's expansion was more like a sphere of influence than direct control. Most coastal towns had a chief. This chief was often an Immigrant Arab or Persian without involvement in clan rivalries. But the traditional system of local government was never eliminated. The ruler was always limited by the council of lineage heads, the *wazee*, which represented the different clans (Trimingham 1964:12-14).

During the fifteenth century Mombasa succeeded Kilwa as the most important state. Both of these dynasties were dominated by Shirazi culture with a strong Islamic influence. Through these important harbours merchandises, but also culture and religion spread to other coastal towns. This was when Islam for the first time was widely spread along the coast of East Africa (Nimtz 1980:4). *"When visited by Vasco da Gama in 1498 the coastal and islands towns... were dominated by a privileged class of Muslims living easy lives surrounded by slaves."* (Trimingham 1964:18)

When the Portuguese explorers arrived at the East African coast they first established friendly relations with Malindi. The Malindi ruler needed allies to go against the Sheikh of Mombasa and welcomed the Portuguese. In 1505 they together invaded Kilwa and burnt Mombasa. By 1530 they controlled the whole East African coast. The Portuguese had ambiguous intentions with their involvement in the Indian Ocean. When da Gama arrived in Calicut and was asked what he sought he is said to have answered; "Christians and spices." The Portuguese viceroy of the Indies wrote home of his plan to capture Malacca in 1511:

The first aim is the great service which we shall perform to our Lord...quenching the fire of the sect of Muhammed...And the other is the service we shall render to the king...in taking this city, because it is the source of all the spiceries and drugs...For I hold it certain that if we take this trade of Malacca away from them, Cairo and Mecca will be entirely ruined. (Greaves 1990:411)

The impact of Christianity delivered to the surroundings by the Portuguese was very low. Apart from churches built for their own needs, Christianity wasn't spread among the coastal people and no mission was left when the Portuguese were defeated.

The prosperity of the coastal states declined during the years of Portuguese dominion, and by this also the spread of Islam. The Shirazi towns depended upon the trade, and during these years Shirazi families migrated and established new towns on the coast without the earlier success. The Portuguese were few in numbers and only possessed a limited control of the area. But the decline of the coastal towns was to a large extent caused by the active warriors of African tribes from the hinterland. The Shirazi towns were squeezed between pressure from both land and sea (Nimtz 1980:4). The Zimba tribe in 1587 massacred the people of Kilwa, and the town never recovered from this slaughter. Mombasa was the Portuguese strongest point of resistance and after having defeated the Zimba they built the famous Fort Jesus as their headquarter on the island in 1592 (Trimingham 1964:19-20).

1.1.3 The Omani Arabs

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Omani Arabs entered the scene and became the most influential force in the area. Through alliances with Pemba and Zanzibar they rebelled against the Portuguese. Later on Pate asked for help, and Fort Jesus was besieged in 1660. The war on Mombasa lasted until 1698 when the Portuguese had to flee the area. But despite the Omani's apparent supremacy internal power struggles delayed the full control over the area another century. In the meantime the previous ties between the Swahilis and the Arab-Persian world had their renaissance. This time the South Arabian Arabs, the so-called Hadramawt, and the Omani Arabs were the ones with most influence on the Swahili coast culture. From these areas a new wave of immigrants left for the East African coast. The Hadramawts, being Sunni Muslims exceeded the Omanis in influence on the coastal culture, the latter belonging to the Abadiyya sect (Nimtz 1980:5). The Shirazi people, being scattered and minimized by war and famine, now had the time to recover. Deserted settlements were inhabited by Shirazis from other places.

The leadership of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan, renewed the influence of the Omani Arabs. In 1836 the Omanis gained permanent control over Mombasa, and in 1840 he transferred his court to Zanzibar. This time the Omanis had more influence over the coast with agents as "tax-collectors" in all major cities. The golden area of slave trade made Zanzibar the most important port on the coast trading with slaves, ivory, cloves and gum-copal. Zanzibar was reckoned an autonomus state until the establishment of the British protectorate in 1890. This economic revival of the coast benefitted the Swahili culture as well as the spread of Islam through the increasing numbers of trading caravans into the interior (Trimingham 1964:21-23). The origin of

these caravans is a mystery in the history of East Africa. Nimtz seems to give credit to the inland people, being more active in trade with the coast (1980:6), while Trimingham seems to presume that the Arabs took the initiative to this trade (1964:23).

There were three major trade routes into the interior of the country. The southern route connected the towns of Kilwa and Lindi with the Lake Malawi area and the areas further west. The main route connected Zanzibar with the coastal towns Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam and continued into the Manyema region (present day Zaire) and Buganda. On this route Ujiji and Tabora were the major towns in the interior. The northern route connected the towns of Mombasa and Tanga with the Kilimanjaro region, the Mount Kenya region and Lake Victoria (Nimtz 1980:6). The Arab-Swahilis' main purpose for these caravan routes was not slave raiding expeditions. Their main goal was the buy slaves and ivory for later exportation. The Sultan's authority was limited to the coast, so the trade depended upon cooperation with the inland tribes. Large plantations were created along the coast by the Sultan, and this led to peaceful conditions with the tribes in the surroundings. Arab traders also built small trading centres and settled along the routes. But most of all it was the authority and the advantages that local chiefs on the trade route received from the Arabs that led to the expansion of Islam. These chiefs often took Muslim names and adopted a nominal Islam (Trimingham 1964:24). The early Islamization process along the trade routes followed to a large extent the same pattern as the Islamization of the coast, i.e. peaceful, gradual conversion.

1.2 The Colonial Period

In 1884, Karl Peters formed a German colonization society in what was to become German East Africa. This company started making treaties with Arab rulers in an attempt to involve Bismarck in the race for the colonies. In 1887 the company was registered as the German East Africa Company and was given the authority from the German state to exploit new areas (Rasmussen 1993:21). The Industrial and the Agricultural Revolution in Europe and North America had created needs for raw materials and commodities, and this also acted as a stimuli for the Christian Missionary Movements (Katoke 1994:4).

1.2.1 The Colonial Rule in German East Africa

When Karl Peters arrived East Africa he was met by Christian missionaries. The Lutheran J. L. Krapf, a German sent out by the Anglican Church Missionary Society in London (CMS), left

Europe for Zanzibar in 1844. There he was heartily welcomed by the Sultan Sayyid Sa'id. In 1846 he was joined by J. Rebman. It was first and foremost the journeys of David Livingstone that started the missionary invasion of East Africa. His attacks on the slave trade and his thoughts about Christianity and commerce gained influence in important circles in the church and among economists (Westerlund 1980:49-50). The first CMS station was opened in 1876 in Mpwapa with the permission from the Sultan of Zanzibar. Several missions followed. Most of them started out in Zanzibar, but soon realized that the Muslim majority along the coast was hard to convert and that the climate and the Malaria made their work impossible. However, the missionaries moved to the interior where the climate was less humid and where people were more open to their preaching (Jasper 1994).

It may sound like a contradiction, but after the introduction of the German colonial power, Islam spread rapidly into the interior. The reasons behind this are various. The Germans tended to think that the culture of the coast, the Swahili culture, was superior to the rest of the area. Young literate men, *akida*, were hired in low-level administrative posts all over the country, and Swahili was made the language of the administration. Also in government schools, built to educate local government employees, the language was Swahili and the teachers were largely Muslims. To bring down various uprisings the Germans had to recruit African troops, most of these were Sudanese Muslims that stayed in the area employed as policemen or labourers. A government survey of the state of Islam in 1912 concluded that an overwhelming majority of the employees of district governments were Muslims, even as far upcountry as Arusha. This led among others the missionaries to accuse the German government of supporting the spread of Islam (Nimtz 1980:12).

The missionaries came to Africa to convert people into a personal Christian belief. In terms of numerical strength they did not succeed their first decades of presence. Medical work and education were very important parts of their work, and the schools were where the majority of converts met this new religion. Most of the converts were freed slaves who sought protection in the missions where they lived very regulated lives. The Arabs felt their dominion over the slave trade threatened, and several missions were attacked. One of the reasons why so few natives converted to Christianity was the pressure by the missionaries to abandon their traditional life and beliefs in for example the ancestral spirits. This belief was an important part of the clan society, and made the new Christians not only face a religious, but also a serious social conflict. Christianity was also clearly identified with the colonial rule at this stage.

Another conflict was between the missionaries in the interior and the German colonial rule concerning the use of the Swahili language in education and local government. The missionaries

felt that Swahili was too closely connected with Islam and the Arab vocabulary, and preferred to use local tribe languages (Westerlund 1980:49-50). But the conflict was also about the content of the education. The missionaries central aim was to educate Africans into reading the Bible and become personal believers, whereas the German educational system aimed at educating civil servants (Rasmussen 1993:32).

The spread of Islam in this period was to a large extent dependent upon the spread of Sufi orders. The Shadhililya established missionary centers along the coast and taught a new Islamic practice and established brotherhoods. The Uwaysiya were active among Swahili and Bantu speaking tribes and they were the leading anti-German rebels in the south (Lapidus 1989:865). Throughout their reign the Germans had to fight Muslim upheavals. By far the most important was the Maji-Maji uprising 1905-07. This was a genuine African upheaval, where Africans of diverse ethnicity joined together against colonial rule, but also against the economic imperialism of the Indians and the Arab traders. The concept of the upheaval was based on traditional religion³, but the teachers of Islam were active and some Islam teaching was involved (Rasmussen 1993:22). The uprising was turned down, but in the years to come Islam experienced a certain growth. The reasons for this is somewhat vague, but the failure of the traditional religion may have led to a vacuum that was filled by Islam. This serious rebellion together with Islams continued growth made the German gradually change their approach to the Muslims. From 1891 until 1912 the Germans did not officially have a positive or negative attitude towards the spread of Islam. But a sharp change is to be seen around 1912. Their now rather hostile attitude is best to be exemplified by their attempt to make the Africans breed pigs. The simple philosophy behind this was that when the Africans had developed a taste for pork meat⁴, they would be less eager to become Muslims.

This new German policy would probably have lasted if it was not for the outbreak of World War I. One of the German allies in this war was Turkey, the centre of the Muslim world. The Germans tried to make the Muslims in East Africa their allies against the British and the French. The Sultan in Constantinopel, the leader of all Muslims, declared in 1914 holy war against the allied forces and encouraged Muslims everywhere to join the Central Powers. So from the outbreak of the war and until they were defeated by the British, the Germans pursued a pro-Islamic policy (Nimtz 1980:13).

³*Maji* means water or medicine.

⁴ Pork meat is forbidden according to Islamic dietary laws.

The First World War was close to a disaster for the missions in the area. In the outbreak of the war all the British and French missionaries were deported and left their mission stations. On the local churches this had a dual effect. The weak churches disappeared, and left the area open for traditional religion and Islam. The stronger churches, however, had to take care of themselves and gained internal strength by this sudden independence. The example given by the Europeans can hardly have been a testimony of the message of the Bible.

1.2.2 The British Colonial Rule in Tanganyika

The first period of British rule (1916-24) was for the British more a holding action than a direct influence over the area (which they renamed Tanganyika). It is in this period Islam achieved its greatest numerical growth. Before the war it is estimated that the Muslims represented 3 percent of the population in Tanganyika. By 1924 the estimation was 25 percent. Different from the first period of the expansion of Islam, this second wave was mainly caused by African Muslims who had converted during the earlier periods. Many Arab and Swahili *walimu*, Koranic teachers, were replaced by Africans. The impact of the Sufi brotherhoods was strong among African Muslims and their teaching was to a larger extent than orthodox Islam adaptable to African beliefs (Nimtz 1980:63f). The War along with the coming of a new colonial power created an uncertain religious atmosphere. In addition to this, Tanganyika experienced in the following years several epidemics and famine. Nimtz argues that Islam during these crises played a crucial role for many Africans. While Trimingham (1964:27) claims that the peace and stability of the colonial rule led to the expansion of Islam, Nimtz states "*...Islam's major expansion occurred not during tranquil times but, to the contrary, during periods of upheaval and crisis.*" (Nimtz 1980:15)⁵.

The British introduced a new system of government in Tanganyika. Based on experiences in other African countries they opted for indirect rule in local government. This meant that the traditional ruling system gained more power on behalf of the Muslim tax-collectors. English speaking natives were preferred, and where the Swahilis once had dominated under the German rule, a new group of people, often educated by English missions, were to receive the most influential jobs in local government.

The missions faced large difficulties in the period previous to the First World War. But 1923-35 was the glorious period of mission influence in Tanganyika, and that was largely due to their emphasis on education. The conflict between the missions and the colonial rule continued, but

not to the same extent as under the German rule. The German problem was that the missions did not educate Africans for jobs in the government, because they had their own secular Swahili education. The British rule took more direct control and made the missions cooperate on a higher standard of education in the elementary schools and focused on higher education. The strategy of the missions was to gather the Christians in villages to provide the converts with an environment different from their earlier surroundings. The missions were often afraid of government interference, their teaching emphasizing spiritual matters, but an agreement on education was reached in 1925. While the Western influence and emphasis on education benefitted the Christians, the Muslims stuck to their traditional education, which was mainly religious (Rasmussen 1993:32-33).

During World War II, German missionaries were again departed, and the situation from 1919 appeared once more. This time, however, Swedish and American missions took over the administrative responsibility for the churches left by the Germans. Also this period strengthened the independent African churches. The inter-war period led the Protestant missions to a closer ecumenical cooperation. This was largely due to the spread of Swahili as a common language, making it possible to create common liturgies (Rasmussen 1993:33-35).

The process towards independence was partly started by the establishment of Tanganyika African Association, TAA, 1929. Their target was to do away with all tribal, sectarian, political, educational, cultural, territorial, and other differences to promote a solid brotherhood of Africans. TAA was mainly supported by Muslims. In 1955, a new organization, Tanganyika African National Union, TANU, was formed as the continuity of TAA. It was an organization that focused on unity, against tribalism and religious differences, and the primary task for TANU was to win independence. According to Westerlund (1980:81f) the Muslims were more eager to join TANU than the Christians. Also the brotherhoods supported TANU, and their support was very important in the struggle for independence. But not all Muslims supported TANU. In 1957 AMNUT, All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika, an organization largely consistent of Arabs was formed. To them the matter of education played a major role. They were afraid of the secular school system supported by TANU and wanted a more orthodox religious education. They also wanted to postpone independence until the Muslims had reached the same educational level as the Christians. The socialistic politics of TANU affected the Shia Muslims who mainly were Asian businessmen. Their interest group, the East African Muslim Welfare

⁵Lapidus supports Nimitz` theory (Lapidus 1989:864).

Society, EAMWS, gradually took over the role of AMNUT. Apart from their economic interest, the question of education was also crucial to them. They wanted separate Muslim schools (Westerlund 1980:81-99).

In the early days of TANU, most Christians were reluctant to join the organization. There were several reasons for this. One was that civil servants were forbidden by law to join political activities and few would give up their jobs to join TANU. The strong anti-colonial attitude of TANU affected the often more pro-western, mission-educated Christians. The British Government tried to forbid their teachers from joining the organization, but most of the churches stood against this pressure, they feared a total Muslim dominance in TANU. Not all Christians were opposed to TANU. Christian teachers like Nyerere, who soon became the leader of the organization, supported TANU from the beginning. Christian churches also took part in the criticism of the colonial rule (Westerlund 1980:108-9).

1.2.3 The British Colonial Rule in Kenya

Kenya, unlike Tanzania, did not develop as an African society. Kenya became more of a white settler society. The trade routes from Mombasa towards the inland were disturbed by hostile war-tribes like the Masai and the Somali (Trimingham 1964:29). The Swahili inhabitants along the coast had always had strong relations with Zanzibar and the rest of the coastal towns further south. These ties were gradually made weaker by the colonial power. In 1888 Kenya was acquired by the British East Africa Company and made a separate protectorate in 1904. In 1918 it was declared a crown colony. Early in this century the country was organized for European settlement, and whites from all over the British Empire came to Kenya and settled in the highland territories. The natives who lived in these areas were forced into native reserves. The best land and the mineral resources were reserved for white exploitation. The white settlers also had the access to educational, medical and economical services.

But from the British missions and from the military service emerged a small educated black elite that formed the East African Association and the Kenya African Union. The leader of the latter was Jomo Kenyatta. These organizations demanded better education for Africans and access to land. The Mau Mau revolt broke out in 1952 with black guerillas fighting the white colonialists. This African opposition led to better conditions for the natives and in 1963 they won independence. The leading party was the Kenyan African Union Party and the first President was Jomo Kenyatta.

The Muslim population in Kenya was much smaller than its Tanzanian counterpart. Therefore the Muslims in Kenya never had the same influence on the development of the country as the Muslims in Tanzania. The Muslim communities were spread around the country, and even along the coast the Muslim Swahili society soon was outnumbered by people from the interior (Lapidus 1989:869).

1.3 Post-Independence

After many years of struggle with TANU in the frontline, Tanganyika gained independence in 1961. Zanzibar was dominated by an Arab elite that won both the 1961 and 1963 elections. This regime was overthrown immediately after independence in December 1963 by African revolutionaries who confiscated and nationalized Arab land, and in 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar together formed the republic of Tanzania (Lapidus 1989:866).

1.3.1 The Ujamaa Politics

The *ujamaa*⁶ is an ideology and a political system gradually developed by TANU. Julius K. Nyerere who was elected the first leader of the organization had an enormous influence on the development of the *ujamaa* politics. The main aim for TANU in their early days was to achieve *uhuru*, independence. After independence was gained 1961 the long road towards Africanizing and remodelling the country began. The ideology of *ujamaa* was somewhat vague before 1967. The political theorist in TANU, Nyerere, stated that *ujamaa* was "*...to receive the traditional egalitarian way of life which had been violated because of colonialism.*" (Westerlund 1980:25). The *ujamaa* presented by TANU was an ideology of contradictions. The traditional way of life was to be revived, at the same time nation building was the main goal. *Ujamaa* was described as a socialist ideology (though not a Marxist socialism), but it was claimed to be a genuine African ideology. TANU leaders said that Tanzanians did not have to be taught *ujamaa*, because *ujamaa* was for the Tanzanians the natural way of life.

According to Nyerere, the one-party system was more in accordance with African thinking than a Western multi-party system. He also claimed that the democratic principles were taken better care of in one party, identified with the nation as a whole, than in several parties

⁶The word "ujamaa" can be translated "familyhood" or be referred to as "the socialism of TANU" (Westerlund 1980:14).

representing only some sections of the community. Nyerere's thoughts gained support and in 1965 TANU was established as the single political party in Tanzania.

When the famous Arusha declaration was presented in 1967, the content of the governments *ujamaa* politics became more explicit. Capitalism was now the main enemy and nationalization was the new line of politics. Agricultural and rural development along with self-reliance was emphasized. No political leaders were allowed to hold shares in any company and they were not allowed to receive two or more salaries. The Arusha declaration represented a more radical socialist policy. The following years Asians in increasing numbers left the country along with valuable means, frightened of the nationalization of property (Westerlund 1980:25-28).

Maybe the most radical part of the Arusha declaration concerned life on the countryside. Nyerere's idea was to establish *ujamaa* villages where common facilities like schools, hospitals and shops along with common production should be the mainstay of Tanzanian society. Private property should however be allowed, and private gardens in addition to common soil were to be available. Traditionally people lived scattered on the countryside and the intention was that none should be forced to move. The government hoped that these villages would develop into socialist communities. In 1973, however, when only 15 percent of the population lived in villages, the government decided that it was no longer voluntary to live in *ujamaa* villages. This forced "villagization" led to incredible economic costs for the government and caused many villages to be established within hopeless ecological conditions. Another problem was that of leadership, the leaders attitude towards the idea of *ujamaa* was often sceptical. (Westerlund 1980:28-29)⁷.

1.3.2 The Christians and *Ujamaa*

As already mentioned the Christians were somewhat more reluctant to join TANU than the Muslims. After independence the Christian scepticism continued. One of the major concern in the churches, and especially in the Roman Catholic church, was the fear of communism. The right to private property was regarded a divine right, and they also feared an atheistic state. At this stadium the *ujamaa* was a rather vague ideology, and the churches, which were the holders of considerable properties and were involved in commerce, feared a state after a Eastern European pattern. The churches also had strong links to their sister-churches in the West.

⁷While Westerlund gives a rather negative picture of the situation in the villages, Rasmussen (1993:80) leaves us with a somewhat more positive presentation of life in the *ujamaa* villages.

TANU's ideal of self-reliance was distant, if ever wanted in the churches. The most extreme example is the Catholic church which in 1969 only had 20 percent of its budget locally funded (Westerlund 1980:111-16).

Another major issue among the churches was the question of education. By the time of independence, 70 percent of the schools were sponsored by the church. The strong Sunni Muslim domination in TANU put strong pressure to prohibit teachers from involving in politics. This shows some of the tension between the well educated church leaders and the less educated Muslims in TANU. Despite assurances from TANU leaders that the churches did not have to fear for their influence over own schools, the nationalization of schools was announced 1969. To many church leaders this came as a shock. For them the schools were still important places of converting people. All teachers were from now on government employees and the teaching of religion became subordinated to political teaching. The nationalization of schools was a part of the governments equality program, and intended or not, the integration of pupils from various parts of the society into the earlier Christian schools made it easier to make Christians take active part in the building of *ujamaa* (Westerlund 1980:118-22).

The major change in the Christian attitude towards *ujamaa* appeared after the Arusha declaration. This declaration was politically a step further left, a direction the churches earlier had feared. The reasons for the change of attitude must therefore to a large extent have occurred within the churches themselves. President Nyerere, himself a devoted Catholic, had several times urged the church to "play their part" in the building of *ujamaa*. The gradual Africanization of the church led more pastors to take part in the development of the country. For them an important part of the gospel was to help the poor and the oppressed. A bishops' statement from the Catholic church in favour of the Arusha declaration referred to Acts 4:32 and gave biblical argumentation for *ujamaa*. This radical change of attitude in the Roman Catholic church must also be seen on the background of Vatican II. *Gaudium et Spes* (1965) focused on solidarity and *Populorum Progresio* (1967) criticized liberal capitalism. Although this new positive approach, it was crucial for the church to stress that what it supported was *ujamaa*, not socialism (Westerlund 1980:124).

The Christian top organizations gradually became close in cooperating with the *ujamaa* government. This also led to cooperation with Muslim organizations that had supported the government all along. One of *ujamaa*'s main intentions was to put aside religious differences. The villagization process stimulated this process. Christians and Muslims lived side by side in the villages and the relationship improved gradually. The Catholic church even urged its members to emphasize that Christians and Muslims believed in the same god (Westerlund

1980:129). The success of *ujamaa* in terms of religious tolerance is also stressed by Rasmussen (1993:81).

1.3.3 The Muslims and *Ujamaa*

The Sunni Muslims in Tanzania were more or less united in the support of TANU. They claimed that *ujamaa* could easily be identified as a part of Islam, and the principle of self-reliance fit the Sunni Muslim society⁸. The African Muslims also saw the nation building as a means of improving their own situation. Nyerere was very popular among the Muslims and held them out as examples for the Christians because of their efforts to support the government's *ujamaa* policy. He also gave credit to the Muslims for relating their religion to this life, and not as the Christians focusing on the hereafter. Westerlund uses Mazrui's studies on the interrelationship between Islam and socialism to support Nyerere, stating that Islam is more "secular", more "materialist" than Christianity (Westerlund 1980:89).

But not all Muslims joined the mainstream Sunni support of *ujamaa*. Whereas the Sunnis sought improvements through *ujamaa*, the Shia Muslims worked for transnational, pan-Islamic unity through EAMWS. The leadership of this organization was held by Asian Shia Muslims, mainly Ismailis with Aga Kahn as their founder. Their work was clearly in opposition to TANU's nation building program. When the one-party system was developed 1965, EAMWS was not declared illegal because it was reckoned a religious organization. The Muslims, unused to making distinctions between religion and politics, faced a conflict with two inconsistent factions. In a regional conference in Bukoba it was stated by the pro-TANU faction that only supporters of the party could be the leaders of Tanzanias Muslims. Gradually more regions pulled out of EAMWS, in what was a struggle between non-African Shia Muslims and national oriented Muslims. The Islamic Crisis of 1968 was a fact when the government declared EAMWS unlawful. Another organization, the Supreme Council of Tanzanian Muslims, BAKWATA, was established with very close ties to TANU. By the opposition it was called a branch of TANU. The purpose of this organization was to support Muslims in matters of religion, education, socially and economically. By the Shia Muslims BAKWATA was looked upon as an organization mainly for African inland Muslims, and without the Shia support BAKWATA suffered from lack of economic means, despite its close relation to TANU. At this

⁸The Muslims in Tanzania received aid from several Arab countries, like scholarships for African students at the al-Azhar university in Egypt (Westerlund 1980:87), but their degree of self-reliance was high compared with the Christian churches.

time the struggle for political independence and the struggle to "Africanize" Islam walked hand in hand in Tanzania (Rasmussen 1993:58).

1.3.4 Civil Religion Under *Ujamaa*

The concept of civil religion aims at creating a common faith as opposed to any particular religion. Civil religion provides meaning, social solidarity and to a certain degree, political union for the nation (Linder 1975:401⁹). Gleason focuses more on the achievement of national unity as one of civil religions principal functions (Gleason 1977:526¹⁰).

Julius Nyerere explained in an article called "Socialism is Secular" the relationship between the *ujamaa* philosophy and religion. In this article he says that society has nothing to do with things that are entirely personal. A man's relationship with God is a personal matter. Socialism is not interested in a man's soul or whether he believes in a life after death. Socialism is according to Nyerere secular and has nothing to say about whether there is a God. He therefore concluded that there was nothing incompatible between socialism, Christianity or Islam (Westerlund 1980:64). David Westerlund calls this an attempt to *compartmentalize* religion, i.e. reduce it to metaphysical matters and give it an area of autonomy where society will not interfere. Socialism will, on the other hand take care of all earthly matters.

Nyerere himself must have known that religion is not simply a personal matter, there is always a social aspect to religion¹¹. In a country with several religions of some size present, the social aspect of religion is always a sphere of conflict. Nyerere's thought was hence that *ujamaa* had to have increased importance at the expense of religion. Under the primacy of *ujamaa*, religion was subordinated. But Nyerere did not consequently treat religion as an entirely personal matter. When he asked the Christians to "play their part" in the process of building a social society, he used religion as a motivation (Westerlund 1980:64-65).

The most obvious examples of civil religion expressed in Tanzania public life is the national anthem.

God bless Africa Bless its leaders.

Let Wisdom Unity and Peace be the shield of

Africa and its people.

⁹In Westerlund 1980:66

¹⁰In Westerlund 1980:66

*Bless Africa Bless Africa
Bless the children of Africa.*

*God Bless Tanzania Grant eternal Freedom and Unity
to its sons and daughters.
God Bless Tanzania and its people.*(in Westerlund 1980:68)

The national anthem was prayed every morning and evening on the national radio, and was used on official occasions, national holidays and on more or less important occasions. But also the Parliamentary Prayer, held in the beginning of each Parliamentary session, contains strong evidences of civil religion;

Almighty God, merciful and full of splendour, Lord of all creatures, Creator of heaven and earth, we humbly beseech Thee that our country, The United Republic of Tanzania, be under Your eternal guidance and protection. Bless our dear Tanzania to be a peaceful country so that all people living in it may have unity and charity towards one another...(in Westerlund 1980:68)

In both the national anthem and in the Parliamentary Prayer, *Mungu*, God, is the central character, and nationalism is mixed with religious elements in a way acceptable to both Muslims and Christians. An attenuated religion was in this way used to foster national unity, a religion free of dividing elements like prophet Muhammed and the divine Jesus. The documents of TANU were not religious but contained several similarities, the document where the *ujamaa* principles are laid down is called the TANU-creed, and it consists of expressions like "TANU believes..." etc. An editorial in Daily News¹² wrote that to be a member of TANU;

...is to accept the spirit and the letter of Tanu's ideology, much in the same way as to be a Christian or a Muslim is to accept the teachings of Christ or Mohamed the Prophet.(Westerlund 1980:69)

An important aspect of civil religion was the prayers said in political meetings. Apart from the Parliamentary Prayer there were several other prayers and at political meetings people were

¹¹As long as a person follows an established religion and does not create his own religion in isolation.

reminded to pray for Africa. The prayers were also important on public holidays which were divided equally between Muslim, Christian and national holidays. Nyerere himself seldom mentioned the name of Jesus or other aspects of Christianity, so as to maintain his good relationship to Muslims. His religious statements as a politician were safely within the limits of TANU's civil religion where politics were emphasized and religious aspects had second priority (see Westerlund 1980:67-71).

1.4 Summary

The early history of East Africa is the history of Muslim immigrants coming from South Arabia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian sub-continent. Most of the settlers were single males who married Bantu women and created the Swahili culture. Important elements in this culture was the religion, Islam, and the language, Kiswahili. The Portuguese conquered Mombasa at the end of the 16th century. They did not, however, carry out much influence on their surroundings, and were soon beaten by the Omani Arabs. It was another two hundred years of peaceful Islamic expansion before the first white missionaries settled in the area around 1850. This was followed by colonial rule for one hundred years. Under German colonial rule Islam spread rapidly into the interior of Tanganyika because of the colonial power's use of Swahili civil servants. Also the Sufi orders played an important part in Islam's rapid spread. Christianity also gained a foothold in the region under German colonial rule, but the First World War was close to a disaster for the European missions. The British took the German position after the war. The British emphasis on education in their missions led to the glorious period of mission influence from 1923-35 when Africans in increasing numbers received the Gospel.

The process towards independence was led by TANU who sought *uhuru*, independence. TANU was mainly supported by Muslims since the Christians through their contact with the missions were more pro-Western. But gradually the Christians joined TANU and Julius Nyerere was elected the first President of Tanzania, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. He created the *ujamaa* philosophy, which focused on the unity of the country. Religious differences were put aside and a civil religion, with emphasis on the common features of Islam and Christianity, was promoted by the government.

¹²Daily News is a government newspaper and was earlier known to be the voice of the government.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT 1984-1994

The religious geography of the coast of East Africa exhibits many interesting aspects. The gradual change from an area where the traditional religions once were dominant, to a multi-religious society with the establishing of two new religions has in many aspects left its marks. The traditional religions were local religions with no wish to convert other tribes with a different religion. The two new religions, however, were universal religions with the objectives to convert the whole world to their special belief. This led to competition between the two religions - the race for the soul of Africa. A short historical outline was presented in the previous chapter. This second chapter will deal with the new directions in the religious relationship and focus on what has happened in Tanzania after the *ujamaa* politics was abolished. During the *ujamaa* period the relationship between Christians and Muslims was one of peace and tranquility, even if the two religious societies had somewhat different approaches to the development of the country. The last decade, however, certain elements have sown the seeds of discontent between the two religious communities in Tanzania. This has also been the situation on the coast of Kenya and parallels from the religious relationship there will be referred to.

The forthcoming chapter will try to present the events that have occurred, refer from the debate, and mention some of the results that the change has led to. A further presentation and evaluation of the different Christian and Muslim groups will not be carried out here, but will be dealt with in the next chapter.

2.1 The Religious Geography of Tanzania

C.K. Omari¹³ wrote in 1984 an article about the socio-political dimension of the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania. The first thing the article comments on is the use of the statistics concerning religious adherence. At first sight, statistics may seem like an unimportant matter, but the contrary is reality. Statistics are used for different purposes, and to Muslims they are more important than to Christians. Some Muslims tend to believe that physical force

¹³C.K. Omari is professor of Sociology at the University of Dar es Salaam and one of Tanzania's leading commentators on the religious situation.

constitutes the basis of the state. This idea is based in the Islamic tradition that once the Muslims are in the majority, they are entitled to create an Islamic state. The National Census from 1967 concludes that Tanzania Mainland consists of 37% Traditional Believers, 32% Christians and 30% Muslims. In the 1978 census there was no question concerning religion and ethnicity. For convenience rather than to give a true picture, the official numbers were that each of the religious groups held 30% (Omari 1984:2-5). These numbers were given for political reasons so that no group could claim to have the majority. The statistics were simply an attempt to maintain the peace. However, the opposite was the result. The situation today is that each group use their own statistics, and base their demands on these unofficial statistics.

Omari attacks Ali M. Kettani who presents a statistic which, according to himself, is built on the official 1978 census. He claims that the Muslim population is 55%. Omari calls this "*misleading if not false*" (Omari 1984:2), and argues that the census did not have any question about religion or ethnicity. He continues his argumentation trying to show that Kettani's numbers cannot be true by pointing to the fact that Muslims live in the less developed parts of Tanzania, and in these parts the fertility rates are low. Also Dar es Salaam have low fertility rates, and this area is predominantly Muslim. On the basis of the 1967 census compared with the fertility rates, Omari finds it impossible that Islam should have increased from 30 to 55% in 12 years.

J. Haafkens presented on a conference in 1991 different statistics from Tanzania. Statistics from the Islamic Foundation (1976) gives the Muslims a 65% majority. The numbers from CHEAM¹⁴ showed that the percentage of Muslims was 32. The World Christian Encyclopædia¹⁵ gives these numbers from 1980: Christians 44% and Muslims 32,5% (Haafkens 1991:Appendix). Omari supports the numbers of Barrett in the Encyclopædia with the explanation that the numbers from the Christians are more reliable than the Muslim numbers due to the tradition in the churches to always keep complete lists of its attenders each sunday. The main reasons for these lists are budgetary and to keep the record of church-growth. The Muslim numbers have on the local level tended to include all those with Muslim names, and several Christians and Traditional Believers have Muslim names (Omari 1984:5).

The representation in government in 1984 shows a small Christian majority, but Omari explains this with the educational background of the candidates, traditionally Christians have had easier access to education than Muslims. The candidates were chosen because of their abilities and not because of their religion. Christians and Muslims cooperated in politics like they did in

¹⁴A map of the Muslim world produced by the Centre for Advanced Studies on Modern Asia and Africa (CHEAM), Paris 1984.

¹⁵Edited by David B. Barrett, Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1982.

the rest of the society. Omari's conclusion on his article emphasizes the good relations between the two religions, and their common aim to build "*a nation of unity and equality where all religions are respected and have freedom.*" (Omari 1984:18).

2.2 Towards Changes

Julius Nyerere, after more than twenty years as the President of Tanzania, retired from his office in 1985. In his retireing-speech he warned his fellow countrymen that the risk of a religious conflict in Tanzania was larger than the risk of ethnical conflicts (Westerlund 1994:147). The politics created by Nyerere and his party CCM¹⁶, had always stressed religious tolerance and cooperation, but Nyerere saw the emergence of a conflict and used his last possibility as President to warn people about the conflict and urged them to promote understanding. Nyerere was succeeded by the Muslim Ali Hassan Mwinyi from Zanzibar. Several Muslims saw in this an opportunity to strengthen the influence of Islam in society through a Muslim President and also a Muslim Vice-President. Some Christians feared this, and were suspicious of the new President. But Mwinyi continued the Nyerere line and underlined the need of a strong secular state (Rasmussen 1993:100).

In 1987 signs of the emerging conflict became visible when BAKWATA¹⁷ organized a nation-wide tour where well-learned Muslim leaders spread their message of "comparative religion." This tour led to a series of discussions and arguing between the Imams and "born-again" Christians concerning biblical and doctrinal issues. The Christian participants were not well prepared and did not leave a good impression on the public. The antagonism reached a climax in May 1987 when both former President Nyerere and the present, Mwinyi, saw it necessary to come out in strong defence of the freedom of religious belief as stated in the constitution of the republic (Ludwig 1994:2). The same year BAKWATA asked the government to reestablish the Islamic courts that existed in colonial and pre-colonial times. This shows a change of attitude within BAKWATA, and this change might be a result of the massive criticism that the organization had received from other Muslims who blamed BAKWATA for not doing enough for the Muslim community. It is also possible that the increased genuine Islamic profile came as a result of the internationalization of the organization. Certain Arab countries contributed economically to the building of schools and mosques, sponsored scholarships and

¹⁶In 1977 TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party, ASP, the two ruling parties on the Tanzania mainland and on Zanzibar, together formed *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, CCM, The Revolutionary Party (Rasmussen 1994:56).

¹⁷BAKWATA (*Bazara Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania*) The Supreme Council for Muslims in Tanzania.

sent Islamic teachers to the new schools (Westerlund 1994:145). But to some Muslim groups this change in BAKWATA was not radical enough. The dissatisfaction among these groups led to the formation of BALUKTA, intentionally a Koran-reading society. Their constitution from 1987 states that their major purposes are to propagate the reading of the Koran and strengthen religious and higher education for Muslims.

At a conference on the Christian-Muslim relationship in East Africa in May 1987, C.K. Omari gave a new interpretation of the situation in Tanzania. The article published after the conference shows that Omari basically sees the relationship as he did in 1984. He does, however, trace some changes. During the election campaign in 1985 some religious denominations were ready to use religion in their election campaigns. The party had to react to stop this trend. The Revolutionary Party's headquarter used posters and radio announcements and put an end to this new phenomenon in Tanzanian politics. The elections resulted in a slight majority of Christians in the President's Cabinet and a slight Muslim majority in the Party Central Committee. To Omari this result was another proof of the equal religious representation in Tanzanian politics (Omari 1987:62-63).

Omari repeats in this article his fear of Muslims using their own statistics to promote an Islamic state. The traditional Muslim idea that when the Muslims constitute the majority of the population they are entitled to introduce their own laws in the society, is an argument which Omari fears that can easily be used by extreme Muslim groups and cause trouble for the government. Christian fundamentalists¹⁸ act, according to Omari, different from their Muslim counterparts, and their problem is not towards the state but more towards people. Their aggressive focus on other people as "lost" and hence targets of conversion, threatens to ruin the harmony of the religious relationship. In his article Omari uses Lebanon as an example of what might happen if such religious propaganda continues. He does, however, not find any connection between the increased Muslim activity and the fact that both the President and the Vice-President are Muslims.

Another factor that Omari's article points out as influencing the religious relationship is the pressure and influence from friendly Islamic countries. According to Omari they try to make Tanzania look like an Islamic state. Some Gulf states have also shown interest in helping Tanzania recover from her economic problems. This help is by the government considered

¹⁸A further investigation and evaluation of what Omari calls "Christian fundamentalism" will be carried out in chapter three.

purely political, but when these Muslim states do not separate politics from religion, such solidarity may mean both. Some Tanzanians worry that as a result of the help these outsiders will dictate their social relations. Omari gives one example of this when a high level Iranian delegation visited the country in 1986. The delegation demanded that no alcohol should be served and that no women should carry out state functions during their presence. Tanzania had, by then, women ministers who would normally have attended such receptions. The government gave in to the Iranian demands. Omari comments that in the long run such an attitude will create division between people whose relationships are built on different premises (Omari 1987:66-67).

In his conclusions Omari warns against these new trends, but states that the relationship between the two groups remains harmonious. He also emphasizes that the government does not favour any religious group but focus on unity and on building a secular state.

2.3 The Tension Erupts

During the summer of 1988 tension erupted on Zanzibar when the chairwoman of the Association of Tanzanian Women UWT, Sofia Kawawa, criticized the Islamic marriage law and claimed that polygamy denied justice to women. UWT has close ties to CCM and the linkage of Kawawa's statements to government politics led to violent demonstrations in Zanzibar where two people died in the clashes. President Mwinyi found it necessary to make a statement where he stressed that Kawawa's initiative was her personal opinion and not the politics of CCM. A Presidential Committee was set up to examine the circumstances of the violent reactions. The result of the investigation was delivered to the President of Zanzibar in secret (Smith 1990:10). Zanzibar faced more trouble the same year when Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad was sacked from government. He was accused of planning to overthrow the government with help from mercenaries from the Gulf states. This shows some of the nervous tension present in the Zanzibar government concerning the semi-autonomous role in the union and the strong pressure from its inhabitants for independence. Demonstrations followed and reached a climax in May 1989 when Hamad was arrested after he called for a referendum on the union matter (Ludwig 1994:4).

On the mainland, professor Kighoma Malima was appointed minister of education in 1988. He claimed that Muslim youths had been discriminated against, and suggested preferential treatment for Muslims in the selection process for secondary education. A strong reaction came from a fundamentalist group, Warsha, who in an open letter to all Muslims supported the favoritism for Muslims (Smith 1990:11). The following year Malima was appointed Minister of Finance, and this resulted in speculations among Christians about increased Islamic influence in

government. At a meeting of the Christian Council of Tanzania, CCT, a delegate claimed that this policy was a part of the ground work for Islamic advancement or *jihad*, holy war (Ludwig 1994:2). In an effort "*to safeguard unity, peace, calm and understanding in the country*" (Daily News 14/3 1989) the government the same year announced the ban of the controversial book "Satanic Verses."

In 1989 the Christian organization "Big November Crusade Ministries"¹⁹ was formed with the aim to organize the big open air meetings which had taken place in Dar es Salaam every year since 1986. The big so-called "Power Crusades" go on for about two weeks and have attracted close to 200.000 people at its peak. The crusades have spread from Dar es Salaam to other parts of the country and often foreign preachers have visited the crusades. The German preacher Reinhard Bonnke has visited Tanzania several times and has by critics been accused of using a "powerful" and militant language when preaching at the open air meetings (Ludwig 1994:7-8). The focus of the crusades was often on believers of other religions as "lost" and hence targets of conversion. These attitudes from the Christians were noticed by the Muslim community and some Muslim leaders accused the crusades of spreading hatred between the two religions.

After this the situation in Tanzania was stable until 1992 when the tension reached new heights. One of the reasons was the intensified activities of the Koran-reading society BALUKTA. They held public lectures insulting Christianity and Christian leaders and distributed derogatory radio and video cassettes, the latter shown in public. This provoked Christian militants who on their side gave counter attacks and threatened to publish "Satanic Verses," claiming that this was the true interpretation of the Koran. The government was forced to react and Prime Minister John Malicela imposed a ban on religious meetings outside mosques and churches (Katoke 1994:15). President Mwinyi called for religious toleration on the front page of Daily News²⁰ (15/2 1993). He urged Tanzanians to bury religious differences and live together as brothers and sisters. BALUKTA rejected this appeal, and according to Israel Katoke Muslim fundamentalists made further strategies to endanger lives of Christian leaders and to destroy their properties. During the month of Ramadan two containers had been unloaded in Dar es Salaam containing weapons disguised as dates needed for the meals of Ramadan (Katoke 1994:16). The Christian weekly newspaper, Family Mirror, followed the situation closely and printed; "Iran Funding Muslim

¹⁹The Big November Crusade Ministries was founded by representatives from the Assemblies of God, the Lutheran Church, the Anglican Church and other smaller churches (Ludwig 1994:7).

²⁰Daily News is a government controlled newspaper, but has lately been quite outspoken on conflicts and has also frequently criticized the government.

Fundamentalists" on their frontpage (Family Mirror no. I. April 1993). The article claimed that the weapons were funded by Iran and that certain Muslim groups in Tanzania cooperated with organizations in Iran.

Two other political decisions turned out to make the year 1992 even more crucial for the religious relationship in the country. In February the government announced that they wished to return all schools and hospitals, nationalized in the 1970s, to their former owners which in many cases were churches. In June the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre was handed over to the Good Samaritan Foundation where the Lutheran church held the majority in the board of trustees. Several hospitals were in the following handed back to different churches. This caused concern among parts of the Muslim population. A result of this concern was that President Mwinyi in October declared that schools were not to be returned, but private organizations were encouraged to build new schools.

The other, and most radical political decision made in Tanzania the last decade, was the decision to introduce multi-party-democracy. This was announced in the summer of 1992. Some limitations, however, followed the announcement. Parties based on ethnicity or religion were not allowed to be formed. The government also emphasized that the state, the political parties and the religious leaders had to work together to secure the religious harmony and the social peace within this new political system (Ludwig 1994:3). But popular sentiments are very hard to avoid in a new-born democracy and the leader of the Democratic Party, Reverend Christopher Mtikila, is an example of this. He has openly declared that his mission is to defend Christianity against Islam. He was first brought to prominence when he at a CCM conference in 1988 circulated a letter opposing Mwinyi's presidency because, he claimed, Mwinyi favored Islam at the expense of Christianity. The Democratic Party's manifesto proposes the break-up of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the expelling of all Arabs, Indians and Somalis from the mainland (Africa Events, March 1993:22).

2.3.1 Internal Problems for the Religious Communities

But not only the relationship between Christians and Muslims experienced tension. Also within the religious communities conflicts developed. The Supreme Council for Muslims in Tanzania, BAKWATA, was repeatedly criticized for not being able to promote effective leadership for the Muslims in the country. The organization was also held responsible for chaos and disunity among the Muslims. The rival organization, BALUKTA, gained at this time more and more

influence (Ludwig 1994:3). The reason for BALUKTA's growth was their increased activity in promoting education for Muslims and their organization of pilgrimages to Mekkah. The outspokenness of their charismatic leader Sheikh Yahya Hussein was also a considerable factor in their increased influence.

The churches also faced internal problems. The main problem among Protestant churches was the splitting-up of dioceses and that these conflicts sometimes followed ethnic lines. The most serious and dramatic incident was the so-called "Mount Meru Crisis" of 1992. The conflict among the Meru people started with the demand from a group among the Lutherans to form their own diocese. The leader of this faction, Jackson Kaaya, wanted separation from the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania, ELCT. When this demand was not met by ELCT, the property was taken over by violence and several people were killed in the incident. The new "Mount Meru Diocese" was recognised by the state authorities, but this led to a sharp reaction from the Lutheran bishops. They sent an open letter where they challenged the government. The registration was withdrawn by the minister of Home Affairs, A. Mrema. Later a new diocese, "Meru Diocese", loyal to ELCT was formed (Ludwig 1994:3).

2.3.2 The Good Friday Upheavals

Attempts were made by the government to improve the relationship between the two religions. Several times during the first months of 1993 representatives from the government appeared in the newspapers pleading for religious toleration (Daily News 15/2, 19/2, 22/2, 25/3²¹ 1993). In March Mwinyi met the leaders of the Catholic, the Anglican and the Lutheran churches in an attempt to reorganize the relationship between the church and the state, after the churches had expressed concern about the development. The churches complained about the public speeches, cassettes and some newspapers carrying derogatory and insulting contents - blaming the government for lack of action. The President tried to appease the church leaders and to play down the issue, but one month later the government had no other choice but to react (Ludwig 1994:4).

On April 9, on Good Friday, Muslims from five different mosques, under the direction of BALUKTA, organized attacks on pork shops in three districts of Dar es Salaam. Previous to this, the Imams of the five mosques had written a letter to the District Commissioner demanding a closure of all pork butcheries before April 5. The Commissioner arranged a meeting on April 6 telling the Imams that the butcheries were licensed. The Muslims could not accept this and on

Good Friday they attacked the shops causing material damages and injuring the owners (Embu 1993:4). The government carried out a massive crackdown on the demonstrators arresting close to one hundred Muslims during the month of April, including the leader of BALUKTA, Sheikh Yahya Hussein. The Minister of Home Affairs, A. Mrema, stated that "*Evil factors must be crushed*" (Daily News 15/4 1993) and Field Force units were put into action as several days of rioting and violence persisted. Both courts and mosques were besieged by demonstrators and the police arrested people with petrol bombs and other types of explosives (Daily News 11/4 - 27/4 1993). The front page of the newspaper Family Mirror read; "*500 Youths Register For Jihad.*" The following story claimed that Muslim fundamentalists planned a military training-camp in the Morogoro region (Family Mirror no. II. April 1993). During this period there were tapes circulated which called for further destruction of pork butcheries, poisoning of breweries and bombing of dance-halls and liquor stores. On Zanzibar two liquor stores were burnt down after petrol-bomb attacks. The government struck BALUKTA off the list (Daily News 29/4 1993) and tapes released by the organization were to be surrendered to the police. During the crackdown three Sudanese teachers of religion were expelled from the country. Again Family Mirror printed a front page about the religious conflict, this time with two cover stories. The first stated that Mwinyi was accused of betraying Islam by the Muslim Student Organization because of the massive crackdown after the pork-butcheries affair. The other story claimed that BALUKTA offered free tickets to Mecca for joining *jihad* (Family Mirror no.1. May 1994). Most Muslim leaders supported the government crackdown and to BAKWATA, to whom BALUKTA had become a serious rival, the government action was a relief. As a result of the religious unrest the government decided that no new religious organization would be registered without the approval from either BAKWATA or the Christian Council of Tanzania, CCT (Embu 1993:5).

2.3.3 The OIC-Crisis

Perhaps the most serious political and religious issue, that shook the leaders of both religion and the nation, was Zanzibar's membership to the Organization of Islamic Conference. The membership was first mentioned on BBC before it was picked up by the local press. The news was first denied by the union government but later confirmed by the island itself. The issue was intensely discussed on the mainland and the crucial political question was whether Zanzibar had violated the constitution or not. A committee was immediately brought together to look into the matter. Also from the church critical voices were raised, and their main concern was the religious

²¹The President of Zanzibar tells Sheiks: "Do not use religion to agitate youths."

content of the membership. The Lutheran Bishop Peter Mwasmasika said that if Zanzibar had joined the OIC there was bound to be chaos in the country. A church delegation was invited to Zanzibar by the Chief Minister Dr. Omar Ali Juma, who tried to explain the membership. Juma said that the OIC might be the only organization that could handle the South-South cooperation. He also emphasized the economic advantages of membership, including access to IDB's (the Islamic Development Bank) projects. The Chief Minister also stated that "*the organization is neither strictly Muslim or Arab.*" (Ludwig 1994:4-5). Omar Ali was supported by President Mwinyi who according to Africa Events, argued that the OIC was primarily an organization for international economic and cultural cooperation where IDB offered interest-free loans.

The Tanzanian President tried to argue that Zanzibar's OIC membership was not a religious issue, and nor was it a political one, but primarily economic. (Africa Events, March 1993:20)

In March 1993 Tanzania's parliamentary committee on constitutional and legal affairs announced to the national assembly that Zanzibar's decision to join the OIC was a violation of the unions constitution. Their reference to the constitution was that foreign affairs was a union matter. After stormy debates, the Zanzibar government decided to withdraw its membership in August 1993. It has been claimed that former President Nyerere "*refused to advise the state on the matters of the union*" (Embu 1993:7) unless they withdraw from the OIC. Anyhow, soon after the withdrawal Nyerere told about 80 journalists at a press conference in his home that he was disturbed by the government's handling of the issue. He warned that if those in authority continued to violate the law, the union was bound to break, and he emphasized that the present union should be maintained. But the OIC-crisis increased the influence of those mainlanders who had argued for a three-government system where each is running its own affairs under a loose federal type government (Ludwig 1994:5).

At the time of the OIC-crisis the government faced another problem as a rumour circulated that Tanzania had joined the Islam in Africa Organization, IAO, way back in 1989. A document claiming to be an official communique, issued in the Nigerian capital after the IAO-conference in 1989, was circulated to all private newspapers in Tanzania. The document alleged that Tanzania was represented in the steering committee, and contained, among other facts, the information that one of the aims of IAO was the eradication of all non-Muslims religions in Africa. Several newspapers followed the case without checking the document any further and the

Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly justified parliamentary investigation on the matter. The communique turned out to be a forgery. The result of the intense discussions was more distrust between the two religions (Africa Events, March 1993: 19-20).

2.3.4 Destruction of Church Properties

1994 continued the way 1993 ended, with more religious conflicts. Apart from religious disagreements and discussions the events took a more serious and sad turn. Shauritanga Secondary School outside Moshi, a girl-school owned by the Roman Catholic church, was set afire and 43 young girls were killed. After this, several churches received letters with threats of church-burnings. The magazine WATU could, in September, tell the story about a church in the southern part of the country where the caretaker had noticed the smell of petrol, called the police and managed to prevent a fire as the criminals fled (WATU 22-29/9 1994²²). On the 22nd of September St. Mark's Catholic church on Zanzibar was burnt to the ground (Kiongozi, October 1994). Arsonists also burnt down the African Inland Church in Lamu on the 23rd of October (Daily Nation 24/10 1994).

The Roman Catholic newspaper Kiongozi, on the front page of the October issue asked the question; *"Will Christian Churches and Institutions Continue to be Burnt?"* The article blamed the government and the President for failing to control the situation. According to the newspaper people understood silence as support, thinking that the President supported the criminals by not taking action against them. The Roman Catholic Bishop Polycarp plead, in the same article, for the Christians to remain calm and pray. He said that the criminals are a small group of Muslim fundamentalists who, first of all, have personal interest in creating chaos as they are being funded by rich countries. He pictured them as a small fire that can create huge damage if not put out. He further said that the Christians must stick together because, if the Christians divide, the Fundamentalists have reached their goal and can run the country. As a private citizen, and not as a bishop, Polycarp questioned the lack of action from the government, concluding that if the government does not react it must be because they support what happens (Kiongozi, October 1994).

The writings of C.K. Omari from 1984 and 1987 focused on the good relationship between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania. In 1987, however, he was concerned about the tendencies

²²In Kiongozi, October 1994.

he experienced of religious separatism. In a paper from a lecture given in Bayreuth, Germany, October 1994 he says:

But more disturbing is the way Christian institutions like churches, hospitals and schools have been targets of rampant burning and destructions. Some of the suspects have been Muslim radicals who have vowed publicly through their magazines like Al-Nur and Mizania that their aim is to make Christians' living impossible in Tanzania. (Omari 1994:8)

In this paper Omari blames weak leadership for not being able to control the religious situation in Tanzania. The development in Omari's writings is symptomatic of the development of the religious situation in Tanzania. 1984 with the end of the *ujamaa* period was also the start of a decade of increased religious conflict.

2.4 The Experiences of the Church

Apart from some radical elements among the Christians in Tanzania who were immediately provoked by the increased Muslim activity and responded, the large majority of the Church remained calm. The close ties between the two main church organizations CCT and TEC²³ and the government made the Christians trust that the government would react against the new disruptive elements. When the leaders of the state were not able to stop the agitation the Christian leaders called for a meeting with President Mwinyi to discuss the matter. The public speeches, and the derogatory content of some of the cassettes and videotapes that were spread, really caused concern among the Christian congregations.

Also in the Tanga region the Christians have experienced new Muslim activities. Rev. Joyce Kibango, of the Lutheran church in Tanga, has lately noticed a change in the approach of the Muslims.

There have been complaints about Christians from the mosque loudspeakers, and also an extended use of biblical criticism among Muslims. They are more aggressive now - times are changing. (Kibango 1994)

²³Tanzania Episcopal Conference, the Roman Catholic umbrella organization.

Tanga Big Mission²⁴ earlier experienced that Muslims tried to disturb their open-air meetings. But, after permission was required to hold the meetings the harassments have stopped. Rev. Kibango also claims that there have been campaigns going on among certain groups in the Muslim community to marry Christian girls so that the girl and her children would become Muslims. As a result of that Joyce Kibango received complaints from young girls who did not understand the implications of such marriages. Despite this, it is in fact the "normal" intermarriages, for generations, between Christians and Muslims that have kept the situation from getting out of hand, according to Rev. Kibango (Kibango 1994).

Another who has experienced the Muslim activity is Rev. Rafik Daudjee, a pastor in an Tanzania Assemblies of God congregation in Dar es Salaam. Daudjee is of Indian origin and was born a Muslim. After he finished his Master of Divinity in Nairobi and returned to Dar es Salaam as a Christian pastor he has repeatedly been offered money and the opportunity to open his own business if he returned to Islam (Daudjee 1994)²⁵.

The official line from the church has been to remain calm and pray for peace. The Bishops have repeatedly asked the Christians to pray and not react violently to the challenge from the extreme Muslims (Kiongizi, October 1994). But the church has been forced to realize that the religious relationship is changing, as expressed by the Roman Catholic Bishop James Sangu in Daily News 12/4 1993:

..."it is high time Tanzanians stopped boasting to the world that they were living in a peaceful country." He said they should rather concentrate on how best restore peace, which "is going out of hand."

This advise has been followed by the Christians, and physical reactions towards the Muslim fundamentalists have not appeared. The churches have however had to take their precautions, and several Christian institutions have increased the number of watchmen after the damaging of church property lately.

²⁴ An organization with support from the Lutherans, the Anglicans, the Pentecostals and the Assemblies of God.

²⁵ The same tendencies as experienced by Kibango and Daudjee, are referred to in a CCT report from the Tabora region (Sendegeya 1995).

2.5 The Situation Among the Muslims on the Coast of Kenya

The Muslim community on the coast of Kenya has had a different development than their Swahili counterpart in Tanzania. The Muslim group in Kenya is much smaller and have therefore played a much more marginal part in the development of their country. The largest Muslim community in Kenya is situated in the coastal region around Mombasa, with Muslims minorities spread around the interior. According to Christian sources, the Muslims hold 7 percent of the population in Kenya²⁶. The percentage given by Muslims in Mombasa is 30 (Ahmed 1994)²⁷. Regardless of the percentage it is a fact that Muslims have been marginalized especially in the field of education. This because of the negative attitude that the Muslims developed to the missions that introduced the Western education (Maina 1995:5)

Kenya has also suffered from tension between the Christians and the Muslim minority the last decade. Several of the controversies have been over issues of education. In 1991 a number of schools, among them Star of the Sea Girl's High School in Mombasa which is sponsored by the Catholic church, were sued by Muslim parents after expelling girls for wearing *hijab*, the Muslim veil. In all the court cases, the court ruled in favour of the Muslim parents. This controversy reached political dimensions when a local Muslim parliament claimed that Muslims were being harassed in the coast province for dressing according to the Koran. The conflict ended when President Moi intervened and directed that no Muslim girls should have to dress in conflict with their faith. Similar controversies occurred in other parts of Kenya and this has had implications on the Christian-Muslim relationship. Several Muslim leaders have appealed to the Muslim communities to build their own schools in order to prevent further discrimination from the Christians (Maina 1995:6-8).

Other issues that have increased the religious tension is various public statements from Kenyan Christian leaders who have showed lack of insight and disrespect for Islam with some very unwise statements. Archbishop Manasses Kuria stated, while delivering a sermon in Nairobi, that Islam and Christianity were similar because Muhammed was a Christian before he founded Islam, and that several Muslim traditions are learnt from Christians. Statements from other leaders of the church about increased mission directed against the Muslims, referred to in the newspapers, have caused countrywide outrage among Muslims, who accused the Christian leaders of creating hatred between Christians and Muslims (Gitari 1994).

²⁶World Christian Encyclopædia, edited by David B. Barratt, states that the Muslim population in Kenya is 6 percent, whereas CHEAM, Advanced Studies on Modern Asia and Africa, claims that the Muslim population is 7,3 percent (Haafkens 1991:Appendix).

²⁷This number is supported by Kettani 1986:176.

When the question of multi-party democracy reached its peak in Kenya in 1992, the Islamic Party of Kenya, IPK, was founded in Mombasa. The leader of the party, Sheikh Khalid Balala managed, with his fiery speeches, to gain support in the old harbour of Mombasa (with the centre of the old Swahili culture as the base of the party). IPK was supposed to be a democratic party with the aim of overthrowing the present government, but was denied registration because it was reckoned a religious party. The denial of registration led to riots in Mombasa with the imprisonment of Balala as the result. This caused even more anger among the mainly young followers of Balala who attacked the police station with Molotov-cocktails and stones. Balala was later released, but several clashes between the youths of IPK and the police followed. Later Balala left the country and stayed for some time in Somalia where he, on the BBC, claimed that he was gathering an army of 700 soldiers (Ahmed 1994). In 1994 he was denied continued citizenship in Kenya when he applied for a renewal of his passport at the Kenyan embassy in Bonn, Germany (BBC Africa News 4/2 1995).

Sheikh Balala gained popularity among the unemployed youth in the old port of Mombasa by providing money for several of them to get married. He spoke of the need to follow Islam in order to change the hopeless situation that many Muslims experience without any education or jobs in times of recession. The leader of the Islamic Youth, IPK's youth organization, in an interview affirmed this but would not tell where the money came from other than to say that "*IPK has friends both inside and outside Kenya.*" (Ahmed 1994).

Something close to the Salman Rushdie affair occurred in Kenya when on July 22 an anonymous letter was published in one of Kenya's leading newspapers, The Standard, carrying derogatory statements against Muslims claiming that Muhammed often had hallucinations and epileptic fits which made him have supernatural visions. Some Mombasa Muslims imposed a death-sentence on the not yet identified author, and offered the sum of 400.00 Kenyan Shillings to anyone who fulfilled the sentence. After an attempt by radical Muslim youths to storm the building of the newspaper, the police provided protection. Muslim leaders called for the government to take action against the newspaper for publishing insults towards another religion. The case calmed down when the editors of The Standard called a meeting and apologized to the Muslim leaders. From the viewpoint of some Christians this Muslim response was an example of intolerance of others with a different opinion. This was strengthened when Sheikh Khalid Balala, leader of the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), issued a similar *fatwah*, a religious decree, against two Mombasa politicians for their anti-IPK stands (Maina 1995:13).

2.6 Summary

The Christian-Muslim relationship on the coast of East Africa has gone through radical changes the last decade. The tension has increased mostly because of the revival of religion that Tanzania has experienced after the fall of the *ujamaa* politics. Especially among the Muslims the focus on a more pure Islam, with suggestions to reestablish the old Islamic courts, has been intensified. The Good Friday upheavals also showed that militant Muslims are ready to use strong means to reach their goals. The government unfortunately did not react early enough to stop the militant Muslims and has not been able to do anything about the destruction of church properties. An increased focus on more active evangelism can be traced among some Christian denominations, but the majority of the churches have so far stayed calm and waited for the government to react. This patience has been a successful effort to hinder serious clashes in Tanzania, but it is obvious that the church is far from satisfied by the way the government has handled the situation. Whether this will have any affect on the 1995 presidential election is yet uncertain.

Among the population on the coast of Kenya the same tendencies as those occurring in Tanzania can be traced. The Muslims focus on more pure Islamic ideas and express discontent with their minority status. This indicates that the Muslim groups in Kenya and Tanzania are influenced by the same religious tendencies even if the two national states have gone through different political developments.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

During the last decade the relationship between the Christian and the Muslim communities in East Africa has developed into a relationship of serious antagonism. In this chapter the development within the different religious communities will be given a closer examination. The first part of the chapter deals with the Muslim community and give a presentation of the different Islamic organizations in Tanzania and look at some parallels in Kenya. The chapter also contains a presentation of how the Muslims view their own situation, and a short survey of the intellectual tradition among the Muslims in East Africa. In the presentation of the Christian community only a very short survey of the Lutheran and Catholic churches will be given. A closer examination will be given to the development in the Pentecostal churches since I view this development as the most interesting with reference to the Christian-Muslim relationship. The tendency of charismatic influence on the established churches will also be discussed. What several writers describe as “Christian fundamentalism” will be looked upon, and an evaluation of the Christian contribution to the change in the religious relationship will be given.

3.1 Muslim Organizations

3.1.1 The Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims (BAKWATA)

The Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims, BAKWATA, was established in Iringa December 12 1968 as a result of the Islamic Crisis of 1968. BAKWATA is by far the largest Muslim organization in Tanzania and has close links to the government. The birth of the organization was caused by a serious conflict between EAMWS²⁸, who wanted a strong pan-Islamic unity among Muslims in East Africa, and a more government-friendly faction focusing on national unity. In the early days of independence the focus on strong national unity was predominant among African Muslims, and the fight for a nation-building Islamic organization was also a fight against Arab and Indian interests in the more Shia-directed EAMWS. BAKWATA was established and given a Swahili name²⁹, showing the focus on a new nation with an official

²⁸East African Muslim Welfare Society

²⁹Baraza Kuu la Waislam wa Tanzania

language instead of the signals an Arabic name would have given. No membership cards were issued by BAKWATA with the thought that all Muslims were automatically members of the organization. But the opposition never paid much attention to this new organization, and lived its life without much influence during the *ujamaa* years.

Even fully supported by the government BAKWATA faced problems and their problems were largely financial. With the money from the Shia Muslims no longer available, "self-reliance" was the only possible solution. Ideologically this was very right considering the policy of *ujamaa*. Economically, however, it was a disaster. Compared with Christian organizations like CCT with a massive Western financial support, BAKWATA made a meagre impression. The purpose of BAKWATA was to assist Muslims religiously, socially and in the field of education. One of their aims was to work out religious material for use in primary and secondary schools. Up to 1977 only two textbooks for this purpose had been produced by the council. Another major problem for the Sunni Muslims was to find competent teachers for the teaching of religion in primary and secondary schools.

The intention from the beginning was to start publishing a Muslim magazine or a journal, a Muslim newspaper was also considered. But none of these plans were fulfilled by 1977. BAKWATA instead made use of the state radio, CCM papers, meetings, announcements in mosques etc. to be heard by the people. BAKWATA was important among the Muslims being the official organizers of pilgrimages to Mekkah.

Around 1980 David Westerlund heard rumours from Shia Muslims that BAKWATA had been in contact with Saudi-Arabia for assistance, but he was met with suspicion from BAKWATA officials when he made requests about this, for that time being, very touchy political question (see Westerlund 1980:100-106).

The opposition against BAKWATA has again raised their voices the last decade. This new criticism is also the result of a more open society where for instance open letters in the newspapers are a common feature. One specific argument used against the organization is that it is more Tanzanian than Islamic. The council was lately accused of both failing to lead, and being the cause of the chaos among Tanzanian Muslims (Ludwig 1994:3).

Sigvard von Sicard claims that the new Islamic revivalism has also largely affected BAKWATA. He says that "*Since 1985 the council has become more forceful than before in pursuing Islamic interests.*" (Sicard 1991:8). A result of this has been financial support from other Muslim countries. Teachers from the Gulf states, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia have been brought to Tanzania to teach in the schools, and several public lectures have been given. The

request in 1987 to the government about reintroducing the Islamic *qadi*-courts, shows a change of weight from national to pan-Islamic unity (Sicard 1991:8-9).

3.1.2 The Koran Reading Society (BALUKTA)

BAKWATA's most serious rival to the hegemony among Muslim organizations has recently been the Tanzania Council of Koran Reading, BALUKTA. This organization was registered in December 1987 by its leaders Sheikh Hassim and Yahya Hussein. Their major task was to promote the reading of the Koran and support the established *madrasas*, the Muslim religious schools, both financially and materially. They also intended to build new *madrasas*, Islamic centres and higher institutions of religious learning. BALUKTA also organized Koran-memorizing competitions and participated in competitions held abroad. Their constitution also states that their aim is:

To publish and print and distribute and to assist in the publication, production and distribution of Islamic religious books, literature, films, video and audio cassettes, pamphlets, posters, periodicals and journals. (Ludwig 1994:11)

BALUKTA was several times warned by the Administrator General that their activities had to be limited to Koran reading. Several Christian leaders complained about the derogatory material spread by the organization. In August 1988 the council was asked to give back the document of registration, but no action followed and BALUKTA became increasingly aggressive (Ludwig 1994:11).

The Koran Reading Society also started to organize their own pilgrimages to Mekkah. This caused more conflicts with BAKWATA which had been appointed by the government to organize the pilgrimages (Daily News 17/4-1992). The Christian newspaper Family Mirror accused BALUKTA of offering free tickets to Mekkah to Muslim youths who joined *jihad*. (Family Mirror no. 1. May 1993).

In October 1992 BALUKTA accused CCM Vice-Chairman, Rashidi Kawawa, of swindling Muslims of millions of shilling, being responsible for the Maulid and Idd Prayr Committee. They demanded his immediate resignation and confirmed thereby their anti-government attitude (Ludwig 1994:11). After the rampages of the pork butcheries in Dar es Salaam in 1993 both Yahya Hussein and Sheikh Hassim were arrested by the police. The trials against them in court were postponed several times because of demonstrations in the courtroom

by BALUKTA-supporters (Daily News 20/4-1993). The result of these events was the deregistration of the organization. Both the two leaders and their supporters were later released from prison.

3.1.3 Other Muslim Organizations

One of the more radical Islamic movements is the Workshop of the Commission of Islamic Authors, Warsha³⁰. Their intention is to translate and publish Islamic books in order to educate Muslims. Warsha consists of a considerable number of well-educated young men, some of them Shiites. The majority of their followers are in the 20-40 age group. They originally started as a group within BAKWATA in 1975 to work with questions of education, but their radical demands to have Islamic teaching in the organization's secular secondary schools led to a break in 1982. The members of Warsha were after this denied any posts inside BAKWATA.

From their headquarters in the Quba-Mosque in Dar es Salaam they continue their activities, arranging courses and publishing periodicals and literature. Their most famous publication, *Uchumi katika Uislamo*, is a book about Islamic economy. This book criticises the political system of *ujamaa*, claiming it to be communism. But most of their productions are concerned with the five pillars of Islam. Warsha is also trying to change the traditional teachings in the *madrases*, where the basic teaching still is the memorizing of the Koran (Westerlund 1994:148).

Another rival of BAKWATA is the National Muslim Conference, Baraza Kuu, which has a number of university employed Muslims among its members. The organization was established in 1992 and it is trying to replace BAKWATA as the umbrella organization of all Muslims in Tanzania. Their activities are being closely watched by the government (Westerlund 1994:149). Baraza Kuu is also trying to build up their own schooling and education system, in an attempt to succeed where BAKWATA failed (Ludwig 1994:11). The organization caused some trouble when they held a demonstration in January 1992 where they occupied the offices of BAKWATA in Dar es Salaam (Daily News 6/1-1992).

Through their Ten Year Development Plan, published in 1984, the Tanzania Muslim Youth expressed some of the feelings lying latent among many Muslims. The plan emphasizes the need for a separate Islamic development in society. One aspect of this development is the increased

focus on the implementation of *sharia* (Sicard 1991:8). As already mentioned this issue was followed up by BAKWATA three years later.

Other new organizations are the Union of Muslim Preachers and the Union of Muslim Students, which after the upheavals in April 1993 accused Mwinyi of betraying Islam (Family Mirror no.1 May 1993). Also a University Muslim Trusteeship has been founded at the University of Dar es Salaam. Their aim is to emphasize that the teachings of the Koran is a complete mode of life. This is done by the organization through research, through the publishing of Islamic literature and through establishing investment projects which are compatible with Islamic practice. The University Muslim Trusteeship sees, as most other Muslim organization, the importance of promoting education among young Muslims to remove the gap between Christians and Muslims in this field. The Trusteeship aims at helping well qualified young Muslims through awarding scholarships and provide financial assistance (Ludwig 1994:12).

3.1.4 Parallels on the Coast of Kenya

In Kenya the Islamic Party of Kenya, IPK, was founded in January 1992 when the pressure for multi-party democracy reached its peak. It was formed to represent the interests of both Muslims and non-Muslims, and to fight for the democratic rights of Kenyan Muslims at all levels. IPK was denied registration because it was considered a religious party by the Registrar General. The party has with its charismatic and fierce leader Sheikh Khalid Balala become very popular with the majority of the Muslim community (Maina 1995:14). IPK has, however, faced massive resistance from the government, which is no surprise as their number one aim is to replace President Moi (Ahmed 1994). Sheikh Balala was forced to leave the country after several instances of imprisonment, and this has somewhat calmed down the activities of the party.

The Islamic Party of Kenya claims that their protest has developed because of the treatment that Muslims in the coastal region have received from the government. The schools lack equipment, the teachers are unqualified, the region has no university and faces a serious water problem. In addition, the Muslim population in this region suffers from high unemployment, and the increased tourism in the area has led to an explosion in the building of pubs and night clubs which in the eyes of the Muslims is a sign of the demoralization of their own society.

³⁰Warsha ya Waanchisi wa Kiislamu.

The leader of Islamic Youths³¹, Mohamed Abdulwahab Ahmed, claims that IPK fights together with their Christian brothers for a more democratic Kenya. Their constitution is also free of religious proclamations. Their main enemy is President Moi and the present government whom they accuse of differential treatment and corruption. In an interview Mohamed argued with reference to the Koran each time the question of legitimation was pushed forward. The violent actions, which he did not deny had taken place, were always a response to police provocations, and had to be met with "an eye for an eye," with force if necessary, and this was in accordance with the Koran according to Ahmed (Ahmed 1994).

During my fieldwork I got the impression that IPK and Balala's position in the old town of Mombasa had been very strong, but was now on the decline. Young people I was in contact with supported the party and were willing to fight the police if necessary, but it seemed that the organization suffered from a lack of structure and from the absence of its leader. The young unemployed and demoralized Muslims saw in IPK a chance of improved living conditions and a restoration of pride and dignity. The graffiti on the old town walls speaks the language of the young people; "IPK - for freedom", "IPK - cool and deadly".

Another somewhat more marginalized group of Muslims in Mombasa is the Coast People's Party, CPP. They claim that when the coastal province that once belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar was given to Kenya by the English colonial power, certain "coastal safeguards" were granted the coast people as a guarantee for some degree of autonomy. This historical fact has, according to CPP, been neglected by the government, and they regard it their mission to grant the Swahili people of the coast the possibility to decide their own matters. CPP accuses IPK of being a group of rebels without support in the population, and does not blame the government for the bad physical and demoralized conditions of the old town of Mombasa, but rather the lack of true Islam - which is a religion of peace, not of riots (Nassir 1994³²).

3.2 Muslim Self-Comprehension

The new vitality among Muslims, seen in the recent creation of several new Muslim Organizations comes as a result of several changes in politics and religion both on the

³¹ Islamic Youths is the youth organization of IPK.

³²Stambuli Abdillahi Nassir is the leader of the Coast People's Party. He claimed that his father was the representant of the Coast People in the conference where the strip of land was given to Kenya. According to documents he showed me, both former President Kenyatta and President Moi attended the same conference.

international and the national level. In Tanzania it is obvious that the new political situation, with multi-party democracy and a political climate where religious organizations are again allowed to be formed³³, has influenced the Muslim view upon their own identity and their influence upon society. Even though the Muslims believe that they constitute the majority of the population (Kettani 1986:172) they admit that they face the problems of a minority community³⁴. The Muslims feel that they have been marginalized through history. The dominion of the Western colonial powers was seen by the Muslims as a period when the Christians were favoured and when Christian values were deeply rooted in the country through the establishment of the Western educational system. Even today, more than 30 years after independence the issue of education is a crucial one to many Muslims. This is clearly seen through the aims of all the new Muslim organization presented earlier in this chapter. They all share a major focus on education, both religious and secular. Statistics show that the Muslim student intake to the universities in Tanzania is below ten percent and that the academic staff at the University of Dar es Salaam is below five percent (Africa Events March 1993:22). Among Muslims these numbers led to the demands of preferential treatments for Muslim youths (see 2.3). A look at the statistics from the secondary schools in Tanzania, however, shows that the problem is much more deep-rooted than Christians being favoured in the university intakes. The Muslim writer Abdul Mtemvu in the magazine "Change" July 1993 presented a survey from 1990 where out of 127 division 1 passes only 14 were from Muslim secondary schools. No Christian seminary produced division 0 (fail) while 46% of all Muslim students failed the Form 4 examination (Embu 1993:9).

The Muslim backwardness in education is by the Muslims claimed to be a result of lost opportunities because of differential treatment through history. The Western form of education was introduced by the Christian missionaries and most Muslims connected the schools with conversion to Christianity and therefore refused to send their children to these schools. The Muslim community was unable to, or not interested in creating their own schools where secular education was given in addition to the religious syllabus. The result of this is a serious problem for the Muslims since the control of the political power to a large extent is connected with education. Due to uncertainty about their present predicament the Muslims in Tanzania seem to be looking back at their history for answers. They again and again remind themselves that they were the leading force behind the independence movement and the formation of TANU. They

³³This will be further dealt with in the next chapter.

³⁴Tanzania is referred to in Kettani's book "Muslim Minorities in the World Today" and Tanzania is also in Journal, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs several times referred to as a country where the Muslims face minority problems.

also remember that Nyerere - in 1962, after realizing that he had come to power through a strong Muslim support - promised the National Assembly that he would rectify the educational imbalance, which he considered a colonial legacy. But this promise has not yet come true and the Muslims feel that they continue lagging behind Christians in every sense of the word (Africa Events March 1993:22).

The view that the Muslims have lagged behind and been marginalized by the Christians is shared by several Muslim writers. Ali Kettani in his book "Muslim Minorities in the World Today" claims that out of 19 million people living in Tanzania in 1982 55% were Muslims.

There are about two million Christians in the country, mainly a product of the Christian missionary schools. The real power is in their hands. ...Islamic activity is discouraged and Muslims find themselves as second-class citizens in spite of being the majority. (Kettani 1986:173)

Kettani in his short survey of Tanzania claims that Islam is making headway "... in spite of official discouragement, even suppression." (Kettani 1986:173). It is also the complaint of the author that only BAKWATA was allowed to represent the Muslims and as a result of that few contacts have been left between the Muslims in Tanzania and the Muslims in the rest of the world. Similar thoughts of not having been able to keep up with the Western development is expressed by Saiyid Hamid, former vice-chancellor at the Aligahr Muslim University in India, when commenting upon the *ummah* of the Muslim minorities.

With few exceptions, Muslims all over the world are educationally extremely backward. In addition, they do not compare at all with Christians in selfless social work. ...Over half a Millenium, our case appears to have gone by default. We have not check-mated the efforts made over the centuries by non-Muslim agencies to malign Islam. (Hamid 1991:178)

This feeling among Muslims of not having the rights that belong to them is expressed by Muslims at all levels. In terms of looking back in history, both Mazrui (1986) and Kettani (1985) emphasize that Islam is much older than Christianity in the area and hence more "African." Kettani even asserts that Islam was present in the coastal region prior to most of the indigenous religions which he claims were brought to the coast from the hinterland after Islam was rooted among the swahili culture of the coast (Kettani 1985:220). As above mentioned, the colonial

period has been presented by the Muslims as a period of oppression that left Christianity as its legacy. But the criticism of the new generation Muslims also focuses on more recent history. The history of TANU/CCM is once more being discussed and several Muslim writers try to analyze what went wrong with the Muslim influence. The Muslim writer Msaud argues that because the Christians were cooperating with the colonial power the process of demanding independence was left to the Muslims. He also states that the colonialist propaganda presenting Nyerere as the founder of TANU is forgery. Furthermore he claims that the government of the early sixties had the mission to suppress Islam and let more Christians in the government leadership. Msaud joins the increasing criticism of BAKWATA as a government controlled organization and claims that the organization was formed without the will of Tanzania Muslims and he ends his article:

Muslims should now stand together to resume the lost glory of fighting for our right in all spheres and especially the political sphere. (Msaud 1991:91)

Another Muslim intellectual, Mohamed Said who represented the new Muslim organization Warsha at a conference on *Dawah* in East Africa in Nairobi in 1989, presented the thoughts of recapturing lost political power motivated by an analysis of recent history. His major focus was on how the government introduced a campaign of intrigue, sabotage, bribery and misinformation against EAMWS in the time prior to the Islamic crisis of 1968 (which led to the ban of EAMWS and to the formation of BAKWATA). This was done because the government feared EAMWS' efforts to mobilize and unite all Muslims in one strong organization. Said claims that EAMWS had plans to build a Muslim University with the support of the Egyptian government, and was in contact with Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon for cooperation. These contacts were however broken after 1968. Said further states that "*Nyerere obviously launched a crusade against Muslim unity.*"(Said 1989:2) and he is clear in his verdict on history, claiming that CCM has alienated itself from its founders and that the de-Islamization of the party has now gone full circle. In describing BAKWATA Mohamed Said is even more merciless:

The word BAKWATA is a word of insult. To refer to a Muslim as a BAKWATA member is like calling a Christian a disciple of Judas Iscariot who sold Jesus for 30 pieces of silver. (Said 1989:3)

Said concludes by saying that the Muslim identity was wiped out of CCM in that the party should be a party without religion. It is now time for Muslims to wake up and recapture their lost

political power, is the message of Mohamed Said and he refers to the increased activity among the Muslims all over Tanzania. More than 100 Muslim organizations, even though only a few of them are registered, have according to Said been formed around the country. He says that the government is afraid to register the new organizations because they want to protect the power of BAKWATA. But this cannot go on, says Said and continues: "*Because of the anti-Muslim campaign even the most liberal Muslims have become radicalized.*" (Said 1989:5)

But not only the previous governments are the targets of the criticism from this new and very vocal element among Tanzania Muslims. The present President, who by many Christians has been accused of being religiously influenced in his political appointments and extremely lenient towards Muslim militants, is also being criticized by these Muslims. They accuse Mwinyi of failing to create an environment where the imbalance that the Muslims have suffered could be redressed. They are also disappointed that Mwinyi has not appointed more Muslims ministers and general secretaries in his government. This way the President is under double fire and is divided between the policy and tradition of his party and the new demands from the Muslims that feel that now is the time to restore the pride of the Muslims (Africa Events March 1993:22).

3.2.1 The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in East Africa

In the Islamic intellectual tradition in East Africa the writings and the teachings of Sheikh al Amin bin Ali al-Mazrui (1891-1947) is by far the most prominent. Prior to al-Mazrui's activities several *ulama*, Islamic teachers, had acted as mediators between East Africa and the larger Islamic communities in Mecca, Medina, Cairo and as far as Constantinople, but none of them has attracted as much academic interest as Sheikh al-Amin. It was left to him to arouse the much needed social consciousness and commitment among the Muslims of the East African coast. His personal crusade was against the forces hostile to Islam, and he expressed himself through private and public mosque seminars, through journalistic ventures and through his scholarly publications. His efforts did a lot to provide social and religious leadership that was so lacking in East Africa around 1930, when his activities reached their climax (Elmasri 1987:229).

Sheikh al-Amin al Mazrui was in socio-economic and political matters considered a radical whereas in theological and juristic matters he was decidedly a conservative. He sought to change the attitudes of Muslims in the matters that he considered responsible for their backwardness; their indifference to modern education, their neglect of women's education and their economic extravagance. Al-Mazrui was eager to emphasize that it was not Islam that was the cause of the

Muslim backwardness, but that rather the Muslim neglect of the Islamic teachings caused their misery. It would not be correct to say that Sheikh al-Amin was criticizing the entire Muslim community in East Africa. What he was critical of was that group of Muslims comprised by the Arab and the Swahili population. He compared them to the Asian Muslims who encouraged entrepreneurship and thrift, who pioneered women's education and public philanthropy. He also compared them to the Christians who through their adoption of Western education had made rapid progress. One of al-Mazrui's main aims was to encourage Muslims to accept secular education. Prior to his efforts there had been a few incidents of priests persuading Muslim children to convert into Christianity. This created fear among Muslim parents who refused to send their children to the schools because they suspected that secular education would alienate their children from their Islamic religion and culture. In the case of sending young female Muslims to these schools, the parents were even more reluctant. Sheikh al-Amin through his clever and learned argumentation was however able to persuade many Muslim parents that there was no contradiction between secular education and Islamic religion and culture. He often quoted the Prophet's own teaching that Muslims should seek education wherever they could find it, even if it be in China. It was through these efforts that, from the late 1930s, a generation of highly educated Muslims emerged, among them Sheikh al-Amin's own son Ali Mazrui, who turned out to be an internationally eminent political scholar.

Another important lasting contribution of Sheikh al-Amin is the more progressive view of modern Islam. Al-Mazrui managed to enlighten people to see the true spirit of Islam as a religion of social progress. He fought against conservatism and *bid'a*³⁵ practices, many of which were bordering on superstition and unIslamic practices. He also emphasized the necessity of positive social organization and welfare in the Islamic community. The importance of economic and social activities that brought progress was another issue which was central to Sheikh al-Amin's teaching. All these efforts have made him reckoned as the initiator of the new revivalist and modernist movement of Islam on the coast of East Africa (Elmasri 1987:230-232).

It was as a social observer and analyst who sought to adapt the teachings of the Koran to the present society that Sheikh al-Amin presented himself through his writings. His radicalism came from his reluctance to confine his readings to the traditional Hadramaut literature that characterized the East African *ulama*. He read modernist theology and jurisprudence coming

³⁵*Bid'a* is an innovation, a belief or practice for which there is no precedent in the time of the Prophet. Thus a distinction can be made between "good" and "bad" *bid'as*. A good *bid'a* must not be contrary to the Koran, the Sunna or a specific tradition (Encyclopedia of Islam vol I 1960:1199).

from al-Azhar³⁶ and Egypt in general. Al-Mazrui also himself contributed to Egyptian magazines that were preoccupied with the plight and decadence of Islamic societies. Together with his Egyptian intellectual contemporaries Taha Husayn (1889-1973) and Ahmad Amin (1886-1954) he shared their admiration for some of the more moderate ideas of Muhamad Abduh and Jamaludin al-Afghani³⁷. Sheikh al-Amin was especially preoccupied with Abduh's social commentaries on the state of the Muslim world vis-a-vis the Western world. Al-Mazrui compared Abduh's Egypt, which had a Coptic Christian minority which was far more intellectually and economically developed than the majority of the Muslims, to East Africa where the Christians had made great strides in the educational and economical spheres. Like Muhammed Abduh, Sheikh al-Amin found the roots of this decadence in the Muslim inability to follow the Islamic path. Their neglect of religious duties had ruined their communal spirit, the *ummah*, so essential for economic, social and political progress. This analysis was the starting point for Sheikh al-Amin al-Mazrui's crusade to reform East African Muslims (Elmasri 1987:231).

To fight the heretical Qadianis³⁸, who started intensive missionary work in the region in the 1930s (Westerlund 1980:47) became another important issue to al-Mazrui. He argued that the Qadianis were successful because the East African Muslims did not bother to study their religion seriously, and because they were so well organized. In addition they had translated the Koran into Swahili, which was the only Swahili-translation of the Koran available. Sheikh al-Amin set himself the task to translate the Koran into Swahili to correct the Qadiani misconceptions which were widely published. Al-Mazrui was, however, not able to complete his translation of the Koran before the scourge of tuberculosis struck him dead. Throughout his life as a writer and as a teacher he had gathered around him a circle of bright students and among them the legacy of Sheikh al-Amin al-Mazrui was carried on (Elmasri 1987:232).

Among the students who followed Sheikh al-Amin was the Zanzibarian Abdallah Saleh Farsy (1912-1982), who turned out to be the most prominent of al-Mazrui's followers. Farsy grew up on Zanzibar which in the early 20th century not only was a commercial but also an educational centre with long traditions. There was a constant flow of students between the islands and the

³⁶The al-Azhar University in Cairo, connected with the al-Azhar Mosque is reckoned as the leading university in the Muslim world (Opsal 1994:317).

³⁷The ideas and the writings of Abduh and al-Afghani will be further elaborated in chapter five.

³⁸The Qadianis was the name given to the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) who claimed to be the promised Messiah of the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims. They were also called Ahmadiyah (Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics vol. X 1974:530).

intellectual centres of al-Azhar, Mecca and Medina. In addition to the religious education, Zanzibar had adopted the British educational system where secular subjects had the priority. Consequently, relative to other East African colonies, Zanzibar had the highest number of literates in both Arabic and Roman scripts. The presence of this intellectually sophisticated environment encouraged Farsy to choose a theological career. Farsy was able to study under learned Sheiks who taught the Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence. He applied himself conscientiously to jurisprudence and Koranic exegesis, but it was the study of the methodology of the Hadith collection that occupied most of his time and energy. He came through these studies to be considered the greatest authority on the prophetic traditions in East Africa. Farsy continued his master Sheikh al-Amin's work by sharing his knowledge with the Islamic population in East Africa through the Swahili language. Farsy was comfortable with Arabic, but saw the education of the masses as his most important task and continued al-Mazrui's translation of the Koran into Swahili. The fight against the heretical views of the Qadianis was also continued by Farsy, and in the preface to the new translation of the Koran Sheikh Farsy emphasized that this translation preceded that of the Qadianis (Elmasri 1987:236).

The most important issue that both al-Mazrui and Farsy devoted themselves to was that of defending orthodox Islam in East Africa. This was mainly done by teaching and publishing their works in Swahili. But especially Farsy also fought for an increased focus on Arabic teaching in the schools. In this capacity he is best remembered for his introduction of the Islamic syllabus in the school system which today is still being used. Both Sheikh al-Amin and Sheikh Farsy were deeply concerned with the lack of religious knowledge among the Arab and Swahili Muslims in East Africa. They both concluded that the lack of community spirit, the badly organized *madrasas* and the low level of education among Muslims had to be dealt with through an intensified focus on religious education to the masses and a return to the path of the true orthodox Islam (Elmasri 1987:232-236).

Among the present intellectual Muslims in East Africa the Shia Sheikh Seyyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi is the most outspoken and clear-minded. He is one of the initiators behind the periodical, *The Light*, which is published by the Bilal Muslim Mission of Tanzania. The Bilal Mission is situated in Dar es Salaam and Rizvi is holding the title of "Chief Missionary" of *The Light* (he was earlier the editor).

One of Rizvi's main preoccupations is the idea of Islamic leadership. He accuses the Sunni scholars who through "hundred and thousands of articles, books and treaties" try to show that the Islamic system of government is based upon democracy. Rizvi also attacks those Muslims who

claim that Islam teaches and creates socialism. *“All this changing with the wind is making mockery of the Islamic system of leadership.”*(Rizvi 1990:5). Sheikh Rizvi asserts that Islam is not the government of the people but it is the government of Allah, by the representatives of Allah to gain the pleasure of Allah. He uses the Prophet himself to underline his criticism of the modernist Muslims both in East Africa and in the rest of the Muslim world:

The Holy Prophet is the highest authority of Islam: he combines in his person all the functions of legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government; and he was not elected by the people. (Rizvi 1990:6)

Apart from writing about the teachings of the Koran and answering questions concerning religious practices, Rizvi is best known for his comments on international politics and religious events. His articles in *The Light* reveal a very strong anti-Western attitude shown through his analysis of the Western political world dominion. Rizvi tends to interpret most political actions carried out by Western nations as moves in what he calls “the ongoing -” or “the 4th Crusade.” He claims that the planning of the nation of Israel started already in 1917 when Great Britain occupied Palestine. This was fulfilled when the USA became the new world power after WW II. Everything went well for the Western powers until 1979 when Iran after the revolution broke its contact with the West and condemned Israel. Following this unexpected event, Rizvi claims that the West started their conspiracy against Islam which led to the Iraqi war against Iran. Also the Gulf conflict was created by the USA, when they fooled Saddam Hussein into attacking Kuwait. This was done in order to secure the Americans their oil-interests in the Gulf by helping the Gulf-states and create a large oil debt to Washington (Rizvi 1991:11). Even the fall of the Iron Curtain was a part in the plan to fight Islam, according to Rizvi:

What was unthinkable a few months earlier became a reality and USA and USSR became bosom friends. All these changes took place in order to free the powers of “Kufr” for fighting against the forces of Islam. (Rizvi 1991:12)

As a leading Shia intellectual in the region Sheikh Rizvi is naturally very pro-Iranian. He sees the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as the succession of the first Imams, fighting for the oppressed. Iran has taken the leading role in the Muslim world as the force behind liberation from the oppressors from the West. *“Thus, all Islamic countries such as Iran must spiritually and financially support countries which are fighting colonizing countries.”* (Rizvi 1983:23) However,

the sorrow of the Muslim world is in Rizvi's eyes that Khomeini's revolution has failed to make Islam the world's third force. The revolution has aroused Islamic revolutionary fervour throughout the world, but it has not been able to unite the Muslim world, Rizvi states:

The conservative governments of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea regions are not interested in uniting as Muslims although all of them are proud of their own devotion to Islam and Islamic leadership. (Rizvi 1983:24)

Sheikh Rizvi is clear in his verdict on the lack of devotion in the other Muslim countries to the universal *ummah* of the Muslims. He claims that the puritanical Saudi government is busy strengthening its own power. The so-called Muslim government in Egypt is using the same methods as the Shah of Iran used to suppress the revolutionaries in Iran. In Iraq the greatest Muslim revolutionaries are either killed or deported. The list of Rizvi's complaints about his Muslim brothers is long, but most of all he attacks the rich Gulf-states:

The stupendous wealth of the oil-producing Islamic countries has not benefited their Muslim masses, let alone benefiting other Muslim countries. It has gone a long way to enrich a small number of Shayks, Amirs, Sultans and their families and dependants, instead of benefiting Muslims as a whole. (Rizvi 1983:24)

An attempt to make a summary of Sheikh Rizvi's view of the Islamic revival and its relationship to the West must contain his emphasis on human values and his focus on the alleviation of human suffering. The Islamic revival is according to Rizvi not pitted against scientific or industrial development, but against the colonial domination of Russia and the USA. Nor is it a confrontation between the revivalists and the Western world as such, but it urges Muslims living in the West to fight against all evil in the non-Muslim world. This was, according to Rizvi, the message of al-Afghani and Abduh, and it is also the message of Imam Khomeini (Rizvi 1983:26).

3.3 Christian Organizations

3.3.1 The Catholic and Protestant Churches

Tanzania is somewhat different from other African countries because of the absence of Christian independent churches. Apart from some independent churches in the Southern parts of Tanzania which belonged to the "Watchtower Movement" and were quite short-lived, Tanzanian Christianity is mainly organized in the churches that were established by missionaries in the 19th century. The two main church organizations in Tanzania are the Catholic Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (TEC) and the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). TEC is the organization that represents most of the Christians in the country since approximately two thirds of Tanzania's Christians belong to the Catholic church. CCT is an umbrella organization which represents various protestant denominations, the Lutherans, the Anglicans and the Moravians being the most influential. These two organizations have been the channels through which the government has been in touch with the church. Whenever major political decisions affecting the church are being discussed, representatives from these two organizations have meetings with either the President or a minister. The organizations have, because of their close ties to the government, been looked upon as representing Tanzanian Christians as a whole, even if Pentecostal and other new churches have not been members of CCT.

Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches have throughout history largely been funded by the West, and the missionaries set the standards for the services, the liturgy, the music etc. The leadership, especially the Catholic hierarchy, was largely made up of non-Africans. African music was for a long time condemned because it was associated with dancing, which many missionaries considered morally wrong. The different denominations seldom cooperated, they experienced rather a competition in the conversion of Africans.

The era of independence slowly changed some of the attitudes of the churches. A tendency towards Africanization was experienced both in finance and in leadership. The Protestant churches were far ahead of the Catholic churches in these matters, this was partly due to the fact that during World War II several Protestant churches were left by themselves when German missionaries were interned. The time of independence also strengthened the trend of cooperation and ecumenism, and here the Vatican II played an important part. The two churches had several joint projects in broadcasting, education, medicine etc. But ecumenism was first of all an elite phenomena which did not necessarily show on grassroot level. Gradually Africanization also appeared in terms of songs and music, and the theology changed together with the political

development of the country as both CCT and TEC developed strong ties to the government (Westerlund 1980: 54-55).

When multi-party democracy was introduced in 1992, the churches did not react enthusiastically. The relationship between the churches and the new parties was from the start very tense, and pastors were discouraged from participating in politics. Opposition parties that asked for prayers before their meetings were refused, and some opposition leaders even claim that they were not allowed to attend the regular Sunday services in the established churches. A result of this was that the churches outside TEC and CCT in the first period after the decision to introduce multi-party system somewhat surprisingly established ties to the new political parties (Ludwig 1994:8-9).

3.3.2 The Growth of the Pentecostal Churches

When the different churches in Tanzania are represented in connection with the changes in the relationship with Muslims, the Pentecostal churches deserve a closer presentation than the Protestant and the Catholic church. The reason behind this is that this church has caused the greatest change both in Tanzanian Christianity and in the relationship of the churches to the Muslim denominations the last decade.

The Pentecostal church has been present in Tanzania since 1927, but its influence was marginal until the 1970s. The Holiness Mission, as the first Pentecostal organization, started their work in the Mbeya region. From 1949 their work was taken over by the Assemblies of God. In 1932 the Swedish Free Mission arrived and started their work in the Tabora region. The Pentecostal Bible School in Mbeya, which was founded in 1959, resulted in many successful preachers from this centre, and evangelization campaigns were started to most of Tanzania's regions. The success of the campaigns is by the church partly explained with the political situation in Tanzania in the 1970s. The villagization programme during the *ujamaa* period helped to make the church grow. Many villages needed preachers and the Pentecostals were much more flexible and could adapt themselves more quickly to the new situation than the Catholic and the main Protestant churches, which were located in their old, established buildings. The enforced mobility may also have made people more adaptable to new religious concepts and doctrines.

Pentecostalism spread significantly during the 1970s, and especially the Assemblies of God grew rapidly. The Assemblies developed into a well organized institution and has now an

archbishop as its spiritual head and a General Council as its executive organ. The General Council meetings decide whether new sections or dioceses will be formed. Up to now there are formed 38 sections and five regions or dioceses are represented by their own bishops.

After a long period of success the Pentecostals in Tanzania experienced a time of splittings. The largest Pentecostal church, the Swedish Free Mission (SFM), faced problems and some of its earlier member churches in 1982 formed the Pentecostal Association in Tanzania. Around the same time The Tanzanian Assemblies of God experienced a struggle for power with the result that a new organization, the Evangelistic Assemblies of God was formed. But it seems that the splittings were no hindrance for the further spread of the movement, rather the opposite. It is hard to estimate the exact numbers of the Pentecostal churches since very few of them keep records, but the total number of Pentecostals in Tanzania could be approximately half a million.

As a result of the Good Friday riots in Dar es Salaam 1993 the government decided that no religious organization could be registered without being part of an umbrella organization like BAKWATA or CCT. The Pentecostal churches which existed outside the established churches had to form their own organization, and in June 1993 the Pentecostals Council of Tanzania (PTC) was formed. Even if the decision to form the council was pushed forward by the government, the need of a unifying body had been felt for a long time in the Pentecostal movement. The PTC has as its aim to represent Pentecostal interests and coordinate the churches' open-air meetings and radio broadcastings. This means that some form of cooperation with the government will be necessary and it will also lead to some kind of integration into the present political system for the Pentecostal Council of Tanzania (see Ludwig 1994:5-10).

3.3.3 The Charismatic Influence on the Protestant Churches

Both Islam and Christianity have experienced a worldwide revival the last decades, but the results of the revivals have been different. The Christian revival has to a large extent affected churches in Tanzania where the focus on charismatic gifts goes far beyond Pentecostalism. Especially the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) has changed its attitude towards this phenomenon. Charismatic gifts like visions, prophecies and healing by prayer are nowadays widely accepted among the Lutheran churches. Especially healing by faith is more and more integrated in the church activities, as explained by bishop Mwakisunga:

We don't use any paraphernalia, herbs or medicine but simply prayers of faith. And thank God, many sick Christians are coming to pray instead of consulting diviners and medicine-men. Many have received healing from God, this includes those who are demonically possessed. (Ludwig 1994:7)

The new trend in evangelization is the open air meetings that seem to have become a regular happening. Every year at least one big "crusade" is taking place in Dar es Salaam. Behind these arrangements are representatives of the Assemblies of God, the Lutheran Church and the Anglican Church. The three churches work together in the "Big November Crusade Ministries." This organization was formed in 1989/90 and has since 1990 also worked outside Dar es Salaam. In 1991 there were crusades in 12 regions of Tanzania. The big "power crusades" go on for about two weeks and in Dar es Salaam there have been at the peak 200.000 people attending. Preachers from outside Tanzania are often invited and the German Reinhard Bonnke is a regular visitor (see Ludwig 1994:5-10).

3.4 Christian Fundamentalism

3.4.1 Omari's View on Christian Fundamentalism

The sociologist C.K. Omari has also noticed the change among the Christian churches in Tanzania. In his writings from 1987 the chapter "New Trends" has a sub-heading called "Fundamentalism or Fanatism" where he handles what he calls Christian fundamentalism. Omari is not very exact when he describes the phenomena, but my understanding is that his interpretation of Christian fundamentalism or fanaticism is the trend represented by the charismatic and Pentecostal churches. What Omari criticizes is first of all the more active and outspoken evangelization that is a common feature among these churches.

Fundamentalist attitudes towards people of other faiths are rigid and tend to create antagonism among people of one nation. If this is allowed to continue it will in the long run destroy the existing good Christian-Muslim relationship. (Omari 1987:66)

He also says that these Christians do not have a theological basis of wanting any political change, so they are not, like the Muslims, in that sense a threat to the stability of the nation, but rather a threat on the personal level (Omari 1987:66).

In an interview during my field study in 1994 Omari explained the Christian revivalism with a gap that is left by the mainline churches. The mainline churches have not fulfilled certain religious principles, and thereby left a vacuum where other new churches have gained a foothold. He also said that this revivalism among Christians is not going to get involved in politics, they will separate themselves from politics because they are preparing for the future.

This world is not yours, so look for the future. The revival among Christians is anti - perhaps not modernity in sense, but in participating in civic order...My estimates are that the charismatic revival will continue because it appeals to the poor, and it may go on for a while, but it won't survive the next century because it does not answer all the questions. (Omari 1994B)

Social problems might therefore from Omari's point of view be one of the explanations of the revival of more fundamental Christianity. Omari continues by saying that the poor cannot "eat" the religion therefore they will sooner or later seek other material gains. There is, however, one side of the Christian revivalism that Omari has problems explaining. The interesting thing about the Christian revivalism is that it appeals not only to the poor but also to the intellectuals in Tanzania. Omari says that this is a phenomenon that he has to look further into but his theory about the revivalism is so far still the same; "... social problems may be one of the causes, but perhaps more a religious vacuum." (Omari 1994B)

3.4.2 Ludwig's View on Christian Fundamentalism

Frieder Ludwig in his chapter "After ujamaa - Is Religious Revivalism a Threat to Tanzania's Stability" also deals with the new elements in Tanzanian Christianity. Like Omari, Ludwig accuses the new Christian trend of being aggressive towards other religions:

A new feature of Tanzania's Christianity is the increasing influence of pentecostalism and so-called power-crusades, in which sometimes a very aggressive language is being used. The charismatic preachers emphasise personal holiness and personal salvation; thus the doctrine is individualistic and exclusive. (Ludwig 1994:6)

His main point is to focus on the attitude of the new Christian trend, what he calls "*the new aggressive charismatic approach*" (p.8). Ludwig also criticizes the cooperation the Big November Crusade Ministries has with the German preacher Reinhard Bonnke, whom he accuses of using a "*powerful or militant language*" (p.7). Ludwig also questions Bonnke's view upon Africa as a "*field which is ready for harvest*" (p.7) and claims that this is a view which does not leave much room for dialogue with other religions. Bonnke's attitude is often imitated by local preachers and Ludwig quotes one Vicar General in the Anglican church after Bonnke's visit in 1993;

People want excitement and feeling. In our churches we are still worshipping in the old ways of our forefathers, but our Christians also want to clap and sing and dance and give witness. (Ludwig 1994:8)

Ludwig concludes that this certainly is a new element in Tanzanian Christianity.

3.4.3 Mtikila and The Democratic Party

Israel Katoke's writings from 1994 tell about what he calls "Christian militants" that threatened to publish the book "Satanic Verses" in the heated first months of 1993, but Katoke is not specific when he speaks of these Christians (Katoke 1994:15). One Christian who, on the other hand, is often spoken about is Reverend Christopher Mtikila, pastor of a Full Salvation Church and leader of the Democratic Party. Because of the strong language he has used criticizing the ruling party and his outspokenness in the court cases which sometimes follow, he is a well known figure in the Tanzanian press. Mtikila grew up in a mission in the district of Ludowa, and later worked as a clerk before he got into business where he claims to have been very successful. In 1982 he had a "born-again" experience and have since been a pastor in the Full Salvation Church. From 1988 onwards he started criticizing the government and the President, and in the summer of 1992 he was allowed to form his own political party, called the Democratic Party. Most important of his political issues is the union with Zanzibar which he calls Nyerere's betrayal of his own people (Ludwig 1994:9). He is also known for his degrading statements on people of other ethnic origins than Tanganyikan, and has openly declared that his mission is to defend Christianity against Islam (Africa Events, March 1993:22).

3.4.4 Evaluation of Omari's View

In the following I will make a personal evaluation of the views on Christian fundamentalism represented by Omari and Ludwig. Professor C.K. Omari speaks in sociological terms when he is describing the new trends in Tanzanian Christianity. He claims that in the charismatic movements people tend to focus on the hereafter and the fact that Christians are "not of this world." He seems to think that the poor that join the charismatic movement look for easy answers and a way out of their earthly misery, and will leave the movement as soon as they realize that their everyday life were not changed. His conclusion is that social problems is one of the reasons behind the revivalism of what he calls Christian fundamentalism. According to Walter Hollenweger this view is an old sociological theory trying to define the charismatic movements as sects which are trying to overcome the feeling of deprivation, and it is not important whether the deprivation is really overcome or merely allayed. Hollenweger rejects this theory by referring to more recent sociological works and uses Christian Lavile d'Epiay as an example. D'Epiay in his ambitious studies of the Pentecostal movement in Chile shows that the Pentecostal church not only creates the hope for a better world to allay the misery of everyday life, but creates a social framework that takes care of the members of the congregation by concentrating on finding work for its church members and focusing on care for the sick and teaching of basic education as parts of the gospel (Hollenweger 1972:465-67).

It is also a question whether Omari's sociologist terms is an adequate way of describing what is going on in the Pentecostal movement in Tanzania today. Is it possible to describe religion, the human faith in a personal God, only in terms of human reactions like Omari does? He claims that people come to the charismatic churches because of deprivation, in a search for security. But is it not possible that people who face serious problems search for the restorement of ties that go beyond material security, and that they will stay in the churches even though they cannot "eat" religion? Is it not possible that when all material security is gone, people will turn to the fundamental necessities of life, which to many people is religion? A weakness in Omari's theory is that he leaves these possibilities out and reduces the strength of religion as a force in itself. From my point of view, any theory trying to describe the religious situation in Tanzania that does not take seriously the spiritual content of religion must be regarded as incomplete.

Omari does, however, himself show that his theory is incomplete by referring to the fact that in Tanzania the charismatic revival also appeals to the intellectuals. This tendency was new to Omari and he did not have any sociological explanation of this phenomenon. To me this is a sign that the charismatic movement is a strong and unpredictable movement that contains elements which have been missed by many Christians regardless of social and intellectual status.

Hollenweger describes it as the "second wave" when, after the poor and intellectually deprived have started the movement, the intellectuals and the economically well-off join the Pentecostals (Hollenweger 1972:462). There are also several examples from the history of the Pentecostal movement that the charismatic revival has started among the intellectuals and economically well-off (Engelsviken 1975:35-38).

Omari continues to explain the situation by claiming that a gap is left by the church to be filled by other denominations, and here Omari is in line with Hollenweger who argues that the growth of the Pentecostal church is partly due to the inability of the established churches to communicate its faith (Hollenweger 1972:462). The established churches in Tanzania today experience an attraction towards the charismatic movement, and both the Anglican and the Lutheran churches have joined the Big November Crusade Ministries on this background. What especially the Lutheran church experiences is an acknowledgment that all of the biblical principles have to be taken into consideration in the life of the congregation, also the charismatic gifts. The fact that the Pentecostal churches have a tradition of focusing on these elements, which are new to many Christians, has given them a rapid growth. People have, through the charismatic elements in Christianity, experienced that the church can cover fields where the traditional religion was once dominant, like healing of the sick and exorcism.

These elements are new elements in the Christianity in Tanzania, having earlier been left out by the established churches. My understanding of Omari is that he considers the charismatic revivalism as the filling of a religious vacuum and a result of social problems. The interesting question is, however, whether Omari sees these new charismatic elements as only a new fascinating approach adopted by the congregations to attract people to the church, or biblical elements that, properly carried out, will lead to continued growth. Partly he touches this issue by saying that he does not think the growth will outlast this century, because by then people will find out that the movement did not answer all their questions.

Omari's theories are interesting but somewhat incomplete because they only describe human reactions and does not take into consideration the spiritual content of Christianity that can change the life of human beings and, as a result of that, make the church grow.

3.4.5 Evaluation of Ludwig's View

Frieder Ludwig criticizes the attitude of the charismatic movement, more than the essence of it. His chapter is to a large extent descriptive, but his critical attitude towards a man like Reinhard Bonnke is obvious. What Ludwig first mentions and later repeats is the aggressive attitude of the charismatic movement. Here we face a large problem in analyzing Christian movements. The attitude in evangelization will always be influenced by the theology of the movements, and depends on which aspects in the theology of religions the movements choose to follow. Ludwig does not draw any lines in a discussion concerning theology of religions. The attitude of evangelization is, however, always built on some - conscious or non-conscious - theology of religions. The charismatic movements practice an exclusive theology of religions, i.e. they focus on the necessity of personal conversion. Those who reject this personal conversion will be entirely lost. Therefore, evangelization is utmost important for the movement, being viewed as a matter of life or death. To them active evangelization is the fulfillment of the missionary command of the Bible. To others, who view the question of salvation differently, active evangelization will easily be understood as “aggressive approach.” In commenting on the matter we have to draw lines between sincere and aggressive evangelization and attitude, and here we will always be ruled by our own background, experiences and cultural context. The Christian faith demands us as Christians to share the gospel and to be eager to win other people for our faith, but the guidelines which we shall follow in doing this is to a large extent left to ourselves to consider. The personal witness is often an important part of evangelization, but we still face the problem, what are the limits that a witness has to work within. Kenneth Cragg once said that mission and theology belong together because the faith is always brought by someone else³⁹, the way we deliver the message is influenced by our view upon evangelization. A factor that necessarily has to be taken into consideration, regardless of line chosen in the theology of religions, is respect. Respect of the personal faith and religious background of other human beings is the most important element. Evangelization is spreading the good news and that is possible without patronizing the target of evangelization. In a society like Tanzania, where Christianity and Islam are the two major religions, one should be extra careful not to ruin a good relationship, which is the basis of further evangelization.

Ludwig also criticizes the Big November Crusade Ministries' cooperation with the German preacher Reinhard Bonnke. Again it is Bonnke's aggressive language and attitude that is the case

³⁹At a seminar at the Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology March 1 1994.

of discussion. Bonnke is a famous world evangelist and he is known to regard Africa as a special field of his mission. Bonnke is not himself interested in discussing theology and dialogue, his attitude is more pragmatic. In Oslo Spectrum in 1993 he told the audience about an experience he had in a theological debate on TV. When Bonnke was asked about his opinion on the matter discussed, he answered that he was not there to "*split hairs*" (discuss theology) but he was there to "*populate heaven*."⁴⁰ Reinhard Bonnke's arrivals in other African countries have caused upheavals. When he arrived Kano in Nigeria in October 1991 fatal clashes between Christians and Muslims occurred because the way the campaign was announced provoked some Muslims. According to the Nigerian Tribune 300 people were killed in the clashes. The governor in Kano reported that 35 people were injured and 74 arrested while a church, a mosque and 15 cars were burnt. Newspaper reporters claimed that they counted 120 burnt-out shops (Rasmussen 1993:96). One cannot blame Bonnke personally for incidents like the one in Kano, but it ought to make one consider the extremely powerful forces one is dealing with. The Bible encourages us to maintain peace, and that should in most cases be possible without compromising the Gospel. The Tanzanian preachers who want to imitate the style of Reinhard Bonnke must pay attention to their religious context - they have to consider the consequences of what they preach, they cannot, like Bonnke, just leave their country after a crusade.

But the development among the non-established Christian groups is moving in a positive direction. After the formation of the Pentecostal Council of Tanzania the movement has agreed on following certain general lines. The constitution of PTC states as one of its objectives to:

...take measures to ensure its non involvement in politics, ensure cooperations with all persons, as well as the Government and other public organs, in its endeavours to save and deliver man from all forms of oppression and to secure the promotion of peace and national unity. (Ludwig 1994:10)

Also the Big November Crusade Ministries has achieved an agreement with the government after the ban of religious open air-meetings. John B. Lutembeke, secretary of the Crusade Ministries puts it this way:

⁴⁰The Pentecostal World Conference in Oslo 1993, "Populate Heaven" is also the title of one of Reinhard Bonnke's books.

When we preach, we don't have to provoke other religions. We don't have to attack other people's faith. That is a condition. We have to promote unity - we must not preach against it. (Ludwig 1994:10)

Ludwig concludes his chapter by giving credit to the Pentecostals for setting up an umbrella organization which secures a more moderate attitude. He also registers that there is a tendency that the Pentecostals and Power-Crusaders are being more integrated in the established system of state/church relationship from which they have been excluded for a long time (Ludwig 1994:10).

My view is that the trend among the Christian denominations in Tanzania is positive. The fact that is indicated in Omari's theory that the mainline churches have left a gap is taken seriously by both the Lutheran and the Anglican churches. They are trying to fill this gap by presenting a Christianity where charismatic gifts, healing by prayer, singing and to some extent dancing has a natural place. This mode of worshipping has a long tradition in Africa, and in the search for their own way of expressing the Gospel it is a natural thing for Africans to bring their tradition into the church. In other parts of Africa this kind of contextualization has occurred in the independent African churches (Oosthuizen 1979), but in Tanzania these elements have found a place in the established churches, even though it is to a lesser extent than in the independent churches. Like their brothers in most other countries the Pentecostals in Tanzania are influenced by the power-crusades and other attitudes inherited from the United States, where the Pentecostal movement had its origin. But the fact that it was black Americans, descendants of African slaves that started the movement, makes it reasonable to talk about a circle that has now been closed more than about foreign influence. Rev. Rafik Daudjee, a pastor in the Tanzanian Assemblies of God's English-speaking congregation in Dar es Salaam expressed great satisfaction with the way the crusades had become a cooperation between the different churches (Daudjee 1994). The cooperation shows that the churches in Tanzania are dynamic and alive, willing to move in new directions to live out the Gospel.

3.4.6 Evaluation of Mtikila and the Democratic Party

What is a matter of concern in Tanzania today is when politicians like Rev. Mtikila are being linked with the church. His racist views cannot be accepted by the church and his attitude towards Muslims can endanger the good relationship on which moderate politicians are trying to

build a nation where people of different religions can exist side by side in peace. According to Africa Events (March 1993:22) Mtikila's followers went on rampage after a mass rally - beating up Indians and Arabs and attacking their shops. Reporters claimed that even Africans wearing a *kanzu*, a Muslim cap or a *baibui*, veil worn by women, were targets of the bullies. Such incidents do not only disturb the political order in a country, but it also weakens the credibility of the church as long as Mtikila is still a pastor.

3.5 Summary

The last decade has clearly brought changes within both the Muslim and the Christian communities in Tanzania. Among the Muslims it is clear that the focus on more pure Islamic values has increased. Among the Christians a stronger devotion towards living out more perspectives of the Bible is visible. One might say that the religious revival is obvious in both camps even though the results of the revival are different. What is clear is that the two religious communities are drifting away from each other compared with the situation when the ideas of *ujamaa* were predominant. The Muslims now raise their voices because they feel that they have been neglected in terms of education and economic development, and their aim is to recapture their lost opportunities. Among the intellectual Muslims there are signs of influence of ideas from both moderate and more radical elements of Islam. Among some of the Christian denominations a fear of the Muslims increasing their influence in society is present. The biggest threat to peaceful religious coexistence from the Christian side is the increased focus on evangelism, which in some cases has led to confrontations with Muslims. The general trend among the Christian churches towards influence from the Pentecostal movement has led to a renewed vitality among the churches. There is, however, a danger that radical elements may abuse the new elements in the church to create antagonism. But the term Christian fundamentalists is hardly adaptable to the large majority of the charismatic Christians in Tanzania.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONAL REASONS BEHIND THE CHANGE

In this chapter different scholars present their views of the reasons behind the changes in the religious relationship in Tanzania. The common ground of these scholars is that they, in their variety of explanations, view internal changes in Tanzania as the most important factor behind the conflicts. Professor C.K. Omari from Tanzania claims that weak leadership is the main reason behind the increased hostility between the two religious groups. David Westerlund argues that religious matters were played down for the benefit of focusing on national unity. This is by Frieder Ludwig interpreted as if the conflict between Christians and Muslims also through the *ujamaa* years was present, but after the fall of the ideology again became visible. The anthropologist Kjersti Larsen is giving a wider range of explanations of the change in the relationship. She claims that the fact that religion has become a public and a political matter has affected the religious relationship. She also focuses on social problems as a reason behind the increased Islamist tendencies found in Tanzania.

4.1 C.K. Omari: Identity and Religion in Politics and the Question of Leadership

To reach a deeper understanding of the political development in East Africa there are certain issues that have to be looked further into. Which factors are important in the development of a country and what makes people react the way they do? It is interesting to lend an ear to the current discussion among sociologists about the African identity. According to Omari (1994) there are two major factors that have to be considered when discussing African identity. The former is religion and the latter is ethnicity. In this presentation I will focus on religion's part in politics, using C.K. Omari's article "Identity and Conflict in Africa with Reference to Tanzania" (1994) to present his theory and discuss the content of it. The discussion concerning ethnicity in politics is very interesting when referring to certain African countries, but in Tanzania the ethnic dimension in politics is relatively small compared to the influence of religion.

4.1.1 African Identity

Mazrui (1986) is in his book "Africans - a Triple Heritage" analyzing the Africans, their identity and their civilization. To him the cultural heritage of Africa can be divided into three parts which he calls the triple heritage; the Indigeneous, the Semitic and the Western. Interesting in this context is that Mazrui separates the three main religions in Africa into these categories. He claims that the indigenous religion is the basic African religion, but adds that Judaism and Islam also can be considered true African religions. Christianity, however, is considered a religion from Europe, rejected by its own (Mazrui 1986:37). In the discussion about the true African identity, Mazrui is opposed by Omari (1994), who refers to Mbiti (1986) and himself, claiming that Christianity also can be reckoned a true African religion, using Ethiopia and North Africa as his examples (Omari 1994:1). To Omari it seems important to stress that Christianity and Islam cannot be contrasted in a way where one religion is considered more "African" than the other. What is made perfectly clear in his article is that religion is one of the factors that influence people's identity in Africa, and here he finds support among both Mazrui and Mbiti (Omari 1994:2). This point is also supported by Kjersti Larsen (1995) who affirms the importance of religion as a part of people's identity.

4.1.2 Religion in Politics

C.K. Omari's article on identity and conflict in Africa (1994) deals with the influence of religion in Tanzania politics. He refers to Brown's analysis from 1989 showing that Western scholars have underestimated the importance of religion in Third World's politics (Omari 1994:7). Brown claims that Western scholars have used other paradigms⁴¹ and theories when explaining the political life of Third World countries. Omari agrees with these results, saying that religion's part in Third World politics is considerable, especially when it is related to access to power and authority in society. Omari claims in the following that religion is in Africa being used for two main purposes. First it is used as a means to access to power and authority. Secondly this often leads to access to resources available. This latter point is very important in developing countries which often have a limited access to resources. It is a pattern which Omari finds in several African countries, and he claims that especially religions which do not separate politics from religion, can use religious ideology, through politics, as *"a road to the accumulation of wealth by few in the leadership group and their relatives."* (Omari 1994:8).

⁴¹Paradigm will in this chapter be used in the sense that it denotes a pattern of observing and explaining a political or religious situation.

4.1.3 Access to Power and Authority

Omari's next move in his article is to apply his theory to the situation in Tanzania. He starts by referring to popular statements that circulate in Tanzania. Some have claimed that under Nyerere, the Christian religion was predominant in politics and development. Accordingly others now link the domination in politics to Islam under Mwinyi. Omari underlines that these arguments are emotional and need further examination. An example of these emotional tendencies is when small radical Islamic groups, mainly externally led, claim that the majority of the population are Muslims. They state that the President is a Muslim, and therefore the other key ministers should also be Muslims, and there should be an Islamic state. These claims, when linked to the appointment of Muslim ministers to key positions, might according to Omari lead to a linkage between religion and politics.

But what Omari finds even more disturbing is when Christian institutions have been targets for burnings and destructions and the suspects of these raids are Muslim radicals who have publicly stated that their aim is to make living impossible for Christians in Tanzania. When such incidents have not been met by sharp reactions from the government, many Christians naturally conclude that religion has permeated politics. The same thing happens, according to Omari, when the government accepts grants and aid from predominantly Islamic countries which also are prepared to export Islamic fundamentalist ideology (Omari 1994:8).

Omari continues by referring to the fact that historically Muslims have lagged behind Christians in education and other aspects of development. When Nyerere's regime nationalized all schools in 1969, the aim was to give Muslims equal opportunities in the field of education. But cultural constraints have obstructed Muslim youths, especially girls, from attending higher education. If higher education and political experience were to be the only criteria for appointments to the higher posts in government, few Muslims would satisfy such demands. The result is, according to Omari that some people get into politics through religious identity, without proper qualifications or experience.

As a result, some have proved competent and some have not. In fact those who were known to be incompetent but were appointed nevertheless, have shown their true colour. (Omari 1994:9)

On the part of religion as a means to access to power and authority, Omari concludes that the religious identity becomes the easy way of government activity. A high level of corruption and incompetence is the result of very little principles and ethical considerations. Religion is, according to Omari, being blamed instead of individuals.

4.1.4 Access to Resources Available

The second part of Omari's theory deals with the accessibility to the resources available. During the *ujamaa* period, leadership positions were constructed not to have access to the available resources. Codes were established to minimize corruption and equity was emphasized. Anyone holding a public office was for instance not allowed to receive two or more salaries. After the collapse of the *ujamaa* policy and the adoption of free-market ideology, there has according to Omari been a lack of ethics in politics. The liberalization process has been without guidelines, and for some, leadership in politics has been the road to accumulated wealth. The liberalization of the economy came at the time when the government was identified with Islam. As a result, Islam has been associated with the corruption in the government. Omari claims that again religion is being blamed instead of individuals (Omari 1994:9).

4.1.5 Conclusion

Omari's conclusion is that what is happening in Tanzania is not a result of a change within the religious communities, but rather a result of weak leadership. After the fall of the ideology from Eastern Europe and the introduction of Western ideologies based on secularism⁴², Omari claims that religious identity is gaining importance among people in Tanzania. This process may lead to the development of conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the struggle for access to power and the resources available. Omari further suggests that Islam is quite clear on its role in politics on ethics and *ummah* (community), but in Christianity involvement in politics is the decision of the individual. Muslim fundamentalists want to rule the society through *sharia*, while the Christian fundamentalists would like to separate themselves from politics. Omari's theory is that such an attitude among the religious groups can lead to a government equipped with people who are only interested in their own situation. Omari's final conclusion is that the only possible way to avoid the now emerging problems is to build a strong secular state on the principles of

⁴²Omari claims that a weakness attached to Western secularism (which is the basis of capitalism and multi-party democracy) is that it does not take the centrality of religion into consideration (Omari 1994:3).

governance, accountability, well developed transparency and an informed civil society (Omari 1994:10).

4.1.6 Evaluation of Omari's View

C.K. Omari's theory about the reasons for the changes taking place in Tanzania contains certain important points that makes it worth further examination. The strength of his theory is that it underlines that religion is an important part of the African identity and that the debate on religion and politics in Tanzania is mainly built on emotions. My own experiences during my field work support these observations. Omari is also based in history when he explains that Muslims have never had the same possibilities as Christians in the field of higher education. Several people I met during my stay in Tanzania also agreed that the current President is lacking the strong leadership qualities that his predecessor Julius Nyerere possessed, and this point is well covered by Omari. I also find his point concerning the fall of the ideology of Eastern Europe and the introduction of free-market economy a relevant observation which has obviously affected the religious relationship in the country .

The weak side of Omari's article is however the simplicity of his conclusion. To blame the leadership of the country alone for the problem of religious involvement in politics seems somewhat easy. Implicit in such a conclusion is the thought that with a strong national leadership Islamist tendencies would never have gained a foothold in the country, regardless of tendencies in other Islamic societies. This thought is being opposed by both Smith (1990) and Sicard (1991), who argues that the external influence of new Islamic ideas in the area is considerable. Both the leaders of the country and the religious leaders have a great responsibility resting upon them to guide the people in political and religious questions. But also these leaders are influenced by trends, political as well as religious which are rooted outside their area of dominion. The political situation of Tanzania is influenced by the political situation in the rest of Africa and in the rest of the world, which Omari himself mentions. Religious revivalism as a tendency that is experienced all over the world will necessarily affect also Tanzania, regardless of who is in political control of the country. Omari's criticism of the Tanzanian leaders' lack of action against extreme religious groups is supported by most religious leaders in Tanzania and also by me, but to draw the conclusion that weak leadership is the major reason behind the change in the religious relationship in Tanzania is from my point of view to exaggerate the importance of the leaders.

The nucleus of my criticism of Omari is again his vague treatment of the term religion. He never makes a closer examination of the function of religion. He claims that religion is used by the leaders to increase their own power, and that might be correct in several African countries, but he denies considering religion as an independent force with a spiritual aspect that might influence people more than the political leaders of the country. From my point of view Omari in his article describes religion only as a sociological factor used to achieve power. By doing this he does not take the strength of what is happening in the religious communities seriously. The increased devotion among Muslims towards the Friday-prayers and the focus on the moral code of Islam (Larsen 1995), together with the search within the churches for ways of worshipping God in all aspects of life, goes in my opinion far beyond the search for personal power.

This new religious vitality also unfortunately contains some more militant elements which focus on the political side of religion more than the spiritual. These militant elements have caused a lot of damage to the relationship between Christians and Muslims. Omari himself questions the fact that Muslim extremists have not been prosecuted by the government after the destruction of church properties. But to draw the conclusion that the leaders are to blame and not religion, is to free the guilty from their responsibilities towards their religion. If what the Muslim extremists do is in the name of Islam, the Muslim community must feel responsible and handle these groups or at least publicly condemn their actions and work against them to promote what they consider the true form of Islam. Alternatively Islam must be blamed if what happens is in accordance with a common view of the religion. Also Christian groups that use means of promoting a gospel that is not in accordance with the message of the Bible have to be made responsible for what they do in the name of their religion.

My personal conclusion is that Omari's article helps us gain insight in the present situation in Tanzania, by elaborating interesting points like religion as a part of African identity, the emotional level of the debate inside the country and the weak national leadership. But I question his emphasis on one particular domestic reason, the weak national leadership, as the major cause behind the emerging troubles in Tanzania. This is done in sociological terms, describing religion only as a means of achieving personal advantages. Omari also frees the religious communities from the responsibility of actions done in the name of religion, by blaming the leaders of the country and not the ideology of the perpetrators.

4.2 David Westerlund and Frieder Ludwig: Compartmentalized Religion

In chapter one a brief summary of the concept of civil religion was given in order to explain the efforts made by Julius Nyerere and TANU to play down conflicts and focus on unity through the socialist concept of *ujamaa*. David Westerlund claims in his book "Ujamaa na dini" (1980) that what occurred was that religion was *compartmentalized*, i.e. it was given a metaphysical area of autonomy where society could not interfere. All earthly matters were taken care of by socialism, and the intention was that the creation of a united society with a civil religion should be so important that the focus on religious differences ceased to exist.

4.2.1 The Special Treatment of the Christian and the Muslim Groups

It was mentioned in chapter one that the national anthem and the parliamentary prayer were important parts of the civil religion promoted in Tanzania. Another important element in the creating of the socialistic policy of Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration, was also used by Nyerere to focus on civil religion, unity and devotion to the concept of *ujamaa*. Commenting on the Declaration Nyerere once said that the dedication to the Arusha Declaration was like a young Christian's or a young Muslim's act of dedication to his or her religion. But Nyerere said that the dedication in itself was not enough, it had to be followed by actions. The illustration made with reference to Christians and Muslims was frequently repeated by the former President, but a similar reference to believers of the traditional African religions was never made. The fact that only Christians and Muslims were mentioned was probably no coincidence since most of the politicians of TANU were either Muslims or Christians (Westerlund 1980:69).

This pattern of always referring to Christians and Muslims when focusing on national unity, leaving out both African religions⁴³ and other religious minorities is further investigated by Westerlund. In the programme for the Union Day Anniversary celebrations in 1967 it was decreed that celebrations of the second day should start in the morning with prayers "in churches, mosques etc." The fact that only mosques and churches were mentioned and that the other religions were brought together under "etc" is to Westerlund another indication of the special concern for Islam and Christianity shown by the government (Westerlund 1980:70). A third example of this concern was the large number of public holidays that were introduced in Tanzania after independence. These public holidays were supposed to be celebrated by

⁴³Traditional African religions were the religion of more than one third of the population in the 1967 census (Omari 1984:5).

everybody, but Westerlund questions whether Traditional Believers and Hindus participated wholeheartedly in the holidays motivated by Christianity or Islam. The demands from Christians and Muslims concerning religious festivals had to be met by the government since both groups could create problems for the regime. If the Hindus or the Traditional Believers felt discriminated against this was hardly a serious problem since none of these religious groups were in a position to cause the government any problems (Westerlund 1980:72).

4.2.2 The Attempt to Include the Social Aspect of Religion in the *Ujamaa* Philosophy

It was mentioned in the first chapter that TANU was supposed to be secular in all its work and that the party documents never raised the question of metaphysics or religion at all. The politicians of TANU could choose their own private religion, but as politicians they were not supposed to promote any specific religion. According to Westerlund this was not always successfully upheld. The politicians often acted religiously as politicians, and religion was frequently a part of politics. In this matter Nyerere was no exception. Westerlund points out that Nyerere was very conscious as to when religion was mentioned, for example during his visits to Peking in 1968 and to the Kremlin in 1969 there were no religious statements made by the President. In other contexts like radio broadcastings in Tanzania where the religious message was more favourably received, Nyerere sometimes included references to God, but Westerlund points out that these references were relatively few compared with for instance President Kaunda of Zambia, and he interprets this as a sign that there were greater risks for religio-political conflicts in Tanzania (Westerlund 1980:70).

Julius Nyerere and the leaders of TANU intentionally reserved religion to deal with metaphysical matters, but they still realized that there was a social aspect of religion that had to be dealt with in the process of making people join in the building of a strong socialism. In a speech at the university of Cairo in 1967, "The Varied Paths to Socialism," Nyerere compared the Koran and the Bible with books on socialism. He distinguished the two religious books from the political ones because the latter were written by man and no man is infallible. By this statement Westerlund claims that Nyerere puts the focus on the Tanzanian civil religion - the word of God is not only expressed in the Bible but also in the Koran, thus Nyerere again underlines his main aim, unity. But even more interesting is a statement made by Nyerere later in the same speech:

The human equality before God which is the basis of all the great religions of the world is also the basis of the political philosophy of socialism. (Westerlund 1980:71)

Westerlund claims that this is an example of how Nyerere tries to connect the social aspects of religion with the central concept of socialism, here on the basis of the belief in human equality. As Westerlund himself puts it:

...it can again be interpreted as a statement of civil religion, a search by a President in a religiously divided country for a least common denominator that could provide a religious legitimization for socialism or its kernel, (the belief in) human equality. (Westerlund 1980:71)

In the same manner some editorials in the TANU-controlled newspapers praised the Muslims for aspects of their religion that were in accordance with the aspects of socialism. In 1974 Daily News stated that man's equality before God was the symbol of the month of Ramadan, with no difference between rich or poor. The newspaper further used the opportunity to call for temperate behaviour with reference to Nyerere's repeated criticism of heavy drinking, urging people to cut down on alcohol and conserve energy for productive work. Credit and encouragement was also given to the Christians in terms of promoting the thoughts of *ujamaa*. At the opening of Mwena Leprosarium in Mtwava Region, financed by the Benedictine Fathers, Nyerere focused in his speech on the fact that he did not find it wrong that most patients would be Muslims.

I believe it is a recognition that whatever our particular beliefs about God and His prophets we can best worship him by living together, and working together, in harmony and in His service. (Westerlund 1980:74)

Westerlund again finds this an important statement of civil religion, as he does in Nyerere's speech to the Maryknoll Sisters from New York where Nyerere encouraged the Catholic church to welcome all who were fighting to promote social justice, and urged the church not to reject people who refused to acknowledge the divinity of Jesus. By this Westerlund understands that Nyerere considered socio-political goals as more important than dividing religious ideas such as the divinity of Jesus (Westerlund 1980:74).

4.2.3 Conclusion

In his concluding remarks in his chapter about civil religion David Westerlund summarizes the two major points elaborated in this chapter. First the special treatment for Christians and Muslims which shows that the government was aware of the problems lying latent in the relationship between the two religions. Secondly the fact that the political leaders in Tanzania realized that religion could not be completely divorced from politics and therefore attempted to argue that the socio-political consequences of Islam and Christianity were the same as the socio-political consequences of *ujamaa*, hence authoritative norms of *ujamaa*, like equality and brotherhood could be given not only a political but also a religious dimension.

The purpose of civil religion was to strengthen social solidarity, to decrease tensions between various religious groups, especially between Muslims and Christians. In other words, the civil religion aimed at creating or promoting national integration and the supremacy of ujamaa. (Westerlund 1980:75)

Westerlund concludes by saying that this kind of civil religion only can be created if people are willing to accept the primacy of politics and the attenuation of religion, and can exist only where the task to build the nation is more important than to build religion. Westerlund suggests that the civil religion perhaps can be viewed as a compromise between the conflicting tendencies in Islam and Christianity where the Muslims were urged not to mix religion with politics and the Christians were asked to play their part (Westerlund 1980:75).

"Ujamaa na dini" was written by Westerlund in 1980 without reference to the development the following decade, but Frieder Ludwig claims that Westerlund's focus on civil religion and compartmentalized religion shows that the conflict in Tanzania is not only a new conflict brought to the country by the general global revivalism or rich Arab states exporting ideas of Islamism. Ludwig sees the now emerging conflict as a result of history and says:

As the emergence of an African Christianity cannot be explained only by the gifts from rich European missions, the new Islamic revivalism cannot be sufficiently understood by referring to "oil wealth which is being pumped into Tanzania." (Ludwig 1994:15)

Ludwig's interpretation of Westerlund's conclusion aims at focusing on the conflict in Tanzania as a conflict that has existed as long as the two religions have been present in the area. According to Ludwig the conflict never ceased to exist, but by Nyerere's statesmanship and his ability to make his ideas the agenda of the day, people focused on the building of a socialist society and reduced the religious conflicts. Ludwig quotes the former economic adviser of Nyerere, Jumanne Wagao, who claims that "*...the fall of Ujamaa ideology is the main cause of the growth of religious militancy in Tanzania as the people grapple for alternative ideologies to help them pull out of stark poverty.*" (Ludwig 1994:15) By this Ludwig claims that the conflict mainly has internal reasons, and that the conflict was present but invisible also through the *ujamaa* period.

4.2.4 Evaluation of Westerlund's and Ludwig's Views

David Westerlund's thorough analysis of the relationship between religion and the political philosophy of *ujamaa* in Tanzania is an impressive study of Julius Nyerere's attempt to build a lasting socialist society with religions existing in peace, participating in the building of a common philosophy. Nyerere's political thoughts did not, and neither did the political ideas from Eastern Europe, survive the 1980s. But religious leaders in Tanzania still hope that his thoughts about peace between the religions will outlast changing political paradigms.

The central question of this evaluation is whether Frieder Ludwig is right in his claims that the religious conflict in Tanzania mainly is of national origin, and has existed all through the *ujamaa* period, and if Westerlund's thesis supports this. My opinion is that Ludwig is only partly right in his claims. If we consider the history of Tanzania, the period after independence was for the Muslim community characterized by a struggle between two factions. On one side was EAMWS⁴⁴ which consisted of Sunni and Shia Muslims where the Ismailis, who were Asian Shia Muslims, held the leadership positions (Westerlund 1980:179). This faction was oriented towards pan-Islamic ideas and had strong historical ties to Asian and Arab countries. This faction was however in the Islamic Crisis of 1968 outruled by the African Sunni Muslims who were in strong support of TANU and later created BAKWATA to be the voice of Tanzanian Muslims.

Is it then right to say that the conflict between Christians and Muslims still existed through the *ujamaa* period? Yes, in the sense that the Asian Muslims and their thoughts still existed even without any influence on the debate in Tanzania. No, in the sense that an overwhelming majority of the Muslims in Tanzania, being African Muslims, supported TANU and the line of avoiding a focus on religious differences. Those who supported the building of a society where religion to

some extent was compartmentalized, and where a civil religion was introduced, were to a large extent the Muslims themselves. They chose the line of peaceful coexistence with the Christians by avoiding thoughts of a Muslim state or separate Muslim courts. The majority of Tanzanian Muslims accepted that their religion could exist within the limits of the *ujamaa* philosophy, an Islam where African tradition was stronger than the ties to the countries from where Islam was exported to East Africa.

The next question I will raise concerns what has happened to the Muslim community after the fall of *ujamaa*, and I will explain why I find Ludwig partly right in his considerations. After the fall of *ujamaa* Tanzania Muslims have experienced a change of focus in the thinking about their religion's place in society. Since the socialist ideas of TANU/CCM, where Islam was made a part of the program to build society, is history - Muslims have had to re-evaluate Islam's importance in the creation of a new society. The last decade has witnessed a clear tendency among Muslims towards a focus on pan-Islamic ideas, experienced clearly on Zanzibar during the OIC-crisis. My partial agreement with Ludwig is situated in the fact that these pan-Islamic ideas were an important part of the philosophy behind EAMWS. Traditionally the bearers of these thoughts in Tanzania also have been oriented towards the Asian and the Arab world, which is also the tendency in the Muslim revival today. The reason why I will question Ludwig's focus on the present conflict in Tanzania is the radical change in the influence from outside countries. The change in the economy of the Arab countries, and thereby also their ability to influence the situation, together with the theological revival of Islamist ideas, are new tendencies which have not been a part of traditional Islam in Tanzania earlier. Even if some of the mentioned tendencies have been present in Tanzania through history, the radical new strength and the simultaneous influence from so many angles make me view the new tendencies, to a larger extent than Ludwig, as a result of external influence. This influence, which will be further elaborated in chapter five, appears in my eyes to have changed character the last two decades, and together with the fall of the political ideologies of Eastern Europe, it has affected Muslims in Tanzania towards re-evaluating Islam's influence in society.

⁴⁴East Africa Muslim Welfare society.

4.3 Kjersti Larsen: Social Problems and Identity

Kjersti Larsen is an anthropologist from the University of Oslo and has spent several of the last twelve years on Zanzibar working with her field studies. The last decade she has noticed a change in people's attitude towards religion in Tanzania, and during an interview⁴⁵ she elaborated her analysis of both the change on Zanzibar and the situation on mainland Tanzania. Kjersti Larsen's focus is on how religion lately has become a public issue that explains conflicts that earlier were discussed in different terms, and she also claims that social problems are one of the reasons behind the Islamist tendencies in Tanzania. She also sees religion as a strong influence upon people's identity, and therefore fears the fact that conflicts are explained in a religious language in Tanzania today.

4.3.1 Religion as a Public and a Political Issue

The most important change in the religious everyday life of people in Tanzania is according to Kjersti Larsen that religion has become an independent issue. Religion has always been an important part of people's life, but recently religion has become a political matter.

In the 70s and in the 80s all political discussions had references to socialism, capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism - explained in marxist terms. Marxism was the language, the ideology through which the conflicts were understood and articulated. Now the situation is that the language through which political opinions are expressed, is religion. (Larsen 1995)

Kjersti Larsen underlines that this change in political language is an interaction between internal and external factors where the changing political landscape of Tanzania has played an important part. During the *ujamaa* period religious issues were played down and made private issues. On Zanzibar President Kharum destroyed places where people used to make sacrifices and public religious feasts were kept to a minimum. But with the Presidents following Kharum, religion more and more has become a public matter and today society is open to religious behaviour on all levels and this is reflected in the way people dress, the number of attenders at Friday prayers and in politics. Larsen also emphasizes that this is a trend that can be traced all over the world

⁴⁵According to Kjersti Larsen very little written materiale is available concerning her interpretation of the recent religious development in Tanzania. Her Doctor thesis will be finished during 1995.

among both Christians and Muslims - religion is made a public matter and has got into politics. The result of these changes is that conflicts are denoted in terms of religion. Instead of blaming capitalism for the problems in Tanzania, Muslims now blame Christians and vice versa, for being the cause of the problems in the country. According to Kjersti Larsen people in Tanzania speak and react according to this paradigm and scholars describe the conflicts in the same terms, hence the two reinforce one another.

4.3.2 The Change in Religion

The fact that religion has become a public issue, together with a change in international relationships have created a somewhat new religious climate in Tanzania. Kjersti Larsen affirms this and says that Islam in Tanzania, like any other religion or ideology is in constant change. To her the global situation of Islam is important to understand what has happened to Muslims in Tanzania. Kjersti Larsen mentions the Gulf war as a serious incident which affected also people in Africa. Even if Muslims on Zanzibar did not agree with Saddam Hussein and his actions, it was important for them to support Iraq more than the USA. The Gulf conflict in a sense affected their own position in the world, because through media the conflict was made a conflict of religions, and Larsen herself was surprised to see how fast Western media coded the conflict in terms of religion - showing pictures of crowds of Americans going to church and furious Muslims demonstrating against the "Great Satan" - the USA. Kjersti Larsen's understanding of this is that religion has become an issue in politics, which contributes to coalitions being made.

But also in the exercise of Islam in Tanzania Larsen has noticed a gradual change.

It is now possible to practice religion in public. This makes people more oriented towards the written religious text while they earlier focused more on the oral tradition which gave more room for personal interpretation. (Larsen 1995)

More written material is available, pamphlets containing simple Islamic teachings and commentaries on the Koran, and this is being read by people. Kjersti Larsen emphasizes that this does not necessarily imply that people have become more religious now than earlier, or that they have become more focused on pan-Islamic ideas. But she admits that the articulation of Islam has become stronger. This affects not only the young men that traditionally stand in the frontline of a more fundamentalistic view on Islam, but Larsen has experienced that also women to a larger extent than before read the Islamic literature. Her experience is that the attitude among

Muslims has changed, even if people not necessarily have become more religious, and she sees this development as twofold. To some Islam has become a political tool, as seen in the present political election campaigns. To others Islam has become political in a wider sense, as to the question of identity, of who they are and of their position in the world. This also affects the question of who they are to associate themselves with, and from whom they are to differ.

4.3.3 Social Problems - Islam Solution

The next issue that our conversation touched was the following: Which conflicts lie behind the problems that according to Kjersti Larsen are explained in different terms at different times? She emphasized that some of the problems in the region are constant whereas other problems change according to the times. But the general problem in all Third World countries is poverty. Larsen states that economic problems always have been a part of East Africa's reality. An increasing problem in Tanzania is that some of the educated youth, who have achieved dreams and promises of good jobs and improved living conditions, today face unemployment. This is mainly an urban problem since the possibility of providing for the family through farming always is a solution in the countryside. As a result, young unemployed men, often with some education, express their aggression towards society through the demands for a different social order.

Islam becomes an opposition, a very good language to express that you disagree with the present government. The Muslims (in Tanzania) find support for their frustrations in several other countries where similar movements agree that Islam represents a different model (of society) and an opposition against what they see as an exploiting system. (Larsen 1995)

Kjersti Larsen will to some extent compare the emerging problems in Tanzania with those of Egypt and Algeria in that they are rooted in social conflicts, but she made it perfectly clear that the violent expression found in Egypt and Algeria, makes them very different from Tanzania's problems. She also said that what is happening in Tanzania now, the aggressive public debates, the burning of pork butcheries and other similar incidents really frighten people. Most of the population who have lived in peace with one another are shocked by these experiences and Larsen claims that the extremists are a small group of people without much support among the majority of the Muslim population.

4.3.4 Identity and Language of Conflict

In a search for the nucleus of the problems developing in Tanzania the question of identity turned out to be the most important issue of our interview, and Kjersti Larsen presented her thoughts about identity and religion in Tanzania with several focuses. First she expressed that the people of Zanzibar look upon themselves as Africans, but they still find their ideals in other parts of the world. The material welfare of the West is to Africans, like it is to people in the Middle East, an ideal.

But when it comes to the moral universe, the focus is drawn towards the Middle East, and this is also the case for the esthetical ideals which are very important.
(Larsen 1995)

Kjersti Larsen sees religion as a moral system with strong connection to feelings about identity. A very important aspect of Islam is that the religious practices are exercised within a community, and the community has a lot to do with the forming of people's identity. Identity is according to Kjersti Larsen created in the process where one relates oneself to a certain group of people, and by that also distinguishes oneself from someone else. Thus the Muslim identity is created around a religious society or community.

What Kjersti Larsen finds to be of great concern in Tanzania today is when conflicts are articulated in terms of religion.

On the one hand you have people who are religious, and on the other leaders who choose to use a religious language. When these meet, and the leaders use religious language to people with a religious conviction, this is extremely efficient because strong symbols are being used. This does not affect people only rationally, but it hits people here - in the stomach - because it is something that affects your whole identity, your complete conviction of how things are. (Larsen 1995)

Kjersti Larsen concludes by saying that on Tanzania mainland things are much more complicated than on Zanzibar because "the others," i.e. the Christians, are so much closer.

4.3.5 Evaluation of Kjersti Larsen's View

Kjersti Larsen's analysis of the religious situation in Tanzania, with a special focus on Zanzibar, contains many interesting aspects. My interpretation is that Larsen has noticed several changes in the religious situation but will mainly characterize them as changes that have taken place because of political changes, both domestic and international. Her first point, that religion now has become a political issue after years of socialist politics trying to separate religion from politics, is in line with Westerlund's theory about compartmentalized religion. The strength of Larsen's view is that she connects what has happened in Tanzania with what has happened in the rest of the world. Religion has all over the world more and more become a public matter and an issue in politics. The fact that a change of paradigm has appeared among scholars and commentators is also an observation worth considering. Larsen's own examples from the Gulf war is a good example of the change of paradigm, where a conflict that earlier would have been given a political explanation now was partly explained as a conflict of religions. Conflicts usually hide a struggle for influence, and with the race between capitalism and socialism behind us, the religious influence, with its implications of economics and coalitions, has gained political importance. It is important, especially to theologians, to be aware of Larsen's warning and not interpret all conflicts which appear to be religious as conflicts concerning theology and transcendent matters. But on the other hand, the focus on religion as an important part of what constitutes human identity, should encourage theologians to take part in the political debate which until now largely has been led from a secular point of view.

In the change that has occurred in people's exercise of religion in Tanzania, Kjersti Larsen's analysis needs further examination. She explained that people's focus on outward, exercised religion had increased, but that people not necessarily had become more religious. Larsen also questioned whether the Muslims had been more preoccupied with pan-Islamic ideas. These are interesting statements that raise several questions. First of all what does it mean to be religious? Kjersti Larsen's view as an anthropologist is interesting. She claims that regardless of political suppression, the religious life of the Muslims on Zanzibar has remained constant, a view which I consider as giving credit to the spiritual side of religion as opposed to religion only as an institutional or cultural practice. But at the same time she admits that the intensity in the articulation of religion has become stronger, and this must mean that people focus on religion in more areas of life, in the way they dress, the celebrating of public holidays, the way they think about the state etc. To me this increased activity shows that people are more religious in the

sense that the practical side of religion has become more important. From this follows a wish for religion to have increased influence on daily life, and this increased focus on Islam in a wide sense also increases Islam's influence in politics, which is noted by those who are not Muslims and by them interpreted as an increased religiosity.

When the question of pan-Islamic identity was raised Kjersti Larsen first was somewhat reluctant to admit that an increased focus on this was an issue in Tanzania. Personally I think that the description of the focus on the new Islamic organizations in Tanzania (see 3.1) shows that this is a tendency that is quite clear, at least among certain groups of Muslims. Larsen gradually affirmed this during our conversation when she mentioned the increased circulation of Islamic literature on Zanzibar (this also happens in mainland Tanzania). This literature focuses on orthodox Islam, which to a much larger extent than traditional Islam, is preoccupied with the idea of the *ummah*, the universal society of believers. Another point is that this literature to a large extent is financed by nations who view the unity of all Muslims as a very important part of Islam, and the increased activity of some of these Arab countries' embassies in Dar es Salaam is influencing the Muslims in the region (Sicard 1991:8).

Larsen's next point, where she claims that social problems has led to a more extreme or fundamentalistic form of Islam, is also found among other scholars as Kari Vogt (1993). Vogt also agrees that the leaders of the Islamists are educated people from urban areas (Vogt 1993:240). Kjersti Larsen considers Islam as a good way of expressing discontent with the existing society, and the same thought is also expressed, somewhat simplified, by Bill Musk who claims that a common feature of the Islamists is that they are all "*fundamentally against something or someone*" (Musk 1992:45). When Kjersti Larsen views the social problems that lead to the development of Islamist ideas as a domestic reason behind the change in the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania, she is right in the sense that the problem of unemployment and poverty is a part of Tanzania's internal problems. But the solution to the problem for the people involved, a radical Islam with the aim to change society, is from my point of view an ideology which in today's version is imported and has not earlier been present in the history of Tanzania.

Larsen's final point, her focus on the religious language being used as a language of conflicts, is important. When certain groups, Christians or Muslims, use a religious political language in order to achieve or in order to increase their own influence, the result can easily become disastrous. This has for a long time been avoided in Tanzania because the religious leaders have

focused on the spiritual aspect of religion. Through history there has been very little serious struggle between the two religions, and their internal problems have until recently been solved in a peaceful way. It is clear that in the political situation that Tanzania faces, there is a danger that religion will be a central issue in politics, and even an issue of conflict. There is a big responsibility resting upon the shoulders of the religious societies to choose the right leaders, and there is a big responsibility resting upon the shoulders of the leaders being chosen. Their task must be to focus on the fact that religious coexistence is still possible. It is important that the Muslim community, where the focus on politics is implied in the focus on religion, realize that if they intend to have a peaceful coexistence with the Christians, the militant Islamist tendencies must be stopped. The religious language, is, as Larsen emphasizes, so strong that if the wrong persons will have the possibility to feed either Christians or Muslims with hatred in the name of religion, Tanzania can become a new Nigeria or a new Sudan.

4.4 Summary

The scholars presenting their views all agree upon one thing, the fall of the *ujamaa* politics has played an important part in the change in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania. But even if they do agree on this issue, they all interpret the consequences of the new political situation differently. Omari claims that after the fall of *ujamaa* the national leadership of the country has been weakened. The new leaders have as a result of the introduction of free-market economy been tempted by bribes and have according to Omari shown very little ethical consideration⁴⁶. This has given religious extremists the possibility to gain a foothold. Frieder Ludwig claims that the end of the *ujamaa* politics has made visible the struggle between the religions that all the time has been present. To Kjersti Larsen it is clear that the new political situation has influenced the religious relationship by offering a more open religious climate. People's possibility to exercise religion freely has increased religion's part in the constitution of people's identity, and hence become more important, both in private life and in politics.

The origin of the religious extremism is also viewed differently by the three scholars. Kjersti Larsen claims that social problems are the main reason behind the Islamist tendencies in the region. The reason why a militant Islam is the answer to frustrated Muslims is according to Larsen that the new political climate has a tendency to explain conflicts in terms of religion

⁴⁶On June 2 Aftenposten could bring the news that the Norwegian government has frozen the development aid to Tanzania because of the high level of corruption in the Tanzanian bureaucracy.

instead of in different political terms. Frieder Ludwig holds the view that it is old conflicts between Christians and Muslims that have now become visible, even if it is influenced by foreign ideas. C.K. Omari seems to consider the Islamist tendencies as a minor threat to the religious relationship since he blames the leaders in Tanzania for the extremists' actions.

The different views presented by these scholars give us insight into the variety of reasons behind the change in the Christian-Muslim relationship. It is obvious that domestic changes have prepared the ground for a change in the religious relationship between the two groups. But these scholars do not examine more deeply the ideas that are the driving force behind the new Muslim vitality. The scholars claim that the domestic reasons are the most important, still, they all agree that foreign influence plays a part in what is happening. Larsen claims that the Muslims' religious ideals come from the Middle East and Omari even claims that most of the Muslim extremists are foreign led. But what is the ideology behind these new Muslim tendencies, and how strong is the international network that is pursuing these interest? These are the question that will be further looked upon in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

GLOBAL MUSLIM INFLUENCE

This final chapter deals with the global Muslim revival that has influenced Tanzania's religious geography lately. A general survey of the background behind what I have called "the general Islamic revival" includes a presentation of some of the main reasons behind the new worldwide Muslim vitality. It also contains a presentation of the main ideologists behind the Muslim resurgence. A presentation of different international Muslim organizations that are active in East Africa is preceded by a closer examination of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This is done in order to present the most prominent and influential international Muslim organization, and to explain why the OIC-crisis was so crucial to many Tanzanian Christians. The presentation of the organizations will be followed by an evaluation of the influence that different Muslim countries have had in the recent development of the Muslim communities in Tanzania. Finally I will look upon the question as to whether this influence is a pan-Islamic influence promoted by a united Muslim world, or merely a pursuing of the different countries' own interests.

5.1 The General Islamic Revival

The Islamic resurgence that can be traced all over the world is hard to grasp because it is not restricted to any region, legal or theological division or any socio-economic class. The attitudes of the different movements are many and within the Muslim community there are different perspectives of the resurgence. This is shown by the different names that the revival-oriented Muslims use to describe themselves or their movement; *ba'ath*, renaissance, *sawah*, awakening, *ihva al-din*, awakening of religion, *usuliyyah* or *salafiyya*, fundamentalism, *tajdid*, periodical renewal of faith, *islah*, reform, *asliyyin*, original ones, and *mutudyyinin*, the pious (Woodberry 1995:1).

The way the Muslims name their movements shows that their focus is somewhat different and this is not well covered by the label "fundamentalism" that Westerners often use to describe the different movements. In a sense all Muslims are fundamentalists. The Koran is believed by Muslims to be a dictate of the Koran in heaven, the will of God written in the Arab language to be received and obeyed by mankind. This is the fundament in which every Muslim believes, the whole religion rests upon the direct revelation from Allah to Muhammed. And this is where

Salman Rushdie made his serious mistake, he questioned the revelation, he insinuated that it was Muhammed's own desire that was the force behind the revelation. The Satanic verses⁴⁷ were not from Satan and the rest of the revelation was not from God, this is the message of Rushdie (Musk 1992:183). To Muslims this is the most serious blasphemy and a sign that the author has left his religion - and that is the basis of the *fathwa*, Komheini's death penalty. Rushdie challenged the fundamentals of Islam and he was answered by the Muslim world.

The somewhat vague "Fundamentalist" label has been adopted by the media and is used to denounce all extreme actions carried out by Muslims. Some scholars, like Jan Opsal, use the term "Islamists" denoting the reformists who see Islam practised in the Medina- period as the pure Islam which Muslims have to return to (Opsal 1994:210). But regardless of labels and different focuses there are some elements that have influenced the whole Muslim world and these elements will be looked into in the following.

5.1.1 The Sense of Trauma

J. Dudley Woodberry focuses on four major reasons when he explains the Islamic resurgence, and his first point is the "sense of trauma" that is felt in many Muslim communities. The frustration and humiliation of years under colonial rule is the most important root of the trauma experienced by Muslims (Woodberry 1995:3). The Medinan period under the caliphate of Muhammed himself denotes to Muslims the pride and the glory of Islam's strength. The concept of the Koran is that God is sovereign, and therefore success follows his believers. This was proved to Muslims when the spread of Islam, through the Arab people, resulted in the the largest imperial expansion ever known. And this was done within one hundred years after the death of Muhammed. Despite the fall of Bagdhad to the Mongols 1258, new Muslim empires like the Ottoman empire of the Middle East and Safavid's rule in Persia ensured that Muslims in general lived under a Muslim ruler and were governed by Islamic law up to the eighteenth century (Musk 1992:48-50).

In a recent analysis of Arab writings between 1945-70, focusing on the search for identity in the Arab world, it is made clear that the Western military occupation of Arab lands and the encroachment of its industrial and technological supremacy has provoked change and efforts to shape an Arab identity (Donohue 1983:47-48). The analysis shows that a variety of reasons caused the change in the Arab world and that one of the attitudes expressed in the articles was

⁴⁷The rewriting of sura 53 occurred after Muhammed was told by God that he had been "fooled" by Satan in the revelation to the first version of the sura (Musk 1992:183).

the need to protect Arab speciality by rejecting cultural imperialism (Donahue 1983:57). Ibrahim Ibrahim, professor of Arab studies at Washington's Georgetown University claims that the reasons why Muslims are critical to the West are many, but they are not theological. "*It is a grievance of colonialism. We have been humiliated. The West defined the world for Muslims.*" (Time, June 15, 1992:24). This humiliation has been succeeded by anger. Bill Musk wonders if the most common denominator in the expression of Islamic reformists is not that they are all "against" something or someone. The reformist movement has become a protest movement, against dependence upon the West, and against secular political leaders. The theological basis of this protest is sura 8:60⁴⁸ (Musk 1992:45-46).

*Against them make ready
Your strength to the utmost
Of your power, including
Steeds of war, to strike terror
Into (the hearts of) the enemies...*

The powerlessness felt by many Muslims today, experiencing the results of years of colonialism was already expressed by al-Afghani (1838/9-97), one of the ideologists of the modern Muslim reform-movements, in the following paradox: The Christians who follow a kingdom that is not of this earth have become the rulers of the world. The Muslims follow the religion of the sword, of victory and power, but have become slaves under foreign rule. Al-Afghani concluded that both had misconceived their religion, claiming that the Christians had taken into possession the structure of the Roman empire, while the Muslims had fallen into fatalism and mysticism (Holter 1976:22)⁴⁹.

This sense of trauma developed during colonialism into a search for identity. In previous times many different people had been united politically under Muslim empires. The colonial powers ignored to a large extent people living together with different alliances and drew boundaries that separated people like the Kurds and the Arabs. The political powers also transferred nationalistic ideas based on ethnicity and language. The result was that individuals had to consider whether they were basically Muslims, Arabs or Egyptians for example, and had to conduct themselves according to different combinations of loyalties (Woodberry 1995:4).

⁴⁸The first words of this verse appears on the logo of the Muslim Brotherhood (Musk 1992:46).

⁴⁹In Opsal 1994:208.

These conflicting loyalties have after independence led to political instability. The Western education system created an educated elite that took over the modernist worldview. This elite was in the front line when the post-war climate made independence possible. The new leaders were foreign-orientated ideologically and grew distant from the mass of their own people (Musk 1992:61). This political instability often resulted in the suppression of the opposition by the ruling government, which led to an even deeper division. But the most serious conflict between the traditionalists and those influenced by the West was the conflict of values (Woodberry 1995:4). The traditional Islamic values were set aside by the people who embraced the modernist thoughts. Modernization and industrialization widened the gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” even more.

Modernisation means, in the reformist's view, "Westification". Patterns of western dominance are deeply fixed in the colony's institutional make-up. A legislature is established with a separate executive power and independent judiciary. Where do the laws come from? Most of them are from the human mind, not from God as revealed in the Qur'an and sunna. (Musk 1992:60)

The most important channel of the continued imposition of a Western worldview has been the Western education which is adopted in most countries. Also recruitment of non-Western nations into Western debates like capitalism versus communism has enforced a Western way of thinking upon the Muslim states (Musk 1992:60). But what most revivalist Muslims are really concerned about is the state of their own community of believers. The secularism and apostasy that follow the influence from the West are the main enemies threatening to disintegrate the *ummah* of the believers. The feeling of powerlessness is especially hard for the Sunni Muslims who never developed a theology of suffering (Woodberry 1995:3). To them the humiliation of colonialism and dependence upon the West is a sign that God has left them, and only a revival back to the principles of the Koran and the will of God can bring renewed power.

5.1.2 Opportunities to Respond

After the sense of trauma, Woodberry holds "the opportunities to respond" as the second source of the Islamic resurgence. After World War I most Muslim areas were colonies or protectorates under Western control. The technical superiority of the imperialists made the possibilities of resurgence limited (Woodberry 1995:5). But the politics of the colonialists changed, for a

complex variety of reasons, in the post-war era, and within 25 years 99 percent of the Muslim countries gained independence. By many reformist Muslims this was seen as a possibility to reestablish the Islamic state and go back to the way things were governed before. This was however not how things turned out. The adoption of western political ideologies by the educated elite left a lasting colonial legacy in the post-colonial Muslim states, which often resulted in a hybrid between a Western secular state and a legitimate Islamic state (Musk 1992:57-59). But the new state gave much more room for political and religious movements than was the case under colonial rule. The reformist Muslims did not achieve what they wanted after independence, but they had the possibility to be a part of the formation of the country and to convince others what was the true path of Islam.

Another factor that has given the resurgence an opportunity to respond is the oil. The oil-crisis of the early 1970s with the rise of oil prices made billions of dollars flow into Muslim countries. This did not only show that the Arab countries could again play a part in international politics with increased self-respect, but it also gave these countries economic freedom. This freedom was used to pursue Islamic interests such as the building of mosques and other Islamic institutions, and it was also used to support other Islamic countries in the same manner. Among the states with increased influence were those with a Fundamentalist Islamic government like Saudi Arabia, with its "moderate" attitude and Libya with its more "radical" approach. Both these countries used their accumulated wealth to support Fundamentalist causes (Woodberry 1995:5).

Undoubtedly, the rise in pitch of Islamic spokesmen in the area can be explained in part by internal politics and the astounding wealth generated by petroleum in the past decade. It would be an error to attribute all to these aspects, but it would be equally erroneous to neglect them. (Donahue 1983:48)

5.1.3 The Historic Precedence

The third root of the Islamic resurgence presented by Woodberry is the historic precedence. He argues that the search for the pure Islam has occurred repeatedly in Islamic history at times of crisis, and contemporary Muslim fundamentalists find their roots in these historic models. The search for roots goes all the way back to Muhammed, who as the greatest prophet began preaching the message of Allah when the tribal humanism of the Arabs was crumbling. The life of Muhammed will always stand as the ultimate example of pure Islam for Muslims.

Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (d.720) was the first major reformer of existing Islam who preached the return to the example of Muhammed when the Ummayyad dynasty (660-75) was on the decline. This led to the development of two different schools of law in the names of Abu Hanifa and Malik. After this first reform movement Muslim reformists have raised their voices each time the leaders or the people have turned away from the example of the Prophet. Among the most famous reformists is ibn-Hanbal (780-855) who developed his school of law and theology and led popular uprisings against the Abbaside Caliphate (750-1258) (Woodberry 1995:5-6). When the Ottoman Turks gained control over the Middle East their empire secured the influence of Islam in the region. But when the empire was on the decline Abd al-Wahhab (d.1791) called Muslims to practice a primitive Islam and rebuked the errors and laxity of the times. The movement raised the question of authority within the Muslim community and criticized the empire's use of the *sharia* which was restricted in some matters and supplemented by traditions in others (Holt 1970A:380-81). The ideas of al-Wahhab were adopted by, among others, al-Afghani (d.1879). Al-Afghani is by many reckoned as one of the founders of the modern reform movement (Opsal 1994:208), and his thoughts and ideas will be further elaborated later in this chapter.

5.1.4 Local Factors

The last of the roots that Woodberry presents as a cause of Islamic resurgence are the local factors that are found in the different Muslim areas. Local factors have greatly influenced the form which the resurgence has taken. First of all there is the difference between the Sunni and the Shia Muslims. The two different schools of Islam practice different traditions which sometimes affect the nature of the resurgence, and sometimes lead to different results on similar conflicts. For instance both Sunni Egypt and Shia Iran faced a conflict where the ruler of the country was the obstacle to resurgence. In both countries Fundamentalists joined more secular forces in the fight against the head of the state, which in Egypt was King Faruq and in Iran was the Shah. Once successful in the revolt, the secular and the religious forces turned against each other in both countries. In Egypt the more secular faction was the strongest and in Iran the religious party took control of the government. But the struggle for power has continued in both countries. In Egypt the Islamists fight for the fulfilment of their cause, and in Iran the more moderate forces have increased their power after Khomeini's death.

In Sub-Saharan Africa both Islam and Christianity have increased their influence at the expense of African traditional religions. The Muslim resurgence is most clear in countries where

Christianity and Islam are close to equal in size, with a struggle to be the most influential factor in the running of state affairs as a result. The war between the two factions in Sudan and the attempt to institute *sharia*-laws in Nigeria⁵⁰ have been the most serious conflicts.

In Central Asia the resurgence has taken the form of resistance to Russification and a fight for independence and the return to old political and religious ties by Uzbeks, Kirghis and Kazakhs. The success of the Afghan mujahidin has shown the tenacity of the religious element in the fight for independence (Woodberry 1995:7).

5.2 The Reform Movement

As mentioned earlier in this chapter Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, together with Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905) are reckoned as the main ideologists behind the modern Islamic reform movement. The trauma of colonization, the powerlessness and humiliation it resulted in, was the background on which these Muslim reformists developed their theology. The solution that al-Afghani suggested was to return to the basic fundamental organizing of society that the Koran suggested. The guidance as to how to organize such a society was found by al-Afghani in the *sharia*, the juridical philosophy of Islam. In this juridical system was the power to change society, but this was, according to al-Afghani, neglected by the priesthood of his time. Muhammed Abduh worked together with al-Afghani for some time and he developed the theology of the movement in his book about the unity of theology. The unity of God is to be reflected in the organizing of society. The true religion has always been the same and therefore Abduh wanted to return to the principles that were followed by the generation of Muhammed. This new movement was called *salafiyya*, derived from *salaf assalihin*, the pious ancestors. The name denotes the return to the fundamentals of Islam, found in the example of the Prophet and in the time of the first four caliphs (Opsal 1994:208-209).

The central aim of the *salafiyya*-movement was to update the Muslim world in the fields of development where it had lagged behind. The idea was that a return to the fundamental principles of Islam would lead to development both materially and in the field of knowledge. To Abduh it was important to emphasize that there was no contradiction between Islam and true knowledge because all true knowledge was found in the Koran. To make this development possible the movement was ready to put aside certain traditional dogmas, and this made them controversial in some circles. To Abduh and al-Afghani it was also important to stress the fact

⁵⁰With the result that more than 100 churches were burnt in 1987 (Woodberry 1995:7).

that the Muslim *ummah*, the fellowship or society, was universal, superior to any ethnic or geographical boundaries. These pan-Islamic ideas had been without political significance when they were reintroduced by al-Afghani and Abduh.

The Muslim reformists did agree that the solution was to return to the examples of Muhammed and the period of the first four caliphs. They also agreed that Islam had to answer the challenge of the new times more dynamically than the traditionalists⁵¹ did. Problems did however emerge over the question of how to put into practice the original principles. One faction chose the direction of following the principles as closely as possible, with the thought that it was deviation from these that had led the Muslims in the wrong direction. This group is called Fundamentalists or Islamists. Another faction chose to reinterpret these principles without being bound to the consequences that these principles caused in a completely different time. This group is called Modernists (Opsal 1994:209-210).

5.3 The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school-teacher Hassan al-Banna (1905-49). He felt that Muslim youth were taught a very corrupted form of Islam and concluded that the Al-Azhar theologians and scholars had failed as the spokesmen of a pure and dynamic Islam. The goals of the brotherhood grew out of al-Banna's view about what had gone wrong in the world of Islam. The diagnosis that al-Banna presented was that of a country in religious, cultural, political, economical, social and moral decadence. The answers of the Muslim Brotherhood were to a large extent an echo of the *salafiyya*-movement, a return to the pure Islam of the original believers and a return to the words of the Koran. Their slogan, *al-nizam al-islami*, creation of a Muslim order, in practice meant an Islamic state. The major change of the existing state was that the *sharia* laws had to be implemented, and the state had to return to the revelation as the source of life and politics. Al-Banna felt that Egypt was at a crossroad, either the way of the West or the way of Islam had to be followed. In his political fight for the way of Islam al-Banna ended his life as a *shadid*, a martyr, when he was murdered by the secret police in 1949 (Musk 1992:91-95).

But the Muslim Brotherhood could not be halted by the assassination of its founder, and in

⁵¹Traditionalists is the name given to those Muslims who in addition to the tradition from the Koran and the *hadith*, adopt elements from local history and tradition into their religion. This results in a variety of local customs, and a tendency to focusing on local and national issues at the expense of pan-Islamic ideas (Opsal 1994:207).

1952 they joined a coup against King Faruq. Faruq's successor, Nasser, carried out a policy that was far from the ideas of the Brotherhood, and after a militant brother failed to assassinate Nasser, several people were executed or put into prison. Among the latter was Sayyaid Qutb (1906-66) who during many years in prison developed an ideology that not only, like al-Banna, motivated for reform, but proclaimed the necessity of an Islamic revolution (Opsal 1994:211). In his most famous book "Signposts on the road" (1964), Qutb divided society into two kinds, the order of Islam and the order of *jahiliya*. The latter order was the type of order which had existed in Arabia before the time of Muhammed. The definition *jahiliyyah* that Qutb used was however borrowed from Mawdudi⁵² and the term does not describe a period in time but a condition that is repeated every time society turns away from the Islamic way (Haddad 1983:85).

Today we are in a similar or darker jahiliyyah, than the contemporaneous to early Islam. All that surrounds us is jahiliyyah, people's visions, beliefs, their habits and customs, their source of knowledge, art, literature, rules and laws, even what we consider as Islamic education, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought - all of it is the product of jahiliyyah. (in Haddad 1983:85)

Moral reform was the urgent need of the hour, and a *jihad* against Westernization had to be achieved. Qutb called for the establishment and the proper maintenance of God's will through the *sharia* laws. Among the ones that Qutb blamed for secularism and turning away from God were the President, communism, Christians (colonists) and Jews (Zionists). Qutb told his fellow Muslims to stop imitating the pattern of the West, presented by "the people of the book." He said that the only pattern Muslims should imitate was the pattern of the Koran (Musk 1992:103-5).

After his experiences of persecution and imprisonment, Qutb developed a more militant ideology in the form of proclamations preached directly to the opposition. Qutb argued that freedom of choice comes only after the forces of oppression have been removed, therefore the *jihad* is crucial if the *dawah*, the call to Islam, is to proceed freely.

Islam is not a theological system that is realized when appropriated as an

⁵²Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) is one of the most influential Muslim writers the last century. He published around 100 books which have been translated to several languages. His efforts marked the introduction to a new era of Islam confronting the modernist world view. Mawdudi has been of greatest inspiration and influence to post-war Muslims all over the world (Berg 1983:introduction). Mawdudi lived his life in India/Pakistan and Mawdudi's relative distance in geography and direct influence to the Muslims in East Africa (together with the limited space in this chapter), does not allow me to further elaborate his thoughts in this thesis.

ideology...and then its mission ceases. Islam is a pragmatic activistic system of life. It withstands other systems which are based on power and is supported by material power. For Islam to establish its divine system, it is inevitable that these material powers be destroyed and the powers that administer the systems that resist the divine way be annihilated. (in Haddad 1982:82)

Qutb sees the liberation of society as imperative to setting people free and to impose the kingdom of God on earth. *Jihad* is reckoned a liberating force, a promotion of the righteous society, and militancy is defended as necessary (Haddad 1983:81-82). This "liberation theology" of Qutb soon ran out of patience with the compromised politics of Nasser, and further clashes with the government followed. This moved Qutb to develop a further ideology on the issue of reformed Muslims attacking other Muslims. Qutb's answer to this⁵³ was to form a "state within the state," a small society of believers who dedicated themselves to the cause of building the new Islamic society. This is, according to Qutb, an imitation of the Prophet's withdrawal from Mecca to Medina. Qutb declared in the trial against him:

We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. Nothing relates us to state or to society and we owe no allegiance to either. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is Dar al-Harb (House of war). (in Musk 1992:107)

Sayyid Qutb was regarded as a too strong threat to the Egyptian government and was sentenced to death and executed in 1966. Within a year after his death Egypt suffered a humiliating defeat against Israel in the six-days war. To Qutb's followers this was his prophecy come true - "*the semi-secular Arab socialism of Nasser... had been defeated because they had turned away from the will of God.*" (p.104) (Musk 1992:104-6).

5.4 The Glorious Revolution in Iran

The so-called glorious revolution in Iran is often connected with the person Ayatollah Khomeini, and he did play a central part in the events in Iran in 1979. But apart from Khomeini, others had

⁵³In the development of this theory Qutb was largely influenced by the 14th century Sunni theologian Ibn Taimiya (Musk 1992:106).

spread the thoughts of reform among the people of Iran. The most prominent among them was Ali Shariati who was born in a small desert town in the northeastern part of Iran in 1933, and was killed during a visit to Great Britain 44 years later. Shariati started his education in Iran, but was offered the opportunity to study abroad and returned to Iran with a doctor's degree from the critical school of French sociology. His return was not popular with the government, but after some time he received a teaching position at the University of Mashhad. There he soon became the most popular teacher among the students, but not among the pro-monarchy leaders of the university who found him far too radical.

Shariati's sociological interpretation of Islam was very popular with the young people. He lectured with an authoritative understanding of Western scholars, but emphasized the spiritual bankruptcy of Western humanism. He evolved a faithful, but politically challenging approach to the exegesis of the Koran. Shariati was not concerned about the traditional Islamic teachings, his concern was rather how to adopt the teachings of the Koran to the needs of the contemporary Iranian society. The aim of his teachings was to make people see that they had to return to the early Shi'ism of Ali⁵⁴ which in contrast to the institutionalized official Islam that was presented by the government. Ali Shariati wanted his listeners to realize the rich heritage that belonged to them as Muslims and be critical of the ideologies exported from the West. To Shariati the people, the mass, was the addressee of the Koran. The Koran is introduced with the name of Allah, and ends in the name of *al-nas*, mankind, therefore the message must be lived out by the people (Musk 1992:137). According to Shariati an Islamic government had to be built on *tawhid*, the unity of Allah. For people to subordinate themselves to something else was reckoned as *shirk*, idolatry. As long as the will of Allah is the sole guide for humanity, an earthly tyranny becomes impossible - and all people become equal (Opsal 1994:215).

The thoughts of government and revolution - an Islam with a touch of Marxism, were shared by Rūhalla Musavi Khomeini (1902-89) who in 1979 was declared ayatollah, the religious leader of the Iranian people. Khomeini became famous through his lectures and writings where he combined topics of spiritual and ethical nature with analysis of the apostasy caused by the government. As the Shah developed closer ties with the West⁵⁵, and left the traditional values of Islam more and more, Khomeini felt it imperative to speak out against the secular government. After a series of speeches against the government, the major clash occurred in 1963 when the Shah sent paratroopers against Khomeini and his supporters in Qum, killing several students.

⁵⁴Ali, the son on law of Muhammed, was the first of the Imams (Musk 1992:105).

⁵⁵Especially USA and United Kingdom who assisted the Shah in a military coup in 1953 (Musk 1992:140).

When the arrest of Khomeini was known the day after, serious riots occurred all over the country⁵⁶. The following year Khomeini was sent into exile, first to Turkey, then to Iraq and finally to France where he stayed until his return to Iran in 1979. While in exile Khomeini continued to write in his struggle against the regime in Iran.

Through his writings Khomeini wanted to prepare the religious students for the take-over of political power. He stressed the need to subordinate political power to Islamic goals and worldview. *Sharia* had to be the order of the day. Those who one day should be the rulers of the Iranian society were those who were experts in the understanding and interpretation of the Islamic laws. This is what became the one-phrased message of Khomeini, *vilayat-i faqih*, government by the experts in Islamic law. He was also very clear about the standards he expected from the future Islamic leaders. To be the representatives of Allah, the clergy had to be totally disinterested in this world and totally devoid of worldly ambitions (Musk 1992:139-145).

The popularity of Khomeini, his appeal to the Iranian Muslims, consists of several aspects, and some of them deserve more attention in this context. First of all his play upon the tension between Iranian nationalism and Islam as universal is interesting. His own person has an ethnic marginality which is often commented upon⁵⁷ and during his stay in France great efforts had to be made to persuade him to talk about the situation in Iran (Fischer 1983:160). This shows the universal, pan-Islamic view of Islam held by Khomeini. Also the ascetic and spiritual attitude of the Ayatollah impressed people. The monotonous way in which he spoke showed a withdrawal from this world, a refusal to be seduced by materialist concerns. Finally Khomeini, unlike other top-rank *ulama*, used a popular language of confrontation, a language of the ordinary man, attacking intellectuals, the rich and the elite (Fischer 1983:161-162).

We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become more ascetic than before and completely shun the goods of this world...Prepare yourselves to be of use to Islam, act as the army for the Imam of the age, in order to be able to serve him in spreading the rule of justice. (in Musk 1992:145)

⁵⁶The government said that 200 were killed, but Islamic leaders claimed that more than 15.000 lost their lives (Musk 1992:142).

⁵⁷Khomeini's great grandfather moved to India, but his grandfather moved back to Iran. Still Khomeini as a young man signed his poems "Hindi." This gives Khomeini a somewhat Indian background (Fischer 1983:160)

5.5 Muslim International Organizations

5.5.1 The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

The philosophy of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is built on the Koranic concept of *ummah*. The meaning of this Arab word has always been a matter of discussion between Arab scholars. The Muslim scholar Abdullah al Ahsan in his book "OIC-An Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution," introduces us to the meaning of the word by interpreting it as "*a confederation round a religious nucleus*." (al Ahsan 1988:2). According to the Koran, mankind was one single *ummah* because it originated from and followed the same source, Allah. Later a division was made between followers and rejectors of the divine guidance. The Koran states that the followers of each prophet is an *ummah* (S 10:47). But the word *ummah* in the Koran is not only applied to a group of people, it is always linked with the *idea* of a well-knitted group of people, hence the word describes the way some people believe in certain ideas.

The Koran establishes *tawhid*, the unity of Allah and the prophethood of Muhammed as the foundation of *ummah*.

O our Sustainer, make us surrender unto You "muslimayn" and make out of our offspring a community (ummah) that shall surrender "muslimatan" itself unto You, and show us our ways of worship, and accept our repentance. (s 2:128)

Through these two ideas a physical identity developed when Muslims every day turned to Mecca in prayer. Whoever accepts this identity is a member of the Muslim *ummah*. But al Ashan leads us one step further into the meaning of the concept, quoting from sura 5:48:

...unto everyone of you (mankind) have We appointed a law and a way of life (shir'atan wa minhajan)...

A more precise definition of *ummah* would therefore have to include an element of the Islamic law, *sharia*, and al Ashan ends up with a final definition; "*In general then, the ummah is a community of law based on certain ideas*." (1988:7 see 1-7).

When Muhammed established his community in Medina through his document known as the "Constitution of Medina," he presented a revolutionary idea concerning people's identity. In the pre-Islamic Arab society each individual fought and made sacrifices for the honour of his

tribe. The tribe, in return, provided security and protection for the individual. After accepting Islam, each individual had to abandon this idea because the new faith demanded his supreme loyalty (al Ashan 1988:8). This means that each Muslim is not first of all an Arab or a citizen of a country, but he is first of all a Muslim, and together with the rest of the world's Muslims he is connected to the pan-Islamic concept of *ummah*. This is the philosophy upon which the Organization of the Islamic Conference is built.

The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924⁵⁸ left the Muslim world in confusion. Several conferences were held in the following years with the primary goal of reestablishing the Caliphate, but without success. In the years to come the world saw the emergence of several political blocks, the communist block in eastern Europe, the anglo-American cooperation, but no Muslim block, and the question is why? Abdullah al Ashan points first of all to the Islamic secularization, predominantly in Turkey and Egypt where to a large extent the adoption of Western thoughts and political ideologies were dominant. The fact that many Muslim nations had suffered from being colonies left them economically and politically weak.

There were, however, two issues that to some extent activated the Muslim countries. First it was the independence of those Muslim states which were still under colonial rule and secondly it was the establishing of the state of Israel in 1948⁵⁹. But it was another decade before the Muslim states were able to act. In 1962 the Saudi Arabian crown prince Faisal sponsored a conference in Mecca that led to the formation of the Muslim World League whose primary aim was to fight secularism and spread the Muslim *dawah*, mission. In the mid-60s the now king Faisal tried to propagate the idea of an organization representing all Muslims, but he was met with criticism from the regimes in Cairo and Baghdad.

It took two very important events to make the Muslim world organize. The first was the defeat of leading Arab nations in the war against Israel in 1967. But the incident that really shook the Muslim world was when the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem⁶⁰ was partly damaged on august 21 1969. Protest rallies all over the Muslim world led to the first Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat 1969. Here it was decided that ministers of the 24 participating countries should meet the following year. The third conference of the ministers in 1972 declared that the name of the new pan-Islamic organization should be the Organization of Islamic Conference (al Ashan 1988:11-21).

⁵⁸The Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Caliphate on the 3rd of march 1924, leaving Muslims without an international platform (Holt 1970 A:102).

⁵⁹Abdullah al Ashan in his book consequently refers to the state of Israel in quotation marks, i.e. "Israel" (1988)

⁶⁰Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam.

Although the OIC was established in response to one particular event, the damaging of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the leaders that met in this conference carried with them a desire from most Muslims to establish a permanent political organization. The OIC-charter is built on the Koranic concept of *ummah* and the objectives of the organization are to build a strong solidarity between Muslim nations and to increase human well-being, progress, freedom and justice for their people throughout the world.

There are four major components of the organization. First there is the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Governments, which is the highest authoritative institution within the IOC. The Foreign Ministers Conference is the main decision-making institution which meet annually⁶¹. The General Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and consists of more than one hundred officials. The fourth pillar of the OIC is the Islamic Court of Justice. This court consists of eleven members educated in traditional Islamic Jurisprudence and they are concerned with all cases agreed upon by its members, disputes among member states, the interpretation of the charter and issuing of *fatwabs* approved by the Foreign Ministers Conference (al Ashan 1988:23-28).

In addition to the four major components, the OIC occasionally creates committees and commissions concerning important matters to the organization. In 1975 the *Al-Quds* Committee was founded to pay special attention to the Palestine issue. The year after Al-Quds Fund was established in order to:

- Prevent and resist Judaization policy pursued by the "Israeli" occupation authorities;
- Preserve and maintain the Arab character of the city of Jerusalem; and
- Support the struggle of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem and in the rest of the occupied territories. (al Ashan 1988:30-31)

In general the Palestine issue has been very central in the OIC. In addition to an office working for the boycott of Israel⁶², an office was created to promote the military coordination between PLO and the front-line states (Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) on the one hand and the other Islamic states on the other. All Islamic states were encouraged by OIC to support the PLO with military expertise and equipment.

⁶¹The foreign ministers have since 1980 met during the U.N. General Assembly sessions in addition to their annual meeting (al-Ashan 1988:26).

⁶²Working together with a similar office at the Arab League (al Ashan 1988:60)

The jihad activities of the OIC can be divided into three fields; military, diplomatic and economic. The OIC decided to undertake in all Islamic countries a psychological mobilization of the people through official, semi-official, and popular uses of the mass-media. Member states were invited accordingly to open offices for volunteers wishing to participate in the jihad for the liberation of the holy land, and to open offices for the PLO. (al Ashan 1988:60)

Another fund within the OIC is the Islamic Solidarity Fund with the intention of raising the moral and intellectual standards of Muslims all over the world by building mosques, hospitals and similar institutions. The other objective of the fund is to provide relief in case of emergencies such as natural disasters etc. The Islamic States Broadcasting Organization wants to spread (*dawah*) and promote awareness of the Islamic heritage. Among several organs within the OIC concerning education, development and research, one finds the International Islamic Law Commission, whose main occupation is to conduct research in various fields concerning the *sharia*.

The most important and also the most active institution within OIC is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The bank was established in 1975 and serves to "...*foster the economic development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities individually and jointly in accordance with the principles of shari'ah.*" (al Ashan 1988:37). Its functions are to grant loans for projects and enterprises and provide financial assistance for member countries. The bank also operates a special fund for assistance to Muslim communities in non-member countries. In 1983 the capital of the bank was 1937 million US dollars, and up to 1989 the IDB had spent 3.5 billion USD in various operations in African countries. The bank also has scholarship programmes for Muslims in non-member countries to study in membership countries. Recent statistics show that IDB offers scholarships for 43 students from Kenya and for 50 students from Tanzania⁶³(al-Gabid 1993:309).

Membership-countries of the OIC have increased in number from 24 countries in 1969 to 46 countries in 1986. The member countries are from Africa and Asia. Article eight of the charter defines membership to include only Muslim states, but the charter does not define what it means

⁶³ Arild Bakke claims that many African students have been offered scholarships and hoped for a degree in science or arts, but have only been offered religious studies of Islam (Bakke 1994:83).

by a Muslim state. According to OIC publications it means a state where Muslims comprise the majority of the population, but in practice the IOC has not followed any consequent policy. An examples of this is Uganda where the majority of the people is not Muslim. Lebanon is a member state even though the President, according to the constitution, has to be a Christian. This shows some of the problems of the organization. The third Islamic Summit Conference was held in Kabahin Makka in Mecca where no non-Muslim is allowed to enter, so the Lebanese President had to leave the Summit (al Ahsan 1988:45-47).

5.5.2 Other International Muslim Organizations

Rabitah al-Alam al-Islam, The Muslim World League (MWL) started its work in 1962 and has its headquarters in Mecca. The organization is very influential in the Arab world and the General Secretary holds the status of a Saudi Arabian Minister. The Muslim World League is preoccupied with several tasks, among them politics, culture, education and development aid. But most important to the organization is *dawah*, or spreading the message of Islam. The MWL also contributes to the building of mosques, radio and television broadcasting, translation of the Koran and other Islamic literature. According to the former General Secretary Hamid al-Radadi the organization employs around 1000 delegates, who are spread all over the world to work among Muslims and try to convert non-Muslims (Bakke 1994:88-89). The sessions held by The Muslim World League evaluate the situation in the Muslim world and discuss which causes the organization shall focus on in the years to come. The 32nd session was held in Saudi Arabia in 1993 and the problems facing "The Islamic Nation" was the agenda of the day. King Faisal (of Saudi Arabia) spoke of unity among the Muslim nations as the only possible solution to solve the problems in the Muslim world, and to secure a place in "the new world order." This also included unity against "The Common Enemy." In spite of the tragedies in the Muslim world, King Faisal saw the end of communism as a sign that atheism was on the retreat, and he said that "*a new era has emerged in today's work, an era which Muslims have been waiting.*" The chairman of the council also called upon the Muslim countries to implement the *sharia* and help Muslim brothers wherever they may be (Al-Islam March 1993:28).

The government of Libya with its devoted Muslim leader Colonel Gadaffi has also increased its influence in religious matters in the Muslim world during the last decades. This is partly a result of the founding of the organization Islamic Call Society, which was founded in 1972 and is a government-led organization aiming to:

- Send out Muslim missionaries and establish scholarships for foreign students who want to study in Libya.
- Support the building and the running of Muslim centres in different parts of the world and finance the building of field hospitals.
- Educate and inspire Muslim workers through conferences and production of literature.

In the period from 1982-1986 the organization employed 587 missionaries, and 28 of them were sent to Kenya and 6 to Tanzania. In the same period of time 518 scholarships were given to foreign students for studies in Libya and Kenya received 8 of these scholarships (Bakke 1994:90).

A more recently established international Muslim organization is the Islam in Africa Organization, IAO. This organization was founded during the Islam in Africa Conference in Nigeria 1989. This conference was attended by most African countries and was visited by the Secretary-General of Islamic Council in London and the Secretary-General of the OIC (both these organizations sponsored the conference). The communique released after the conference calls the Muslims in Africa to unite in the universal *ummah* of Muslim believers, even if they have been separated by colonial borders. The conference urges Muslims in Africa to establish “strong economic ties” to other parts of the Muslim world, in order to evolve an economic system based on Islamic principles. Another task mentioned in the communique is that the conference encourages Muslims all over Africa who have been deprived of their rights to be governed by the *sharia* to intensify their efforts to reinstate the Islamic juridical system. The communique ends by stating that a permanent body known as the Islam in Africa Organization will be formed to fulfil the objectives described in this communique (Alkali 1993:433-434).

The resolution to establish IAO opens with the Koranic verse: “*Verily, this your (Islamic) Ummah is one...*” and continues by focusing on the unity, both spiritually and materially, of the Muslims in Africa and of the Muslims all over the world. The resolution states the organization’s objectives are cooperation with other national and international Islamic organizations, promotion of *dawah* throughout Africa, translation and distribution of Islamic literature and otherwise fulfilment of the communique stated above. The permanent headquarters of the IAO was decided to be in Nigeria, and a steering committee was established with representatives from nine different African countries, among them Tanzania (Alkali 1993:435-436).

Another Muslim organization working to promote the message of the Prophet in Africa is the Shia organization Islamic League. This organization also sees religious education as crucial if the *ummah* of believers is to expand. Islamic League also promotes cooperation with the Sunni societies in order to gain more influence, as they are deeply concerned about the progress being made by Christian missionaries in Africa. A report from the committee named “Dawah in Africa”, suggests that criticism of the West is the common ground upon which Sunnis and Shiites can start their cooperation (The Light October 1988:32-28). Islamic league is closely connected with the Bilal Muslim Mission in Tanzania.

5.6 International Muslim Influence in Tanzania

5.6.1 Influence from International Islamic Organizations in Tanzania

The intention behind OIC was to create a Muslim organization that could be a political organization uniting the Muslims and promoting Islam by helping its members (and also Muslim non-member countries) economically through education and development aid. OIC has established a reputation as a helping hand to poor countries through their development bank, and it was this reputation President Mwinyi referred to when he argued that the OIC-issue was not a religious issue, nor a political issue, but merely an economic one for Zanzibar⁶⁴. The problem for the President was to explain how Zanzibar, as a part of Tanzania, could have permanent membership in a political organization (being a Muslim organization that also includes religion) which only have other national states as members. The religious foundation upon which OIC rests has been presented above, and this religious foundation was the major concern of the Christian leaders in Tanzania who saw OIC as a symbol of international Islamic unity. The OIC-crisis in Tanzania revealed how deep-rooted the conflict of interests is between the two religious communities. It also showed that some Muslims are ready to take a step closer to the international Muslim community with which they have had very little contact during the *ujamaa* period. Kjersti Larsen claims that to join OIC was a natural thing for most Zanzibarians to do because they feel close to the Muslim communities further East. She also claims that Zanzibar is in desperate need of economic aid and, has previously received aid from for example Oman which has sponsored scholarships, teachers and hospitals on the island (Larsen 1995). Economic

⁶⁴The Muslim periodical International Impact refers in its February/March edition 1993 to a list of seven arguments used by Mwinyi to argue in favour of Zanzibar joining the OIC. These arguments contain information that some of the OIC member countries have Christian Presidents, that Tanzania has received aid from religious organizations before etc (p.11).

coalitions always imply influence from the economically strong partner. A stronger influence from the leading countries of OIC was what the Tanzanian Christians feared would be the result if Zanzibar joined the OIC. Tanzanian Muslims in 1989 received 50 scholarships for students who wanted to study in other Arab countries, showing some of the influence that OIC represents even without Tanzania being a member country.

But the Islamic influence from international organizations in Tanzania exceeds that of OIC. The Muslim World League has recently opened an office in Dar es Salaam. This has according to Sigvard von Sicard influenced the more radical elements in Tanzania to pursue Islamic ideas like that of Tanzania becoming an Islamic state (Sicard 1991:7). It has also led to an increased focus on the implementation of the *sharia* among certain Muslim groups (Sicard 1991:8). MWL like OIC in their charters and meetings emphasize unity and cooperation among Muslims as the only solution to stand against the dominant West and the Christian impact. The embassy of Libya has also increased its activities in Tanzania considerably the last decade, and teachers have been brought in to teach in the newly established Islamic schools (Sicard 1991:8). The Islamic Call Society from Libya has missionaries present in the area and offers scholarships for religious studies in North Africa.

Islamic League, the international Shia organization, is also active among the Indian and Arab communities on the coast of East Africa. These groups which are largely influenced by the ideas of the revolution in Iran have for a long time been marginalized in Tanzania. But the views held by these groups have lately begun to spread again. As seen in chapter three (3.2) Muslims in Tanzania search their future in the history of the Muslim community in East Africa. In the time before TANU, the Arab pan-Islamic oriented Muslims of the coast were the most influential Muslims and they had the economic means to establish schools and religious education⁶⁵. The Islamic League has also sponsored scholarships for students from East Africa to Iran and Iraq (Sicard 1991:10).

Another Islamic organization that caused concern to the Tanzanian government during the OIC-crisis was the Islam in Africa Organization. A fake communique claiming that the aims of the organization were to eradicate all non-Muslim religions in Africa and ensure that only Muslim leaders were elected to political posts, caused great concern among the Christians in Tanzania.

⁶⁵This is still evident on the coast of Kenya where the Aga Khan society has the best educational services in the area.

The communique also claimed that Tanzania was represented in the steering committee of the organization. All this was denied by the government and explained as a falsification. When the official communique was published in 1993, it did not mention anything about the eradication of all non-Muslim religions, but it stated that “...a *Steering Committee, with membership drawn from the following countries...has been set up:*” (Alkali 1993:436), and the following list included the name of Tanzania. A report from the Interfaith Unit, a branch of the Christian council of Tanzania, claims that after the IAO declaration in 1989 the Tabora region experienced an increased activity by militant Muslims. The report claims that these Muslims were either immigrants or foreigners, and only the reaction by moderate Muslims living in the region avoided a direct confrontation between these new Muslims and the Christians in the area (Sendegeya 1995:4). The report from CCT claims that this new influence was a direct result of the conference in Nigeria⁶⁶.

5.6.2 Influence From Other Muslim Countries in Tanzania

It is obvious that different Muslim countries have played a part in the changes that have taken place in the Muslim community in Tanzania during the last decade. In the same way that the Christian congregations in Tanzania are supported by missionary agencies from the West in terms of economy and theological ideals, the Muslims in Tanzania are influenced by Muslim countries from North Africa and the Middle East. The question is, however, whether this foreign Islamic influence is one of the reasons behind the change in the Christian - Muslim relationship. Have foreign Muslim countries spread Islamist ideas that are threatening a peaceful co-existence with Christians in Tanzania?

One sign of the increased economic help that Muslims have received from foreign countries is the explosive increase in the building of mosques in East Africa. All these buildings cannot have been put up by the national Muslim organizations, which hardly have money to fulfil simple aims such as publishing periodicals. The fact that some of the most beautiful (and expensive) mosques have been put up where no people live, but often close to a public place⁶⁷ also indicates that the mosques have not been put up by the local people who would probably

⁶⁶The report from CCT carries in its appendix the communique that supposedly was released after the conference in Abuja, Nigeria 1989. This communique contains several points that are absent in the official communique published in 1993.

⁶⁷Like one beautiful mosque on the road between Nairobi and Mombasa, situated where there live no people, but close to a gas-station with a restaurant. This is also where all the tourists stop on their way from Mombasa to their safaris or to Nairobi.

prefer a mosque close to where they live. This indicates that some of the mosques are built for the purpose of giving prestige both to Islam and to those who have financed the mosque. Even if some Christians have complained about the loud noise from the mosque loudspeakers, I would hardly characterize this form of economic aid as very harmful to the Christian-Muslim relationship.

What has caused tension in the religious relationship is however the adoption of radical Muslim ideas among some Muslim groups. It seems as if each of these different groups are often supported by specific radical factions from abroad. Sheikh Rizvi, the leading intellectual of the Shia community in Tanzania openly defends the revolution in Iran and looks upon it as an ideal for suppressed Muslims throughout the world. Rizvi always holds a very general style of writing in his articles. He does not comment upon Tanzania or East Africa as examples nor does he suggest what must be done there in order to fulfil the revolution. But if his writings are to be taken seriously, a Muslim state with the clergy as political leaders and the full implementation of *sharia* appears to be his ideal of Tanzania. With the latest news about the situation of the church in Iran in mind, it is natural that these thoughts frighten the Christians in Tanzania and create antagonism. The Muslims claim that they constitute the majority in Tanzania, and if this claim leads them to pursue an Islamic state after the pattern of Rizvi's thoughts, the Christians automatically feel their position threatened. BALUKTA, which has caused the most serious religious upheavals in Tanzania so far, has by several sources been accused of being funded from Iran⁶⁸. The Iranian influence must therefore be mentioned as one of the reasons behind the worsening of the Christian-Muslim relationship in the country.

The Light reported in 1989 from President Mwinyi's three days visit to Iran and claimed that Tanzania and Iran expressed satisfaction over the trend of expanding relations between the two countries. The two countries looked, according to The Light, forward to bilateral, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, and hoped to develop their relationship through the holding of regular sessions (The Light no. 3, 1989:14).

Saudi Arabia, as a leading Muslim nation, is another country that influence Muslim communities throughout the world. It was mentioned by Westerlund that the changes taking place in BAKWATA around 1980 were probably due to Saudi Arabian influence in the organization. It sounds reasonable that the conservative Muslim government in Saudi Arabia supports the more

⁶⁸Even New Africa Yearbook 1995-1996 in its section on Tanzania refers the rumours that BALUKTA was financed by the Iranian government (Rake 1995:431).

moderate Muslim groups in Tanzania. An increased focus on Islamic ideas has followed such an influence, and this has caused a change of focus among some of the moderate Muslim groups. In BAKWATA this has led to demands of the reestablishment of the separate Muslim courts. Scholarships have been granted to several scholars from East Africa for religious studies in Saudi Arabia. The increased number of new *ulamas* that have emerged from these studies has radicalized certain elements of the Muslim society. This is shown in the new vitality among Muslim organizations during the last decade (see 3.1). Saudi Arabia is also known to be very active within the Muslim World League, which has had influence on some Muslim groups in Dar es Salaam. Also the OIC is largely dependent on the economic contributions from Saudi Arabia (Islamic Watch Feb./March 1993:3-7).

The foreign influence is however not restricted to the exchange of ideas across the Indian Ocean. Several countries in North Africa have played an important part in the recent developments in the Muslim world. The ideas behind the modern Islamic revival are to a large extent the product of Egyptian intellectual Muslims. Intellectuals in East Africa have for a long time been in contact with ideas coming from Egypt (see 3.2.1). There has however traditionally been contact between the more moderate Muslims groups. But the general Islamic revival has also made the moderate groups more interested in pure Islamic ideas, which the development within BAKWATA clearly exemplifies. The majority of the Muslims in Tanzania feel that they have lagged behind the Christians in most areas in modern society and they view this new Islamic vitality as an opportunity to restore the influence they feel that they have lost. In an attempt to explain the revivalist tendencies in Tanzania, Peter Smith puts it this way:

In the Islamic World there has been a renewed vitality which has shown itself in the strong affirmation of an Islamic identity and in an opposition to other ideologies. The heroes and role models were found in people like Colonel Gadaffi, the militancy of the P.L.O. and later in Ayatollah Khomeini. The writings of Abu A'la Mawdudi and his disciple Sayyid Qutb have also been influential. For them the Islamic model is no longer seen as an alternative model of society but as an imperative. (Smith 1991:8)

Another North African country, Sudan, has lately established itself as an Islamic nation, with the government placed in the Muslim north. Sudan has had several controversies with Kenya the past few years, accusing Nairobi of supporting the Christian “rebels” in the south of

Sudan. Sudan has been accused by Kenya of supporting the radical Muslim elements (like IPK) in Mombasa (BBC W.S. 11/4 1995). Teachers from Sudan have also been present in Tanzania, and the fact that three such teachers were expelled from the country after the Good-Friday upheavals in Dar es Salaam 1993 (see 2.2.2) indicates that they were heavily involved with the militant elements in BALUKTA. The influence from Libya has traditionally been viewed as a radical one, often mentioned in the same breath as the influence from Iran (Islamic Watch Feb./March 1993:6).

5.6.3 Pan-Islamic Influence among Tanzanian Muslims?

As shown above, I view the international Islamic influence as an important reason behind the change in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania. What is left is the question whether we can talk about a massive pan-Islamic influence as a united effort from the Muslim countries. If this is the case then the situation for the Christians in Tanzania could be very alarming. A massive pressure, ideologically and economically, from a united Muslim world could easily lead to a clear Muslim dominance in the region. If one considers the intention of the Islamic organizations, and the united voice behind the criticism of the West (which indirectly is often a criticism of the Christians) one might think that this is the case. The intention behind OIC was to create a Muslim political body that could pursue Islamic interests and unite the Muslim countries. The idea was also to have a body that could solve internal problems among Muslim states. Has the organization succeeded?

The Muslim periodical Impact International in its January issue used three pages reporting from the seventh Islamic Summit in Morocco. The reporter, M. H. Faruqi, is merciless in his verdict on the present state of OIC. He asserts that the 13.500 word communique which the summit delivered hardly contained any important resolutions at all, and was barely referred to even in the media in Muslim countries. Impact International claims that the sessions chiefly contained internal quarrels where few discussions dealt with the issues and problems that the Muslim world really is facing. The most clear example of OIC's reduced ability to reach unity was the Palestine issue. This issue, earlier so important to the organization, was reduced at the meeting in Morocco from "liberating the city of Al-Quds" to simply "the question of Palestine." The Muslim periodical claims that the once leading nations in OIC were passive:

The prince of the previous conferences, Prince Saud al-Faisal, looked lost and unsure. The country which had, under his father late King Faisal Shaheed, played a

brave role in helping to bring together the assortments of Muslim regimes under one Islamic umbrella, has gradually resigned its Islamic role...The Iranians looked isolated and somewhat demoralized. They seemed more interested in their national rather than broad Islamic interest. (Impact International January 1995:18)

Another issue that shows the divisions in the Muslim world is the fear among national leaders of the militant Islamists. The Impact reporter somewhat ironically stated that “*the Islamic kings and presidents in Casablanca seemed more worried about “the Islamic threat to civilisation” than even Henry Kissinger or Chaim Herzog.*” (Impact International Jan. 1995:19) This issue was not even on the agenda of the summit, but King Hasan of Morocco introduced it in his opening speech and was later joined by Mubarak of Egypt, Sifi from Algeria, Syria’s Vice-President and King Husein from Jordan. The Impact journalist suggested that those who were most concerned about the Islamic threat were those who were already at war with such elements in their own country, and probably wanted to conceal their misdeeds and corruption.

The deep-rooted problems in the Muslim world were best expressed when the question of the location of the next summit was discussed. The summit is scheduled to take place in Iran, but as the Impact journalist reported:

But such is the petty state of inter-OIC relations that a summit conference in Iran is seen by some other member-states as something quite important to be fought against. The majority of the Arab states are, on the other hand, united only in their subservience to Western powers, but divided bitterly amongst themselves: Kuwait and Iraq, Iraq and Iran, Iran and the UAE, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Qatar and Bahrain, PLO and Jordan, Jordan and Syria, Egypt and Sudan, Libya and Algeria, Algeria and Morocco, Morocco and Mauretania et cetera. The differences are small, but their egos are over-large. (International Impact Jan. 1995:18)

The Toronto based pro-Iranian Muslim newspaper, Crescent, is even more harsh in its criticism of the present OIC. The newspaper claims that OIC summits have been used as a cover for the “*...Muslim rulers collective display of impotence and surrender.*” (Crescent no. 18, 1994). It even goes as far as claiming that the Saudi-financed OIC finally has revealed its real purpose: to fight Islam. Crescent’s main criticism of the leading Muslim states is due to their suppression of

the Islamic movements in their own countries. The claims from the newspaper are that the regimes in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia are in the pockets of their masters in Washington and Tel Aviv. Things can get as sarcastic as this when different Muslim factions comment one another:

If the Arab regimes had their way they would offer OIC membership to Israel as well, no doubt arguing that Jews are, after all, "religious cousins" of the Muslims.
(Crescent no. 18, 1994)

This harsh criticism of the leaders of the leading Arab nations is shared by Sheikh Rizvi and The Light, representing the Bilal Muslim Mission in Tanzania. Rizvi claims that no other nation than Iran has chosen an independent path, which it did on breaking relations with Israel and the West. Saudi Arabia has, according to Rizvi, lost all credibility in the Muslims' eyes because of its cooperation with the USA. As mentioned in chapter three, Rizvi claims that neither of the leading Muslim nations are really interested in uniting the Muslims. From Sheikh Rizvi's writings it is clear that the hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the major conflict in the Muslim world. This conflict again creates coalitions where for instance Sudan has been helped by Iran, and following that, help from Saudi Arabia to Sudan has been stopped (The Light Feb. 1992:60). Saudi Arabia seems to have friendly relations with Egypt, Algeria and Jordan at government level, but all these countries fight Islamist movements in their own countries. Iraq seems to have appeared as an outsider among the Muslim states with a leader that seeks respect in the rest of the Muslim countries by opposing the West. This makes the picture of the Muslim world one full of intrigues, not so very much unlike the picture of the Cold War that, until recently, was fought between the West and Eastern Europe.

The conclusion of this short investigation into the ongoing discussion among the Muslim factions is that OIC and other organizations promoting the unity of the Muslim states have so far failed. The deep conflicts between the different Arab nations and the different Muslim groups have obstructed the Muslims in their efforts to promote the universal *ummah* which is pictured in the Koran. The Islamic revival has led to a new vitality among Muslims and it has increased the belief in Islam as a political force, but it has so far not been able to promote peace and unity among the Muslims themselves, rather the contrary.

This does not, however, mean that the influence from other Muslim countries will cease to exist in countries like Tanzania and Kenya. But it shows that there is no united Islamic influence

that reaches these countries. Thoughts from the global Islamic revival about Islam as a universal belief, and about Islam as a political factor have reached Tanzania and affected the Muslim communities. But the cooperation between the groups in Tanzania and the foreign countries have created domestic problems in Tanzania. BALUKTA was supported by Iran, but faced massive resistance from BAKWATA which has contacts with more moderate Muslim countries. Every Muslim nation is trying to put forward its own interests, promoting its own view upon Islam. The different countries will try to secure their own interests and are of course interested in connections with the political leaders in Tanzania. This is where Omari's criticism of lack of ethical guidelines in the government becomes important. This is also what the Christians in Tanzania fear, that their politicians, as representatives of Tanzania, will promote Muslim interests, a danger which is present with Islam's lack of separation between religion and politics. The OIC-crisis revolved around exactly this crucial issue: who shall influence our political leaders?

5.7 Summary

Through a presentation of the general background and the leading intellectuals of the global Muslim resurgence, I have tried to show that the ideas behind the revival were a focus on a more pure Islam as seen in the examples of the first Muslims. It also contained an increased focus on pan-Islamic thoughts. This worldwide Muslim revival has resulted in the formation of several international organizations. Among them is OIC, a body which has the intention of representing the whole Muslim world. OIC has a clear religious foundation and this was the Tanzanian Christians' primary concern when Zanzibar joined the OIC. I have further shown that the international Muslim organizations together with the leading Muslim countries have carried out considerable influence on large parts of the Muslim community in Tanzania. The radical Muslim influence of countries like Iran and Sudan have affected small radical groups like BALUKTA, which in turn has disturbed the previously peaceful religious relationship. My theory is however that the strong focus on pan-Islamic thoughts that the international Muslim organizations represent, is facing serious obstructions because of the conflicts existing between the leading countries in the Muslim world. This has also affected Tanzania. Even if the Muslims in Tanzania have become more aware of the universal *ummah* they as Muslims belong to, the influence from foreign Islamic countries reflects the existing conflicts and obstructs a united pan-Islamic influence.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Summary

In the introduction I launched four questions in order to explain the changes that have taken place in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania the last decade. The first question sought a presentation of the events that have disturbed the peaceful religious coexistence. The second question asked for a presentation of the changes within the Muslim and the Christian communities. The third question was directed at the domestic political changes in Tanzania and the fourth question was concerned with the foreign Muslim influence on Tanzania.

Chapter two answered the first question by giving a presentation of the increased religious tension that Tanzania has experienced. The recent Muslim activity, which started with preachings in the streets, carrying derogatory statements about the Christians, introduced the visible part of the religious conflict. Even if the political leaders already at this stage warned Tanzanians about the consequences of religious conflicts, it was too late to stop the development. Radical Christian groups responded with an eye for an eye, attacking the Muslims with false accusations, and this fostered even more antagonism. Christian leaders were concerned to see how several Muslim ministers were adopted to high posts, but chose to keep a low profile. The tension erupted on Zanzibar where the mixture of increased religious freedom and the struggle for political independence led to riots. Also the mainland faced upheavals when BALUKTA attacked the pork butcheries in Dar es Salaam and put the whole country on security alert.

The political implications of the increased Muslim focus on their religious identity became evident through the OIC-crisis and the discussion concerning Tanzania's membership to IAO. The development within BAKWATA with an increased focus on genuine Islamic ideas indicates that Tanzanian Muslims recently have become more aware of their belonging to a universal system of belief. The destruction of church properties also shows that radical Muslim elements, with the aims to establish Islam as the leading religious and political authority, have gained a foothold in Tanzania. The same tendencies as observed among the Muslims in Tanzania are also present among the Muslims in Kenya. There, IPK played the role that BALUKTA had in Tanzania, causing upheavals in Mombasa and being denied registration from the government.

The second question aimed at explaining the changes that have taken place within both the Muslim and the Christian communities. Among the Muslims several new organizations have appeared in addition to BAKWATA, which is the official Muslim organization in Tanzania. Most of these new organizations have been started by radical groups which have criticized BAKWATA for being more Tanzanian than Muslim. This criticism indicates that their aim is to focus on the more universal values represented by Islam. The organizations also express discontent with the present situation in Tanzania where they claim that the Christians hold the leading positions in the country and have a much easier access to higher education. This new activity seeks to restore the strength of the Muslim society by focusing on both secular and religious education. They claim that through a more devoted focus on Islam, the Muslim community will restore its pride and again play a leading part in the development of the country. These Muslim spokesmen look back in history for ideals from the independence movement (where they claim that Muslims were leading) and from theological ideas imported from other Muslim countries. The Muslim intellectual tradition in the area, represented by Sheik al-Mazrui and Sheikh Rizvi, showed that influence from the leading Muslim theologians in Egypt and Iran has been, and is, present among Tanzanian Muslims. The parallels on the coast of Kenya again shows that these trends of focusing on more pure Islamic values have not been restricted to take place only in Tanzania, but is present among Muslim groups throughout East Africa.

The Christian community has also experienced some changes the last decade. The Pentecostal movement has experienced a considerable growth, and thoughts from the movement have also influenced the established churches. This has led to an increased focus on evangelism, visible through the ongoing crusades where a considerable weight is put on charismatic gifts. This is an example of how the Christians have focused more on pure Christian values. The increased Christian activity has in its turn affected the relationship with the Muslims. But to call the majority of the Pentecostal movement and the charismatic elements in the established churches “Christian fundamentalists” is in my opinion an exaggeration. The Fundamentalist label can however be applied to the radical elements belonging to the Democratic Party with Rev. Mtkila as its leader. Through his derogatory and racist statements about the Muslim and the Arab and Indian population in Tanzania, he is threatening a peaceful religious relationship.

Regarding the third question, which domestic political changes have affected the religious situation, several aspects were introduced. Omari introduced the suggestion that it is the political leaders, through their lack of ethical considerations, who have been the cause of the emerging problems in Tanzania. He claimed that political leaders were chosen because of their religion and

not because of their political skills. As a result the Christians blame Islam, the religion of the politicians, for what has happened. Omari argued that the right thing to do would have been to blame the politicians for their acts and not their religion. This is a point which most commentators find interesting. The present leadership in Tanzania has turned out to be weak, both in acting against religious extremists and in choosing an independent political path - which is the tradition of the country. The simplicity of Omari's conclusion was however questioned, arguing that he did not consider religion as a force in itself with the ability to influence people regardless of political leadership. It was also asserted that Omari to some extent frees the religious communities from the responsibilities of actions done in the name of religion by his argumentation.

David Westerlund's theory about compartmentalized religion showed us the *ujamaa* government's ability to make the two religious communities focus on national unity. The task to build the nation became, according to Westerlund, more important than to pursue specific religious interests. This created a focus on elements in the religions that corresponded with the *ujamaa* philosophy, and hence religious conflicts were avoided. Frieder Ludwig claims that this shows that the religious conflicts were not done away with during the *ujamaa* years, but merely allayed. The fall of the philosophy of *ujamaa* reintroduced according to Ludwig the tension that had existed prior to, and partly throughout, the *ujamaa* years. I partly agreed with Ludwig in this, relating his thoughts to the new Muslim intellectuals' rediscovery of their Muslim roots, found among the universal ideas of EAMWS. But the new radical strength in the Muslim revival and the presence of foreign Islamic theologians and international organizations in Tanzania, was reckoned as elements that made Ludwig's theory need supplements. The claim that the religious conflicts also existed during Nyerere's reign was questioned because the overwhelming majority of Muslims and Christians actually supported the politics of the government.

Kjersti Larsen focused on the effect that the political changes have had on people's attitude towards religion. The new political climate has made it possible for people to freely express their religion in public. A result of this has been an increased influence of religion in political matters. The Muslims are again allowed to interpret their view of the world according to an Islamic worldview. This has also made the more radical Muslim groups view Islam as the political solution to social problems. A change of paradigm has according to Larsen appeared. Earlier these conflicts were explained in terms of political ideologies like Marxism, but now they are explained in terms of religion. Kjersti Larsen claims that social problems are the reason behind the Islamist tendencies in the area, and hence a domestic problem. This argument was questioned by asserting that the solution to the problem in its present form, a radical Islam, is

imported from other Muslim countries. Central to Kjersti Larsen is also that religion now is more important in people's perception of their own identity. This makes conflicts expressed in a religious language very dangerous. Politicians explaining conflicts in a religious language is by Kjersti Larsen seen as the biggest threat to Tanzania's stability. She connected what has happened in Tanzania with what has happened in the rest of the world, but she was reluctant to admit that this was due to direct influence of Islamic ideas from other Muslim countries. My claim was that the increased focus on an orthodox Islam through literature sponsored by foreign Islamic countries, shows the direct influence from other Muslim countries.

The fourth and last question dealt with foreign Muslim influence on the religious situation in Tanzania. First a presentation of the global Islamic revival was given. This was done in order to understand the nature and the roots of the Islamic resurgence. Secondly a presentation of the leading intellectuals of the resurgence followed. The presentation of the international Muslim organizations active in Tanzania was introduced by a presentation of the nature of the Organization of Islamic Conference. This was done in order to show the religious foundation of the organization. I argued that this explained why the Christians in Tanzania were so upset by Zanzibar joining OIC. It was further shown that several Muslim international organizations have established ties to Muslim groups in Tanzania. The leading Islamic countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Sudan have also intensified their contact with religious groups in Tanzania the last decade. These contacts indicate the connection between the ideas of the leading intellectuals of the Islamic resurgence like al-Afghani, Qutb and Khomeini and the radical Muslim elements in Tanzania. It was also shown that these countries make economic contributions to the Muslim groups in Tanzania by sponsoring schools, mosques, scholarships and teachers. Iran has even been accused from several sources of sponsoring BALUKTA with weapons.

The last chapter also revealed that the intention behind the Muslim international organizations, to focus on a strong pan-Islamic unity, has not been an undivided success. Thoughts about Islam as an universal belief which connects the Muslims in Tanzania to the rest of the Muslim world, has gained a foothold. But large differences between the countries influencing the Muslims in Tanzania have had the result that each country only influence certain groups, and this way the conflicts between the countries are spread to the different Muslim groups in Tanzania. It seems like each country is trying to pursue their view of Islam and secure their political contacts with Tanzania.

Concluding Remarks

It remains to be seen whether the recent religious and political revival in many parts of the Muslim world can attract the Muslims in Tanzania to integrate themselves more deeply with the universal umma, the brotherhood of all Muslim believers. If the Islamic idea of a socio-political universalism based on religion becomes stronger, it can lead to important religious and political changes in Africa. (Westerlund 1980:46)

These reflections were made by David Westerlund in 1980 in his eminent work about the religious situation in Tanzania during the *ujamaa* years. I will conclude by saying that his prophecy to some extent has come true. The religious relations in Tanzania have suffered from changes both in the Christian and in the Muslim community. These changes have led to serious conflicts and my impression is that the radicalization in certain parts of the Muslim community is the most important reason for this. The political changes that have occurred in Tanzania the last decade with its affect on people's re-evaluation of their religious identity, have prepared the ground for international Islamic influence to gain a foothold. It is in other words the interaction between domestic and international events that has created the new situation. The weak leadership in Tanzania has been unable to prevent violent actions from taking place. But probably no leadership could have stopped the interest among Tanzanian Muslims for the new focus on Islam as a political force. The thoughts about the universal *ummah* have also affected the moderate Muslims. As a part of what is happening in the rest of the world, Tanzanian Muslims are looking for ways to restore their lost pride and dignity, and the solution for many of them is to return to a more pure form of Islam. The fact that the Muslim community in Kenya experiences the same development of focusing on ideas from the worldwide Islamic revival, is an indication that these ideas are present due to influence from other Islamic countries. This influence is, however, not a united pan-Islamic influence, but reflects the conflicts in the Muslim world. The fall of the *ujamaa* philosophy carried with it a search for new values as the task "to build the nation" no longer was dominant. The free market ideology led to a shift of focus from the society as a whole towards the individual values of smaller groups. This appeared at a time when religious revival swept the world, a revival which especially affected the Muslims. The result was an increased focus on the ideas only shared by the Muslim community. The evaluation of their situation as a religious community led to a focus on the lost opportunities they had

suffered from in their own country. Supported by the universal rise of Muslim voices, the Muslims in Tanzania now seek to improve their situation, and one of the obstacles to reach their aims is of course the demands from the Christian community.

In the Christian community the change has been noted by an increased interest in spiritual matters. A more devoted Christianity focusing on charismatic gifts has experienced progress through the Pentecostal movement. This has also affected the established churches - especially the Lutheran church. Spreading the Gospel, also to the Muslims, has become an important element in the new Christian vitality. This evangelization has not taken place without reactions, as radical Christians have provoked Muslims by showing lack of respect for Islam. The question of how to share the Good News with other people has always been, and will always be a matter of discussion within the churches. Peaceful religious coexistence is an ideal to the church in Tanzania. But it is a question whether peace is more important than sharing the Gospel. Both peace and mission should be possible to promote for the Christians in Tanzania. Still, this question contains elements of tension. What if all mission towards the Muslims is experienced as a provocation? This is a relevant tension, and in the middle of this, the church will always have its work.

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⁶⁹The interviews are available on cassettes in the Sundnes Drønen library (see page 131).